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This thesis analyses the developments made between 1660 and 1688 that contributed 
towards the Royal Navy becoming a more professionalised organisation. It outlines the 
impact of individuals and their methods towards achieving professionalisation. The 
political and financial problems facing the navy before the restoration of the monarchy 
are also addressed. Biographical case studies of three influential naval reformers; James 
Stewart, The Duke of York; William Coventry; and Samuel Pepys are used to demonstrate 
the significant influence that they had on the process of professionalization. 
This thesis ascertains that although the terminology had not been invented at this stage, 
the principles of Management Control were implemented by Pepys, Coventry and the 
Duke of York as a method of organizational professionalisation, identifying examples of 
performance measurement, rewards systems and the implantation of standard operating 
procedures.  
An in-depth analysis of the Duke of York’s instructions for the duties of the Principal 
Officers demonstrates that the Duke of York introduced enhanced accounting procedures 
and additional control mechanisms to reduce abuses and increase administrative 
efficiency. 
Additionally, a set of professional responsibilities has been created within this thesis for 
Coventry, whose role as secretary is absent from the instructions. This shows for the first 
time, that Coventry identified his professional remit as focusing primarily on 
retrenchment and the reduction of abuses. This contributed towards wider 
professionalisation.  
iii 
This thesis has also analysed the historiographical debates surrounding the characters of 
the Duke of York and William Coventry. Because both individuals had controversial 
private lives, the literature is frequently biased, therefore a fair assessment is reached in 
this thesis through a survey of the primary evidence and secondary literature. Finally, 
Samuel Pepys can also be seen to contribute towards the restoration administration’s aim 
to reduce abuses and implement accounting procedures to increase professionalisation. 
In order to ascertain how professionalised the navy was by the end of 1688; a review of 
the current theoretical understanding of the definition of ‘professionalisation’ was 
undertaken. A new conceptual framework for the definition of professionalisation with a 
set of criteria was developed that is applied to the 3 case studies.  
Finally, this thesis has established that the period of the late seventeenth century could 
be the first time that England is accurately described as being a ‘fiscal-military state’ 
because it has become a powerful military capable state, supported by efficient 
administrative procedures and the ability to secure the revenue required to enable it to 
engage in war. Previous studies by Brewer (1989) and Rodger (2011) have given the 18th 
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Chapter One- Introduction 
 
A fleet, no matter how ferocious and feared, will only ever be as effective as the men and 
provisions it had access to. The importance of competent administration in the success of 
the Royal Navy has been observed by several notable researchers in this field, Dr N.A.M 
Rodger describes this phenomenon in the following way;  
“It was the capacity of naval administration ashore, above all the Victualling Board, 
which transformed the operational capabilities of British fleets at sea” (Rodger, 2006, 
p.583). 
J.D Davies also addresses the seriousness of ensuring an adequate supply of man-power 
for the effective operation of the navy; 
“In many respects, the manning of the navy was one of the most difficult administrative 
tasks which a seventeenth century government could undertake: as Sir William 
Coventry once noted, ‘the greatest difficulty & vexation in a warre is the manning of 
ships”’ (Davies, 1991, p. 67). 
As military success was linked with the country’s ability to outspend her enemies, it is 
essential to analyse the spending power of England and the Royal Navy. This introduction 
will briefly describe the focus of British civil expenditure in the late seventeenth century, 
to demonstrate the rationale for the research aims of this PhD thesis, which will follow 
after this introduction. 
 The reasons for England’s preeminent maritime prowess during the seventeenth century 
are evident when comparing England’s level of spending and access to manpower with 
 
2 
England’s European counterparts. Relative to national income, England was spending 
double that of France, and had thrice the ‘military participation ratio’ (Rodger, 2011, p. 
122)1. Davies observes that for the period circa 1665 the navy constituted, without 
competition, the ‘largest spending department of the state’. Expenditure varied between 
one third and one half of the annual budget depending on the political climate (Davies, 
2017, p.13).  
 
Figure 1- A table demonstrating military expenditure in relation to the expenditure of other civil 
departments, establishing the continuously higher spending on military expenditures in relation to other civil 
expenditures (O’Brien, 1988, p.2). 
Further to this, England’s military spending was unique in comparison to that of other 
European states, due to the high ratio of military spending that was allocated to the navy. 
For example, in 1688, England spent thirty percent of their total military budget on the 
Royal Navy. Comparatively, France spent thirteen to twenty-five percent, Russia spent 
fifteen percent and Spain seven to nine percent on their respective navies (Harding, 2002, 
p. 206). David Armitage describes England as an empire of commerce instead of 
 
1 The number of participating adult males in military occupations.  
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conquest, “defended by its navy rather than being propagated by an army”, this explains 
England’s unprecedented naval spending (Armitage, 2004, p. 271).  
Rodger also considers the phenomenon of this unique unparalleled naval expenditure 
whilst discussing fiscal-naval states. The continued spending during peacetime could be 
attributed to a ‘military-industrial’ complex2, which allowed for invested finances on 
‘advanced technology’ (Rodger, 2011, p. 122). 
Increased peacetime spending carried both advantages and disadvantages. Additional 
expenditure led to the proliferation of a ‘military industrial complex’ that enabled 
finances to be invested in to the development of ‘advanced technology’ that was 
advantageous to the progress of the navy, as well as local industry and business (Rodger, 
2011, p.122).  
However, maintaining a peacetime navy was disproportionately expensive. The nature of 
international conflict ensured that a substantial proportion of the victuals required by the 
military could be obtained en route with local resources. This inevitably reduced the costs 
for the government to operate an effective wartime military. In contrast, in peacetime, all 
victuals had to be supplied domestically from England at a greater cost.  
Wheeler assesses the importance of the navy and its financial procedures, asserting that 
‘modernisation’ was practised throughout both the Dutch and French wars, due to the 
mounting financial burden that resulted from the increasing need for arms and personnel 
during this period (Wheeler, 1996, p.457). Wheeler suggests that this coincides with a 
‘financial revolution’ that was simultaneously occurring within England’s state finances. 
 
2 Rodger describes the ‘military-industrial’ complex as being focused on accumulating capital (assets) rather 
than current usage. 
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He disputes the common assertion that the creation of the Bank of England, at the end of 
the seventeenth century, was the pivotal point within this financial revolution3. Instead, 
Wheeler prefers the alternative suggestion that earlier within the seventeenth century, 
the Interregnum governments “devised, improved and successfully used methods of 
short-term debt that was implemented again by the succeeding Restoration governments 
later” (Wheeler, 1996, p. 458).  
Wheeler notes the direct link between effective financial procedures and English naval 
successes, citing that victory in the First Dutch War reflected England’s capacity to raise 
the necessary finances to adequately supply the fleet. England’s defeat at the battle of 
Dungeness and the mutiny in 1648, both coincided with the failure to arm, victual and 
man the fleet appropriately (Wheeler, 1996, p. 458). With this appreciation for the 
importance of navy finance and administration this research will focus upon the 
administrative structures, abuses, failures and reforms within the Royal Navy.  
Prior to 1660, the navy suffered from periods of inadequate and unprofessional 
organisation, which exhibited a significant impact on the navy’s financial and administrative 
capacity. From 1660 onwards, a number of reforms and protocols were introduced in order 
to improve the financial and administrative organisation of the navy. These were in 
response to internal and external pressures, such that the navy would be better able to 
meet the challenges of the time, including the internal political climate of the country and 
international conflict. This thesis will detail the numerous factors that influenced the 
financial and administrative condition of the navy prior to 1660 and the methods that were 
 
3 Wheeler argues that this time period in England should be labelled a ‘financial Revolution’. He asserts that 
this is because the rapid expansion of the military forces required a “steady stream of manpower, logistics 
and equipment that only a government able to raise unprecedented sums of money for years on end could 
provide”. He then asserts that no state did this as successfully as England. (Wheeler, 1996, p.457) 
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introduced to implement change. Particular focus will be given to the impact of under-
investment upon the navy during this time-period. This contributed heavily to the declining 
credit and increasing debt of the navy, which exhibited a significant impact on employment 
both within the military and dependent dockyard industries.  
These reforms that were implemented post 1660 include examples of the implementation 
of standard operating procedures, performance measurement and the introduction of 
rewards systems. All three of which, although contemporaries did not use this terminology, 
we now identify as Management Control. This introduction of management control aided 
the Royal Navy in moving towards becoming a more professional organisation.  Therefore, 
although these are 20th century concepts, 1660-1688 provides an insight into how the logic 





1.1 Research aim and objectives 
 
The aim of the research conducted here is to establish the extent to which attempts 
made by three senior individuals to instigate management controls were responsible for 
the organisational professionalisation of the Royal Navy in the late 17th century.  
The following research objectives would facilitate the achievement of this aim: 
• Investigate the concepts of professionalism and management control through the 
literature. 
• Establish the situation prior to 1660, using both modern literature as well as  
Holland and Slyngsbie’s discourses of the Navy (Holland, 1896 & Slyngsbie, 1896) 
• Identify three key actors and using primary sources (including the various 
iterations of the Duke of York’s instructions, the Coventry Papers, Navy Board 
letters and Pepys’ diaries and letters) create biographical case studies of each, 
focusing on the reforms that they put in place and how these established 
standardised operating procedures, managerialism, control mechanisms and 
rewards systems. 
• Analyse these findings to establish the extent to which the management controls 
put in place are significant in the organisational professionalisation of the Royal 
Navy in the later 17th century. 
Extensive primary source evidence has been transcribed and analysed as part of the data 
collection for this research. In order to be able to analyse it, a thematic approach was 
taken. Each reform was categorised under the following headings; reduction of abuses, 
accounting procedures, improved efficiency and ‘state of the navy’. This was simply to 
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create a schematic in which the perceived motivation for each reform was addressed, in 
order to be able to identify trends and patterns within the data. This is explored in depth 
within chapter two; methodology.  
It will be argued that the reforms instigated by these 3 key actors lead to organisational 
professionalisation of the Royal Navy in the late seventeenth century through their use of 
management control. This research will argue, through the findings of each case study, 
how even though they were facing severe financial problems, through the implantation of 
financial procedures and the reduction of abuses they managed to start professionalising 








1.2 Original contributions explained  
 
An original contribution that this thesis has undertaken, is the research, design and 
application of a new theoretical framework for the definition of professionalisation. There 
are numerous examples of academics attempting to understand when and how a certain 
organization or time period became professionalised (Abbott, 1988; Hall, 1968; Elias, 
1950). However, accounting historians have not attempted to assess when organizations 
implemented performance measurement or management control. This field is nearly non-
existent, the few examples can be seen within chapter three, however there is no 
attempt by any accounting or naval historians to understanding this at all within the 
seventeenth century navy.  Naturally, the terminologies of professionalisation, 
performance management, management control and organizational professionalism are 
modern and as such were not used in the seventeenth century. However, this thesis will 
constitute the first scholarship that identifies through archival evidence, examples of how 
Coventry, Pepys and the Duke of York implemented practices that can be described as 
performance measurement and how this enabled the seventeenth century Royal Navy to 
become more professionalised.  
This is important because it means that we now know that the concept of management 
control is now new, only the terminology is from the 20th century.  This will potentially 
widen the scope of management control literature, because can now see modern 
concepts differently, and it will enable future researchers to build upon this and see 
which other organisations this is evident in and if these concepts can be placed in any 
other time periods. 
 
9 
The current scholarly literature is somewhat limited in nature with regard to many 
elements of the Royal Navy between 1660-1688.  Samuel Pepys has, of course, been 
more widely discussed. However, discourse relating to The Duke of York tends to focus 
primarily on his personal life and religion, whilst his career as Lord High Admiral and its 
associated achievements are largely overlooked. William Coventry is almost entirely 
absent from history books. The research conducted here has therefore been successful in 
widening the scope of knowledge of naval administration in the late seventeenth century. 
One way in which this has been achieved is increasing the understanding of the 
implementation of naval protocols, as well as highlighting the financially focused job 
profiles of the principal officers under the Duke of York’s administration. To attain this, 
the most in-depth analysis to date has been undertaken of the Duke of York’s instructions 
for the regulation of the navy. This analysis compared each subsequent version of the 
instruction’s supplementary directives, as well as ascertaining how much was original in 
the Duke of York’s version, and how much was present in a previous edition published by 
the Earl of Northumberland. This data establishes for the first time, the focus given to the 
introduction of accounting procedures in the navy, for the purpose of the reduction of 
abuses and increasing efficiency. 
Additionally, this research represents the first comprehensive delineation of the role and 
job profile of William Coventry, this in turn establishes Coventry’s contribution towards 
professionalisation that is exhibited during this period. The enquiry into the extant 
primary evidence relating to William Coventry, has identified that his professional 
responsibilities centre on retrenchment and the reduction of abuses. 
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This research has garnered similar results whilst investigating the primary evidence 
pertaining to Samuel Pepys. These indicate that a clear emphasis of his career was the 
implementation of accounting procedures and the reduction of abuses within the navy, 
through the introduction and supervision of thorough administrative practises. 
Through cross examination of knowledge outlined in each of these case studies, we 
observe for the first time, a clear wider picture of the primary aims and objectives of the 
restoration administration as a whole. Intense scrutiny of the case studies has revealed 
that even though each of the individuals chosen for the case studies have disparate job 
roles and differing levels of seniority we can see similar themes arising. There is a clear 
demonstration that the implementation of robust accounting reforms for the reduction of 
the abuses and to combat inefficiencies were a priority of the restoration administration, 
not just of one individual.  
Davies addresses the lack of literature and attention given to the navy during the 
restoration period (Davies, 2017, p.264). Davies references an anonymous academic, 
whilst describing his experience of conducting academic research, he explains that when 
reading “one weighty, academic, and highly acclaimed modern study of the restoration 
era” he noted that the author had written huge volumes of text without referencing the 
navy in any way. He laments the index of said books which “would be laughable, were it 
not so depressing: ‘armed forces: see army, militia’” (Davies, 2017, p. 264). 
Davies then comically compares references to the restoration navy as being comparable 
to the Loch Ness Monster. Although an amusing anecdote, this attitude clearly 
demonstrates the motive, and indeed the necessity, for undertaking this research. As the 
navy as a whole, during the restoration era is given so little scholarly attention, it is little 
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wonder that a lower profiled individual such as William Coventry was all but forgotten 
before this thesis.  
 
1.3 Why is this research important?  
 
Prior to this research, Sam Mclean in his Doctoral thesis is the only academic to discuss 
professionalisation in the seventeenth century navy (Mclean, 2017).  He does not 
construct an independent framework and instead bases his definition on the literature of 
George Ritzer, Trim and Michael Lewis, to underpin his research on the navy between 
1660 and 1749.  
The value of this thesis however, is that not only has it constructed an independent 
framework for professionalisation, it has taken the concepts further than any previous 
research had. We already knew previously that a level of professionalisation had taken 
place during and around this time period, as mentioned additionally by Coats (2000). 
However, we did not know that these 3 individuals (Pepys, Coventry and the Duke of 
York) implemented systems in order to achieve professionalisation. The understanding 
that what was being put in place between 1660 and 1688 was management control 
demonstrates that a system was put in place that shows a plan, the individuals were not 
simply implementing accounting procedures in an ad hoc fashion. This goes against the 
current view of the late seventeenth century navy. Therefore, it has been demonstrated 
that these individuals were introducing systems, of which Mclean, Coats or any other 
historian have not identified, which shows a next level interpretation of design and 
planning for professionalisation. 
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Additionally, only Lee (1970), Brown (2012) and Mclean (2009) have looked at the 
concept of management control outside of the 19th and 20th centuries. This field of 
academia is relatively new and under researched. Modern Scholars, including Neely et al 
(2005), Langsfield-Smith (1997) and Ferreira & Otley (2006) explore management control 
in an entirely modern context, which the theories not going beyond the 19th century. 
However, the value of this thesis, is that it joins Lee, Brown and Mclean in showing that 
Management Control can be recognised much earlier than it is given credit. Furthering 
this, this thesis is the only research to credit the Royal Navy between 1660-1688 as 
implanting these complex systems in order to professionalise.  
1.4 Earlier establishment of the Fiscal-Military state 
 
In 2011, Rodger agreed with John Brewer by stating that in the 18th century England could 
be described as a ‘fiscal military state’. He defines this as “a state dedicated to making 
war and equipped to do so by the efficiency of its administration, and especially its 
revenue-raising machinery” (Rodger, 2011, p. 121). He states that Britain’s changing 
financial status did not arise despite the financial weakness of the crown, instead it was 
propelled by it. The crown’s weakness caused the state to need to borrow on a large scale 
and as such create the mechanisms to do so.  
Although this is undoubtably correct, this thesis has demonstrated that this was 
happening a century earlier than theorised by both Brewer (1989) and Rodger (2011). 
This thesis will demonstrate that individuals such as Coventry, the Duke of York and Pepys 
were all working towards ensuring the navy was economically efficient for it to be an 
effective war making nation. In the Pepys case study in Chapter seven , an analysis will be 
provided showing that Pepys strived to improve the credit and reputation of the navy and 
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its merchants in order to secure future borrowing- a clear example of a ‘fiscal-military 
state’, 100 years earlier than previously conceptualised.  
Brewer describes the need for spending and administrative development as an essential 
element of the fiscal-military state; 
“Victory in battle relied in the first instance upon an adequate supply of men and 
munitions, which, in turn, depended upon sufficient money and proper organization—
what modern military men call ‘logistics’ and sociologists dub ‘infrastructure’” (Brewer, 
1989, p. 13).  
Therefore, we can see from his earlier postulations and the research gathered in this 
thesis that this can be extended to include the Stuart era navy from 1660. They re-
organised the administrative structures of the navy, worked hard to improve the declining 
credit of the navy to be able to borrow ‘sufficient money’ to adequately supply and arm 
the fleet.  Additionally, this is supplemented, by the new tax system established in 1645, 
that was heavily used by the King Charles II and King James II (O’Brien, 1998, pp. 1-2).  
Additionally, Brewer highlights the 18th century as seeing an unprecedent volume of 
record keeping, he states that “the clerks transcribed in the service of government—tax 
accounts, inventories of supplies, financial statutes, tables of revenue and trade, rules 
governing the borrowing of money and the purchase of equipment and supplies” 
(Brewer, 1989, p. 14). However, this thesis demonstrates that a wealth of new record 
keeping was happening in every role within the naval administration, as evidence within 




1.5 Structure of the thesis 
 
A methodology chapter will introduce and explores how the data was collected and the 
methodological approach that was undertaken whilst compiling this thesis. This includes 
assessing the validity of case study and biographical research as well as understanding the 
relevance of interdisciplinary research within the current academic literature.  
The thesis then includes a literature review detailing the current theoretical 
understanding of what is meant by the term professionalisation and management 
control. This thesis has reviewed scholarly definitions of this notion, from which an 
original framework has been generated, which details a set of criteria that constitute a 
consensus definition within the relevant literature.  The criteria is as follows; 
1. The occupation having permanence and full-time employment 
2. A formal pay system and salaries  
3. The requirement of specific knowledge and expertise  
4. The necessity to undertake formal training or have achieved specific qualifications. 
(The literature does not agree on the level or type of qualification, disagreeing on 
whether it should be university level, vocational or apprenticeship) 
5. The understanding of a public perception or ‘status’ relating to an occupation and 
the need to uphold it.  
6. The guiding of behaviour and establishing of standards within each role.  
 
This chapter also includes an in-depth analysis of the terminology of management control 
and performance measurement. Understanding these accounting history terms is 
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essential because archival evidence will demonstrate how this was being implemented in 
the seventeenth century, and in turn how this demonstrates the organization becoming 
professionalised.  
This thesis then continues with a literature review (chapter 4), exploring the concept of 
naval administration before the restoration of the monarchy. This context is required to 
understand the implications of the changes made during the restoration administration. 
Chapter 4, will include a brief general history of naval administration, outlining ownership 
of the fleet as well as structural and administrative changes implemented from the Tudor 
era. 
This is then followed by a review of the period of the facilitation of the navy by the 
Interregnum government, including the adoption of a Navy Commission. As well as a 
detailed analysis of the successes and failures during the protectorate, which is 
considered to be a period of relatively low fiscal investment for the navy. The historical 
context is necessary, because the individuals selected by this research to be biographical 
case studies would have been raised and influenced by the events of the Interregnum.  
Additionally, within the introduction, the Dutch Wars will be examined for their role in 
the progression of administration of the Royal Navy, and then finally this introduction will 
conclude with a history of the Victualling Board.  
The three biographical case studies will then follow; 
The first biographical case study  (Chapter 5) concerns James Stuart, Duke of York. This 
focuses primarily upon the instructions he created and disseminated for the purpose of 
standardizing job profiles and working practises within the Royal Navy. These instructions 
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have not been examined in any previously published work with the degree of scrutiny 
applied in this investigation.  
A thesis published by Anne Coats does assess these instructions with some depth, the 
topic constitutes only a small chapter in a much larger research project entitled ‘the 
economy of the navy and Portsmouth: a discourse between the civilian naval 
administration of Portsmouth Dockyard and the surrounding communities, 1650-1800’ 
(Coats, 2000). This publication features only a broad discussion of some of the larger 
changes made. For example, asserting that a set was published in 1673 due to Charles II4 
having to hold the Duke of York’s office as Lord High Admiral5. Additionally, Coats quotes 
a few specific examples of James’ implementations, for example, James implemented a 
‘more efficient system’ by stating that the Treasurer ‘must be always ready to pay’. 
However, her analysis and conclusions are significantly briefer regarding the Duke of 
York’s instructions because they are not the primary focus of her work.  
Additionally, Bernard Pool also discusses these instructions within his research concerning 
Navy Board contracts throughout the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries (Pool, 1966, p. 
1-5). Pool evaluates with some technical detail, but only in relation to the making of 
contracts. He does not analyse the minutiae of these instructions, e.g. whether they can 
be attributed to the restoration administration or the particulars outside the making of 
contracts.  
 
4 Charles II was the King of England between 1660 and 1685. He was the son of Charles I, who had been 
executed at the end of the English Civil War, and spent the next 14 years in exile in Europe. Fox describes 
Charles II as “an able, fair-minded, and innovative administrator” of which none of his duties as King were 
closer to his heart than the navy. (Fox, 2009, p. 2) 
5 The Duke of York was forced to step down from public office due to his Catholic faith and the introduction 
of the Test Act in 1673. 
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Conversely, the research conducted for this thesis seeks to assess, with technical detail, 
the individual specifications of each job role outlined within the instructions and assess 
the impact of the instructions upon naval operations between 1660 and 1688. The 
clarification within the instructions of the duties of enlisted men and naval officers may 
have served a number of purposes, which have been categorised within this research as a 
means of either improving efficiency, retrenchment, the introduction of accounting 
procedures, bringing about a reduction of abuses (which were pervasive during this time 
period), or as a means of outlining punishments? Furthermore, this research specifically 
highlights which aspects of the instructions demonstrate examples of the introduction of 
management control. Finally, this research examines in detail and evaluates the 
amendments made to historic instructions published by the Earl of Northumberland, 
which were the precursor to the Duke of York’s instructions.  
These instructions were amended and re-disseminated numerous times during this time 
period, which were often bound together with additional documents, often in response 
to the political climate; either domestic or international. This research will assess the 
content of each version and the implications this has to ascertaining the progress and 
professionalisation of naval administration across this period. This is explored in relation 
to the research objective querying what reforms were introduced to improve the financial 
and administrative organisation of the navy and whether this led to the navy becomes 
increasingly professionalised.  
Additionally, this research will cross analyse the information taken from these 
instructions alongside alternative contemporary sources, including; the Coventry Papers, 
letters from Pepys’ private collection, Navy Board in and out letters, diary extracts and 
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court documents6. These sources demonstrate examples of these instructions being 
actively practised. This has enabled the effectiveness of the publication and dissemination 
of these instructions to be ascertained more clearly as well as the impact of these reforms 
in the context of the wider objective of this research; determining how they contributed 
towards professionalising the Royal Navy in the late seventeenth century. 
Chapter 5 will in turn give a brief biography of the military career of the Duke of York as 
well as a historiographical analysis of the academic literature of the Duke of York. The 
contrasting views of David Thomas, J R Tanner, Andrew Lambert and Francis Turner, with 
regard to the Duke of York, have been discussed in detail (Thomas, 1982, Tanner, 1897, 
Lambert, 2008 & Turner 1950). The opinions of these researchers generally fall into two 
mains lines of thought: that James was an able and talented military leader or that he was 
a scandalous royal, who prioritised his extra marital relations above his professional 
duties. 
This intense scrutiny of the Duke of York’s character is necessary because the 
historiographical debate frequently draws attention to his professional conduct and 
diligence. In order to adequately assess the Duke of York’s contributions towards 
professionalisation through his reforms during this period, it is also essential to establish 
how far the Duke of York was personally responsible for implementing these reforms and 
to what extent he delegated to his junior officers. This research will use primary evidence 
to demonstrate his regular attendance at meetings and first-hand accounts of his 
 
6 According to the National Archives, “The Coventry Papers came to Longleat through Henry Frederick 
Thynne, third son of Sir Henry Frederick Thynne, Bart., by Mary, daughter of Lord Keeper Coventry, and 
grandfather of Thomas Thynne, second Viscount Weymouth (1714). H. F. Thynne was Secretary to his uncle 
Henry Coventry, when Secretary of State, and also his co-heir (CVI. f.352); he was moreover executor to his 
uncle Sir William Coventry”. https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/23729c29-65e4-4382-b33c-
55dae413036d, accessed on the 23rd September 2019. 
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involvement in naval administration, to dispel the popular view of the Duke of York’s 
antipathy and ambivalence towards his professional responsibilities in favour of his extra 
marital relations. 
Additionally, this case study analyses James’ specific professional responsibilities as well 
as those of his supporting principal officers. A brief history of the Navy Board will then be 
delivered, in which their responsibilities are detailed and the evolution of their roles, 
giving attention to who and when they were filled by.  
The second case study (Chapter 6) also takes the structure of a biographical narrative, this 
time concerning William Coventry, the secretary to the Duke of York. Even outside of the 
context of his naval career, William Coventry is largely unacknowledged by historians. 
Some notable exceptions give more detailed accounts; Evelyn Cruickshanks, Pool, Carlyle 
and V Vale. However, although these researchers documented more significant accounts 
on Coventry, these are generally broad and focused primarily on the turbulent period 
when Coventry, who at the time, was in conflict with The Earl of Clarendon7, as well 
Coventry’s time imprisoned in the Tower of London. Excepting these few accounts, most 
other historians’ references to him are brief and he is regularly demoted as a footnote, 
described simply as the ‘personal secretary’ to the Duke of York.  
 
7 The Earl of Clarendon and William Coventry had a volatile relationship that stemmed from the Second 
Dutch War. Vale describes this by stating that Coventry witnessed Clarendon’s work and this convinced him 
“of the overriding need for the chancellor’s removals as a preliminary to wide administrative reforms”. 
Coventry then decided to end his employment as a Navy Commissioner and the Duke’s secretary to focus 
on Clarendon (Vale, 1956, p.108). Naturally, this led to enmity between Coventry and Clarendon. Clarendon 
was impeached by the House of Commons in 1667, accused of subverting the laws of England. The House of 
Commons was unable to prove these accusations, but Clarendon still felt compelled to flee to France. 
Clayton Roberts suggests that Coventry secured Clarendon’s dismissal but opposed Clarendon’s 
impeachment (Roberts, 1957, pp. 1-2). 
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 This thesis will constitute the first attempt to define the role of William Coventry within 
the navy and as secretary to the Duke of York. No historic attempt to establish the 
professional responsibilities of Coventry are evident and, further, his role is not outlined 
within the contemporary set of instructions published by the Duke of York. As a 
consequence, his engagement with the navy is largely misunderstood or unrecognised. 
This focus of this chapter of research was a ‘bottom up’ analysis of a variety of primary 
evidence, including memorandums, minutes and diary extracts, obtained from the 
Calendar of State Papers, The Coventry Papers and Samuel Pepys’ diaries. These sources 
will establish that retrenchment and the reduction of abuses were essentially the primary 
focus of Coventry’s naval career. This will enable the ascertaining of how influential 
Coventry was in professionalising the Royal Navy in the late seventeenth century. 
The third case study (chapter 7) is the final biographical narrative; detailing Samuel Pepys’ 
contribution to the professionalisation of the Royal Navy between 1660 and 1688. This 
will focus on his role in raising awareness for the abysmal state of naval finances and as 
an advocate for financial reform. This is achieved through an analysis of his diaries and 
correspondence, to develop an understanding of the depth of the financial issues facing 
the restoration administration. Additionally, focus will be placed upon identifying Pepys’ 
contributions in aiding his colleagues; the Duke of York and William Coventry to rectify 
the crisis. This contextual understanding of the crises and Pepys’ response, again 
responds to the larger research objective of understanding how the navy became more 
professionalised during the restoration.  
This research has identified a number of sources that demonstrate that, similarly to the 
Duke of York and Coventry, Pepys prioritised the reduction of abuses, increased 
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efficiency, retrenchment and the implementation of accounting practises to attempt to 
alleviate the severity of the abysmal financial situation. Pepys implemented sweeping 
reforms across the administration of the navy, including the introduction of a numbered 
system for the issuing of bills for payment. This helped to ensure their prompt payment 
and increased efficiency. Additionally, this research will explore Pepys’ salary sacrifice as a 
means to improve the credit of the navy. This sacrifice will demonstrate his personal 
commitment to the improvement of navy finances (IOHR, Vol 97, 15). 
Finally, the concluding chapter of this thesis draws together the thematic findings from 
each case study and demonstrates how Coventry, Pepys and the Duke of York have 
implemented management control concepts and this has supported the navy in moving 








Having introduced the research aims and objectives in the previous chapter, this chapter 
will move forward to detail the methodology. This will ascertain how this research was 
conducted and why research decisions were selected in order to establish the extent to 
which attempts were made by three senior individuals to instigate management controls 
were responsible for the organisational professionalisation of the Royal Navy in the late 
seventeenth century. 
This chapter will begin by discussing how the data was collected; this addresses the 
archival locations and the processes in which the primary sources were selected for the 
research. Section 2.2 then analyses how a thematic framework was developed in order to 
accurately and efficiently categorise the data, in order for discussion and analysis within 
chapters five to seven. 
Within section 2.3, rationale is established for the use of case study style research. This is 
an essential discussion as it promotes the validity of the overall concept of the research 
aim; which highlights that three senior individuals will be investigated. Subsequently, this 
discussion will develop further by exploring not only the validity of case studies as a 
research method, but specifically addressing why these three men were chosen as the 
case studies. 
As this thesis is interdisciplinary, and making the connections between historic 
accounting, Section 2.5 of this chapter then scrutinises interdisciplinary research. It 
identifies the similarities and differences between the fields of naval academia and 
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accounting academia as well as the strengths and weaknesses of both fields. With the 
notable finding that academics are promoting the future of interdisciplinary research 
within both fields as the suggestion is that the combination of both skill sets makes the 
research stronger.  
Finally, section 2.6 will briefly document the limitations of primary source material within 
archival research. This topic will be explored and developed further in the subsequent 
source analysis in chapters five to seven. 
Overall, this chapter will demonstrate that interdisciplinary biographical case study 
research was the most suitable approach to this topic. 
 
2.2 Data Collection 
 
The compilation of this thesis was achieved through archival data collection and 
qualitative data analysis. The data analysed here was collected from a number of archival 
sources including: The National Archives (Kew); The National Museum of the Royal Navy, 
(Portsmouth); The National Maritime Museum (Greenwich); The Institute of Historical 
Research (Senate House, London); The British Library (London), The Pepysian Library 
(Cambridge) and the Cumbria Archive Centre (Staffordshire) as well as from a number of 
online collections including the Calendar of State Papers and the Burnley Newspaper 
Collection. Additionally, a variety of published source materials have been consulted, 
including the diaries of Samuel Pepys and compilation source books, such as collections 
published by the Navy Records Society8.  
 
8 A comprehensive list is available in the Bibliography.  
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The appropriate sources were identified and reviewed using online databases; primarily 
the ‘Discovery’ database, facilitated by the National Archives. This proved to be more 
sophisticated than other available databases since it enables enquires to be made using 
advanced queries regarding materials collated from multiple country-wide sources, not 
just the collections available at the National Archives. However, not every UK collection is 
listed on Discovery, for example The National Museum of the Royal Navy’s collection is 
only available through private consultation with their archivist. 
Additionally, published secondary literature have aided in data collection, namely N.A.M 
Rodger and Randolph Cock’s ‘A guide to the Naval records in the National Archives of the 
UK’ (Cock and Rodger, 2008) and C.S Knighton’s ‘Some Pepysian Addenda at Magdalene 
College, Cambridge’ (Knighton, 2000). These descriptive pieces, were useful in isolating 
potential sources within the archives.  
However, these publications are not exhaustive, since other collections, such as those 
held by the Caird Library, hold a large amount of material pertinent to this research that 
are not detailed by either Discovery or Rodger or Knighton.  
These sources range from restricted-Personal diaries in private archives, to open personal 
documents such as letters found within public archives as well as restricted official 
sources such as royal papers and open state papers such as Acts of Parliament (Scott, 
1990, pp. 14-17)9.  
Once collected, the methodology for analysing these sources evolved over the process of 
this research.  
 
9 According to the classification of documents based upon the structure by J. Scott. 
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The first stage in the source analysis was to generate a full, typed transcription, as 
typically the contemporary source materials were not readily legible. This palaeographical 
stage enhanced the ease of subsequent analysis. 
Subsequently, the recurrent themes and topics pertinent to this research were identified 
through comprehensive reading of the text and were addressed systematically with 
comments and annotations. Finally, the relevant sections were collated into a dossier and 
subsequently used for the writing of each chapter.  
Later, the digital software package ‘NVIVO’ was incorporated as a more efficient data 
analysis tool. This software enables the source materials to be uploaded in electronic-
format, which were then be compiled in to ‘Nodes’ that are each associated with a 
specific theme of the research. In the case of this research, the nodes are the themes 
used in each case study. Images detailing the use of NVIVO can be found in Appendix 
four. 
The software then enables the researcher to highlight important quotes or excerpts from 
source materials and ‘attach’ them to each relevant node. Both primary and secondary 
source materials can be analysed in this way. A file is then created with each source 
reference to the node/theme across the data. The use of NVIVO assisted this research in 
analysing the data from each chapter for the purpose of understanding trends and 





2.3 The use of case study research 
 
When creating the research design, selecting which primary sources to analyse and who 
or what to be focus the research upon. This research decided to undertake a biographical 
case study approach. 
A biographical approach was taken for this research because, as a social history, it should 
be established what individuals have contributed to the professionalisation of the navy. It 
is not being stated that it is only the contributions of these 3 men that have 
professionalised the navy, it is simply assessing how these men aided the process. 
Burrows published a paper in 2019 discussing his experiences of writing biography in 
accounting. He argues that it constitutes a strong research opportunity, stating that many 
accounting figures “deserve” biographies because it would give an insight into accounting 
more broadly and demonstrates the “evolution of technical functions” (Burrows, 2019, 
p.149). 
Erben states that biography as a research method ensures advanced general and specific 
understanding; “The general purpose is to provide greater insight than hithero into the 
nature and meaning of individual lives or groups of lives. Gives that individual lives are 
part of a cultural network, information gained through biographical research will relate to 
an understanding of the wider society” (Erben, 1999, p.4). 
Banner also queries the validity of biography is an academic historical methodology. He 
states that within academic circles it is occasionally seen as ‘second rate’. He postulates 
that this is because it is often written from a belles-lettres tradition, instead of with 
academic vigour that is achieved through PhD trained scholarship. However, he argues 
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that biography is at is most valuable when it is based upon “archival research, 
interweaves historical categories and methodologies, reflects current political and 
theoretical concerns, and raises complex issues of  truth and proof” (Banner, 2009, p.580) 
As this research is a doctoral thesis that is extensively using archival source material with a 
theoretical underpinning, it has been ensured that biography is a valid methodological 
approach. It could be argued that biographical case study research leads to the over focus 
upon ‘great men’. However, Carnegie and Napier dispute this assertion stating that in 
order to understand the developing of accounting, we need to understand it as a ‘human 
construction’, therefore analysis of the humans involved is of vital importance. 
Additionally, there is a movement within the current literature away from ‘great men’ 
and towards “humble accountants” (Carnegie and Napier, 2010, p.18). Therefore, these 
case studies include the lesser known William Coventry, is pushing forward ‘humble’ 
administrators into the historical narrative. A choice made to ensure that this research is 
conforming to accepted and established modern methodological practices. 
However, Carnegie and Napier also state the following; 
“Accounting history researchers have yet to explore the potential of comparative 
biography, which involves the study of the lives and careers of more than one individual 
on a comparative basis. The comparative biography approach, sometimes referred to 
as biographical case studies, has been employed for studying the lives of politicians, 
particularly dictators such as Hitler and Stalin, and civil servants … Comparative 
biography is undertaken for the purpose of “enhancing the connection between 
individuals and the illumination of the larger patterns of the past” (Carnegie and 
Napier, 2012, p.20).  
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Therefore, this thesis has simultaneously taken a novel and established methodological 
approach by implementing comparative biographical case studies. This approach is 
established within historical enquiry and an emerging technique within accounting 
history. 
The use of case study research is a well-respected and established methodological 
approach undertaken by both military historians and business historians. 
Cobbin and Burrow undertook an overview of methodological approaches within 
accounting history literature. Their research concludes that the most popular 
methodological approach was ‘descriptive narrative’, but this was closely followed by 
case study inquiries (Cobbin and Burrow, 2018, p.493). Langfield-Smith document the 
benefits of case study research in Management control systems, stating that it “offers the 
potential for deeper examination” and it also enables a breadth of controls to be 
simultaneously studied (Langsfield- Smith, 1997, p.221). This is furthered by her assertion 
that across the academic discipline there are calls for wider use of case study research 
and alongside survey research it will continue to “play a role in the future” (Langsfield- 
Smith, 1997, p.228).  
However, it also arguably fits into Carnegie and Napier’s definition of a Prosopographical 
study. They describe this research methodology as involving the wider examination of a 
collective group of people “by means of a collective study of their lives and careers. 
Otherwise known as “collective biography” (Carnegie and Napier, 2012, p.21). The 
purpose of this wider examination is to understand if institutional change is developed 
from a communal outlook. 
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As the research looks at collective case studies within an institution, arguable you could 
categorise the methodological approach as ‘case study’ or prosopographical. However, 
Carnegie and Napier do assert that there is considerable potential for further research 
with this methodology. They give specific potential examples, including; Council and 
Board members. They state the following; 
The scope for prosopography and its rich explanatory potential is under-recognised in 
historical accounting research, possibly because the successful application of the 
method requires the availability of, and affordable access to, considerable archival 
sources in developing an understanding of the mix of considerations that shaped the 
behaviour and value systems of the historical actors under investigation“ (Carnegie and 
Napier, 2012, p.22). 
Therefore, this thesis is responding to understood gaps within the current academia. 
 
2.4 Why these specific men? 
 
The men were selected because this research wanted to address men from differing 
levels of seniority. Additionally, as an administrative topic, this research also wanted to 
see how this was implemented from ‘office level’, instead of the more traditional notion 
of on board a ship. 
At the beginning of this PhD journey, this original research proposal was significantly 
vaguer. The aim of the research was to research naval accounting during and pre-
seventeenth century. Whilst undertaking the preliminary research for this thesis, the case 
studies originally selected were; The Duke of York, William Coventry and Thomas Alderne 
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and Colonel Pride and the syndicate of Victuallers. This third case study was going to 
investigate the victualling organisation that was instituted by the interregnum 
government. These gentlemen were chosen because of their role within the navy 
commission and their use of navy bills. These navy bills were revolutionary because they 
enabled the victualing board to organise their own finances and not be constrained by 
parliamentary grants. Colonel Pride was in control of the ‘syndicate of victuallers’ 
between 1649 and 1651, with Alderne being his longest standing employee working 
under him. 
However, throughout the period of the data collection for the initial Duke of York case 
study, it became increasingly apparent that Samuel Pepys was a key and integral member 
of the naval administration at its progression towards professionalisation. Initially, this 
research was reluctant to chose Pepys as a case study, due to him already being well 
researched. However, as the PhD developed, it became the opinion of the researcher that 
you cannot examine this topic within this time period without analysing the role of Pepys. 
Additionally, he is well researched within the current academia, however, his role in 
professionalising the Royal Navy through the implementation of accounting procedure is 
not. 
Wilson argues that certain naval men have become more the focus of historian’s 
attention throughout the years. In the example of the Georgian navy he states that only 
commissioned officers are given significant attention and warrant officers are all but 
forgotten. He gives the ever-growing example of Lord Nelson ( Davey & Colville, 2019, 
p.29). Although, undoubtably one of naval history’s most exciting individuals, Nelson is 
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already incredibly well recorded and investigated by historians. Instead, Warrant officers 
such as the Purser and Chaplain are forgotten. 
Therefore, it has been ensured that through the investigation of the Duke of York’s 
instructions and Samuel Pepys’s enquires we have given a voice to these formerly silent 
warrant officers. This research has chosen to analyse in-depth what these warrant officers 
were doing that professionalised the navy during the late seventeenth century. However, 
because this was implemented at a higher level (through the Duke of York and the Navy 
Board) it is necessary to view these warrant officers through the scope of the individuals 
that made the change.  
This research could have chosen the methodological approach of assessing change purely 
through the eyes of the pursers , Boatswains and Gunners, however they were following 
the orders of the bureaucratic officials in the Navy Office. Therefore, to be able to 
ascertain how effectively these changes were made and the reasons for the changes it 
was necessary to research It from the level of the individuals that actually created the 




2.5 Naval Accounting- An interdisciplinary study. 
 
 As an interdisciplinary thesis, it is necessary to explore the differences between history 
and accounting academia. Firstly, history theses tend to omit a traditional methodology 
chapter contrasting this, accounting theses generally undertake a more scientific 
approach to their methodology.  
Fischer also argues that historians have traditionally had an aversion to thinking critically 
about exploring their methodology, a point he believes is only accentuated within the 
field of maritime history. He explicitly refers to a lack of quantitative methodology, stating 
that “relatively few maritime historians today are better prepared to mine such massive 
collections [of data and primary source material]” (Fischer, 2011, p.374).  
Johnman and Murphy highlight that the field of Naval History is also lacking a theoretical 
underpinning to their ideas, potentially causing the field to become less respected 
academically than other disciplines (Johnman & Murphy, 2007, p.269). 
Theory is core to the business and economic history discipline. This engaged this thesis to 
underpin the research with a detailed analysis of the definition of professionalisation and 
management control.  
This research has chosen to investigate the specific accountancy implementations during 
the 1660-1688 time period under the development of 3 individuals. This research 
methodology was selected because it is the standard research practise amongst 
accountancy historians. Edwards & Walker detail that “Accounting historians operate in 
an environment where the production of general histories of their subject is not 
encouraged… tend toward the production of detailed investigations of specific and 
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manageable subjects” (Edwards & Walker, 2010 p.2). Although these specific 
investigations are less accessible to a popular audience and as such have a smaller 
readership, they are more academically respected. A reason for this is because there are 
problems associated with “universality and totalisation”, which can result in many areas 
of history remaining unresearched and not disseminated. They discuss that the only way 
to give these pieces of history a voice is dedicated and ‘un-universal’ academic 
investigations (Edwards & Walker, 2010, p.3). 
One of the most important discussion points that Edwards & Walker highlight is that the 
field of accounting history has developed a wider academic view. They assert that this is 
an approach found not just within accountancy but also broadly within business. 
However, it therefore means that accounting history particularly benefits interdisciplinary 
research. With Edwards and Walker specifically suggesting that amongst others, an 
adjoining discipline that could benefit partnership with accounting history would be 
military history (Edwards and Walker, 2010, p.5). This natural partnership that arises from 
accounting and military histories, due to the technical minutiae of manning, arming and 
feeding a large navy, demonstrate why the study of naval administration and 
professionalisation is a logical interdisciplinary research topic. 
Interdisciplinary academia is widely discussed within historiography. Lambert states that 
the introduction of interdisciplinary research helped reinvigorate the stagnating field of 
naval history by “widening both audiences and the research community” (Lambert, 2011, 
p.207). Edwards & Walker describe the synthesis of accounting history. They describe 
how it can be unflattering assessed as “mind-numbing”. But, they appeal against this 
characterisation. They believe it is an essential process of information gathering. They 
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also suggest that not all accounting historians are assessing simple ledgers, there is a less 
conspicuous field of accounting history academia, they highlight how it can be found with 
social and political histories as well as in the pursuit of military campaigns (Edwards & 
Walker, 2010, p.1). 
This growing trend towards interdisciplinary historical enquiry has begun to carve a new 
‘sub’ field of academia, in which this research places itself. However, this chapter will 
briefly examine the pre-existing field of accounting and military history to understand the 
historiography of both, in order to assertation where this thesis positions itself. 
Cobbin and Burrows have undertaken a concise review paper detailing all the academic 
literature covering accounting as well as military and war, published between 2000-2017. 
One of the biggest military topics of academic enquiry relating to accounting is the field of 
logistics. In a modern context we can see that logistics takes roughly a “third of the US 
defence budget” (Cobbin and Burrows, 2018, pp.488-489). Therefore, with this in 
consideration, we can see why military- accounting academia is such an important field of 
research, that would benefit expanding. 
Funnel and Chwastiak describe what is meant by military accounting, stating that it is “the 
mechanism for allocating resources and ensuring they are employed [deployed] in the 
most efficient way possible” (Funnell and Chwastiak, 2015, p.1). Therefore, with this 
definition, we can see why Cobbin and Burrow highlight that Finance is arguably the 
“fourth arm of Britain’s defence services”. Of which, without efficient implementation 
and attention the rest of the military would be rendered unsuccessful (Cobbin and 
Burrows, 2018, p.489). 
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Funnell criticises the current lack of military accounting, when considering that military 
spending has by far dwarfed all other government spending, the military accounting 
academic history does not parallel this. However, he states that a prominent exception of 
this is Chwastiak’s research upon the Vietnam war (Funnel, 2010, pp.561-2). Cobbin and 
Burrow also lament, that even though it is clear how important financing and accounting 
is to the military, accounting history in this field is woefully underrepresented.  
The work that is published is usually incredibly niche. A special edition of Accounting 
History was published to celebrate military accounting, it stated that they “were premised 
on a definition of military as extending beyond the notion of the fighting forces to include 
“industries and political infrastructure upon which the military depend” (Funnell, 2006, 
p.388)- quoted from Cobbin and Burrows, 2018, p.490.) We can also see from 
conferences and additions to collaborative books that there is a changing attitude to the 
field, with scheduled attention to military accounting (Cobbin and Burrows, 2018, p.491). 
The United Kingdom has been highlighted as being world leading and dominating the pre-
existing literature. Cobbin and Burrow highlighted that within a given time period they 
analysed the publications relating to military accounting. 21 publications researched UK 
military accounting, more than any other country. The USA holds the next position with 
12 (Cobbin and Burrow, 2018, p. 492). Therefore, the UK is clearly an academic leader in 
this discipline.  
Accounting history differs largely from naval history as an academic field. As stated, 
Accounting history tends towards more detailed specific research and veers away from 
general history. Whereas, when looking at some of the most notable recent publications 
within the field of Naval History; Lambert’s 2019 work on sea power states, which is a 
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broader history of eminent states (including Britain, Athens, Venice and the Dutch) and 
how they became eminent ‘Sea-Powers’; JD Davies, Kings of the Sea: Charles II, James II 
and the Royal Navy, which is again a broader history of the later Stuart Kings and their 
passion and intelligence for their navies. Finally, an example can be seen with one of the 
most notable works in the field – N.A.M Rodger’s Command of the Ocean. This gives a 
thorough overview of Britain’s naval heritage between 1649 and 1815, covering topics 
from administration to military tactics.  
Rüger describes Rodger’s work as being designed primarily “not only, as a history of the 
royal navy, but as a history of Britain, told through the prism of the royal navy” (Colville & 
Davey, 2019, p.233). Ruger argues that this is essential for the best naval histories, they 
should be so much more than just “combat, strategy and technology- they were never 
only naval histories”. 
All of these well-respected academic pieces of research undertake a much broader 
general history. This contrasts greatly from accounting history, which, as already 
mentioned, focuses on specific fields of enquiry for more detailed research. Although 
interdisciplinary, this thesis has chosen to align itself closer to the later, and as such this is 
the reason for the methodological choice of investigation specific accounting 
implementations of 3 individuals, instead of a wider institutional study that gives a more 
general history.  
Naval- Business History is not a new notion, it is a pre-established field of academia. 
Davey and Colville describe the movement after 1976 (when Kennedy published his 
landmark work ‘The rise and fall of British Naval master) of historians focusing not just on 
battles and tactics, but assessing the wider picture. This includes; statecraft, geopolitics 
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and economics. He references historians such as Lambert, Knight and O’Brien how 
“resources, economics and government have shaped naval power” (Davey & Colville, 
2019, p.6). These debates spread into the 1990s with military professionalism and the 
fiscal-military state (Davey & Colville, 2019, p.7). Knight also describes this phenomenon, 
stating that from the 1960s “economic, social and business history rose in popularity. By 
the early 1990s the concept of the ‘fiscal-military state’ was being popularised; this the 
study of the politics and administration of the navy moved much closer to mainstream 
history” (Knight, 2011, p.236). Therefore, we can see that this thesis’ approach to 
interdisciplinary naval accountancy practices are not new are form part of an established 
research practise within modern naval history.  
Before moving on, It should also be discussed here, that naval history as an academic 
discipline has a troubled past. Although it fits under the umbrella of history academic as a 
whole, those studying naval history and historiography will lament its standing and 
reputation over the past century. As will be explored directly, naval history was not 
respected for lacking critique and analysis in the pre- WWII era and it is undervalued post 
World War II. No naval historian has held a chair at a university. Both Rodger and Knight 
lament that young scholars have tended to move into mainstream history in order to be 
able to advance their careers (Rodger, 1944, p.44)(Knight, 2011, p.234). However, 
scholarly support for the field increased in the 1980s (Knight, 2011, p.234). Fischer states 
that most scholars believe “that their work fails to receive sufficient respect from other 
practitioners in the larger historical discipline” (Fischer, 2011, p.366).  
Rodger believes that it is important to assert that in all probability it is not that academic 
disciplines do not agree that an understanding of the history of the sea is important, 
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instead they believe that it always falls under someone else’s department. For example, 
he argues that Economic historians will research overseas travel and fisheries, but will not 
touch upon warfare, naval historians will focus upon battles and campaigns, but not place 
these into a historical context to locate their significance and military historians in theory 
see it as importance, but in practice this is neglected (Rodger, 1994, p.43). 
To understand the reason behind this, Lambert stresses that it is important to understand 
naval history’s origins. The field originated as a study for navies as its primary purpose, 
and a study about navies as its secondary aim (Lambert, 2011, p.209). The publication of 
research into the inner workings of the navy were determined by the educational 
requirements as well as strategic reflection of a state’s navy. These histories also fit a 
political purpose, at the same time as there was the development what could be 
described as a ‘historical profession’, there was a growing trend across Europe of secular 
nationalism. This meant that nations were using their histories to support the idea of 
powerful nations, being able to cement the ideas of nationhood as well as reimagining 
their national identities after losses (Lambert, 2011, p.209). Lambert argues that naval 
histories were designed to “foster confidence in the organisation, rather than a reverence 
for factual accuracy” (Lambert, 2011, p.218).  
Hattendorf also describes this situation stating that Naval History needed to appeal to the 
general public only as far as was required in order for them to support its public 
expenditure, it needed to be as informative as required for a stateman to use as a guide, 
and for a seamen to appreciate the ideals of the organisation. Of which, none are the 
‘dispassionate understanding’ required of an academic (Hattendorf, 1994, p.4). 
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One of the eminent scholars, of whom we can accredit the emergence of what could be 
described as an ‘academic field of research’ is Laughton. Working from King’s College 
London, he recognised the importance of using the history of the navy as an educational 
tool. He “used academic methodology to refine the delivery of naval education and 
producing teaching texts” (Lambert, 2011, p.209). However, most importantly for the 
longevity of naval history as a discipline, he founded the Naval Records Society. In a time 
when accurate data collection was occasionally neglected, his society produced the 
volumes of published primary source material. By 1914, the society had produced 45 
volumes of valuable material. This role to 78 by the outbreak of the Second World War 
(Knight, 2011, p.226).  Laughton also wrote the additional entries of 19th century officers 
for the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Lambert, 2011, p.210); A valuable 
biographical reference tool used within the Duke of York, Coventry and Pepys’ case 
studies. 
Rodger poses an interesting point that needs considering with the introduction of the 
Naval Records Society. He stresses that the council of the NRS in their first twenty years 
consisted of the following; “King Edward VII, two royal princes, five cabinet ministers, 
eleven peers, twenty-seven admirals, four generals… two directors of naval construction, 
two princes of the Holy Roman Empire, and the Lord Provost of Glasgow” (Rodger, 1994, 
p.43). He explains that there were some politically motivated decisions around this time. 
Clearly, the pedigree of the council members is unparalleled in any academic discipline. 
However, this plays into the idea that this time period was “a history of gentlemen, for 
gentlemen” (Rodger, 1994, p.42). 
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It is also important that post-World War II, scholars across Europe were allowed access to 
the source material available inside their respective Nation’s National Archives (with the 
exception of the USSR). This allowed for a far clearer data driven methodological 
approach (Lambert, 2011, p.217). An additional development that aided the field to 
mature at a faster rate was the publication of guides to navigate naval history source 
material. For example, Randolph Cock and N.A.M Rodger’s guide helped scholars 
understand the breadth of source material available, attempting to ensure that research 
did not just use the material within the ADM classes at Kew, instead understanding the 
wealth of material available within other classes at the National Archives (Knight, 2011, 
p.228). 
Traditionally research within the naval history discipline has been centred around 
biography of great men and operational minutiae. These writings were traditionally from 
the perspective of commissioned officers with the aim of celebrating Britain’s naval 
supremacy, whilst neglecting; Shipbuilding; Employment; Finance; Politics and Suppliers 
and vendors (Knight, 2011, p.225). Knight describes the research published before 1939 
as lacking analysis of critique (Knight, 2011, p.227). He also argues that due to the 
research’s proclivity for short technical minutiae, in modern eyes were would probably 
refer to the publications as a ‘note’ instead of an academic journal.  
Additionally, many of the eminent scholars (For example Knox, Laughton and Corbett) in 
this period were not writing in great quantity in the Mariner’s Mirror. Their focus instead 
was on the Creations of some of our greatest naval research institutions; The Society of 
Nautical Research, The Navy Records Society, the establishment of the National Maritime 
Museum and saving HMS Victory. Knights postulates that this could be a rationale for the 
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arguable lack of quality within field during this time period; the senior researchers were 
otherwise engaged. Oppenheim’s 1896 work was an exception to this. His detailed work 
on naval administrative history, it is argued by Knight is still useful today. This work has 
proven to be of great value to this research. However, this work was published with 
‘Victoria County History’ and not within mainstream academic circles. Supposedly, this in 
relation to Oppenheim’s reputation for being “prickly and reclusive” and in turn not 
ingratiating himself with his peers (Knight, 2011, p.227).  
Both Lambert and Knight have suggested that the work before World War II was hindered 
by its motivation of celebrating the Royal Navy and lack of primary source material. We 
can therefore see a new era of naval history emerge in the aftermath of the World War II. 
Knight refers to this as “new naval history”, that moves away from operation history and 
becomes more empirical in nature (Knight, 2011, p.218). 
Lambert highlights that Beeler’s work published in 1997 entitled ‘British naval policy in 
the Gladstone Disraeli era, 1866-1880’, was a huge development milestone for the field, 
because it established that naval budget and finance was fundamental to a state’s 
national policy. This in turn ascertained why governments found the funding of navies 
problematic because it created a politically difficult situation. This idea is most certainly 
upheld within the following chapters of this research, ascertaining that the fear of the 
crown using the navy as a spearhead for control was the strongest element in it 
withholding essential finances (Lambert, 2011, p.213). 
Knight asserts that one of the most influential pieces of work to move away from simple 
operational histories is N.A.M Rodger’s ‘In the Wooden World’. He states that this work 
“upended John Masefield’s early twentieth century accepted and hostile view of the 
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harshness of the discipline and governance of the navy. He did this by a close, systematic 
and statistical examination of naval correspondence, logs and muster books in the public 
record office…the enormous success and influence of this book took naval scholars by 
surprise” (Knight, 2011, p.235).  
One of the ways of assessing the impact on this new wave if history, the movement 
towards social and economic interdisciplinary partnerships and away from traditional 
biographies and operational histories is to examine the bicentenary celebrations for the 
Battle of Trafalgar in 2005. More emphasis was played to the lesser known participants of 
the battle and the social history of the era. The Mariner’s Mirror published a special 
edition to commemorate, and from the 16 articles included, only 6 were written about 
the battle itself or Nelson (Knight, 2011, p.239).  
Historiography for Naval History was historically neglected and undervalued with “limited 
concern for the context in which key texts were generated”(Lambert, 2011, p.217). This 
view is shared by Fischer who attempts to address the biggest problems within the field. 
He states that within the International Journal for Maritime History, over the five years 
prior to his publication, 62% of all articles rejected for publication were rejected on the 
grounds of unconvincing contextualisation (Fischer, 2011, p.369).  
Glete states that in the study of the post English Civil War time period, the research in 
naval history has being extensive. However, a lot of this research is both out of date and 
too narrow. He argues that “administration, economy and the development of naval 
capabilities are often inadequately treated” (Glete, 1999, p.2). This shows the necessity to 
undertake research that reconceptualises our understanding of a well-known time period 
with a shifting focus towards under researched topics.  
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Glete postulates that this is because the time period in question is a period of great 
change. This can be seen in the rise and fall of existing empires. He categorises them in 2 
ways, either a political empire or an economic empire or alliance. He exemplifies the first 
using the Spanish empire, the Ottoman empire, The Danish empire and the Swedish 
empire. He then exemplifies the later with the Dutch empire and the Hanseatic network 
of trade in Northern Europe, with the further clarification that he feels the Venetian 
empire sits somewhere between the two. This is important because he queries whether 
we should be asking if these nations can attribute their success due to their economies or 
their maritime policy? Questions he believes are not answered within the current 
academic literature. Glete builds on this to say that time periods of great change have 
traditionally been less suited to specialisation (e.g. interdisciplinary detailed topics). “The 
division of existing scholarship into various subjects and traditions is inadequate for this 
period of change” (Glete, 1999, pp.6-7). Therefore, we need to change this stance and 
utilise interdisciplinary research to be able to research this time period with accurate 
scholarly vigour.  
Funnel states that for any community to exist with any level of complexity, a military 
force is necessary to enforce control (Edwards & Walker, 2010, p.562). Therefore, It is an 
essential organisation required to support the British constitution. Funnel argues that 
from the seventeenth century the primary interest of accounting historians was 
“protections against threats from the military to the supremacy of Parliament and to the 
liberty of individuals” (Edwards & Walker, 2010, p.562).  
This is important within this research, because a large component that is discusses 
throughout this thesis is the parliamentary-crown financial struggle. Parliament would 
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regularly withhold money to the crown to fund the navy, with the thought being that this 
was in order that the navy would not be used against the crown.  
Funnell cites Howard, arguing that the biggest query post English Civil War was the issue 
of needing forces in order to protect from external threats, without said forces being used 
against their own people. The government tended to keep the military small in order to 
reduce their threat, however, the duel problem with this is that it would leave the state 
unprepared against a foreign attack (Edwards & Walker, 2010, p.563). However, as can be 
seen with both the English Civil War and Glorious revolution, this was not entirely 
successful, therefore political controls were also necessary. The Mutiny Act was enacted 
to “stipulate that each year the crown was required to reaffirm its allegiance to the 
principle of parliamentary control of the army as enunciated in the Bill of Rights” in 1989 
(Edwards & Walker, 2010, p.564). 
“an enduring tension arose in the seventeenth century between military efficiency and 
control of the military to ensure political security, with Britain’s naval superiority allowing 
the former always to be sacrificed” (Edwards & Walker, 2010, p.565). 
Funnel describes this as a ‘constitutional theme’ in military accounting. However, there 
are now widening areas of interest within military accounting history. For example, the 
origins of specific accounting measures which would form the basis of what is constituted 
as ‘modern management accounting’ (Edwards & Walker, 2010, p.562). 
Additionally, Funnell explains that from the end of the 17th century, the primary objective 
of military accounting was to act as a control mechanism to ensure financial procedures 
had been followed. 
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2.6 Discussion relating to strengths and limitations of primary source material 
 
As a historical thesis, this research relies entirely upon primary source material for the 
data collected for the subsequent analysis. Therefore, the strengths and limitations of this 
will be discussed directly. In this methodology chapter, this will only be explored in a 
wider sense, the strengths and limitations of specific sources will be discussed during 
their analysis within the main body of the thesis. 
Napier describes one of the biggest pitfalls of archival data collection for accounting 
history. Although he is specifically referencing pre-colonial Africa, his point is transferable. 
He suggests that sometimes there is lack of clear archival evidence because “much of this 
accounting was likely to be oral, hence no permanent writings of other artefacts could be 
expected to survive” (Edwards & Walker, 2010, p.41). 
“the challenge for accounting historians in this type of situation is to be aware how far 
they can use whatever evidence of practices and procedures still survives as a basis for 
conclusions about accounting. The danger is that descriptions in secondary sources of 
behaviour that may appear to be accounting to an accounting historian may not be 
good proxies for any actual accounting activities” (Edwards & Walker, 2010, p.41). 
This is an integral point that is worth considering with source analysis. Some documents 
are specific accounting documentation, for example ledgers and instructional books, of 
which the data is reasonably clear. However, some sources are taken from letters, diary 
extracts and personal addenda.  
As this research is enquiring to accounting practices that are nearly 400 years old, we 
cannot implement an alternative methodological approach. All participants are long 
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deceased. Therefore, the only control mechanism we can place upon this research is the 
examination of wide array of primary source material that is taken from different 
locations, authors and differing source types. These sources are then cross referenced for 
corroborations and the potential existence of patterns or trends. Therefore, although not 
a perfect methodology, and certainly not what would be used in a modern context with 
surviving participants. With this form of historical enquiry, this is the best practice we 
have available.  
Bowen also describes the necessity for cross referencing primary source material. He 
refers to this process as ‘triangulation’. He describes by stating that “The qualitative 
researcher is expected to draw upon multiple (at least two) sources of evidence; that is, 
to seek convergence and corroboration through the use of different data sources and 
methods… By triangulating data, the researcher attempts to provide ‘a confluence of 
evidence that breeds credibility’… [and] can corroborate findings across datasets and thus 
reduce the impact of potential biases” (Bowen, 2009, p.28). 
Bowen also highlights that a particularly useful function of primary source document 
analysis, is using the documents to track change and development. He started that when 
there are numerous iterations of a document, these can be used to compare and identify 
changes, which can enable the researcher to “get a clear picture of how an organisation 
or a program fared overtime” (Bowen, 2009, p.30). This is exactly the function of the 
analysis of numerous drafts of the Duke of York’s instructions, as seen in the Duke of York 
Case study. 
Rodger describes the proper use of source analysis as being pivotal to ensuring that naval 
and maritime history becomes as respected as its other historical counterparts within the 
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wider academic discipline. He states that researchers must “at the level of the 
monograph, this must mean the documentary sources; at the level of the synthesis, the 
printed authorities”. This includes exploiting the archives and all relevant literature 
(Rodger, 1994, p.118). He argues that this had been traditionally neglected and 








This chapter has provided an overview of the methodological choices and rationale for 
this thesis. It has detailed which archives have supplied the primary source evidence for 
the Research as well as stating the limitations of primary source research. However, this 
will be explored in much further detail in the bodies of each case study in chapters five to 
eight, whilst analysing individual documents. 
An analysis of case study research as a methodological choice and the use of biographical 
case studies has demonstrated the validity in using this methodology to support the 
thesis’ research aim of establishing the extent to which attempts made by three senior 
individuals to instigate management controls were responsible for organisational 
professionalisation of the navy in the late seventeenth century. Additionally, this chapter 
has demonstrated that this research is responding to scholar’s appeals for new 





Chapter Three- Literature review for professionalisation and 
Management Control 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter, the methodological choice of using Biographical case study 
research to achieve the research aim; ‘establish the extent to which attempts made by 
three senior individuals to instigate management controls were responsible for the 
organisational professionalisation of the navy’, were reviewed. This chapter will further 
support this aim by providing a review of the findings of selected academics relating to 
the definitions of management control and professionalisation.  This is essential because 
there is debate amongst scholars relating to exactly what is meant by these key terms. 
In section 3.2 the definition of professionalisation is explored across academic and 
practitioner literature. Subsequently, similarities are identified and a new framework is 
developed by collating the definitions and finding a consensus.  
Section 3.3 then provides the same level of review for the terminologies surrounding 
management control, highlighting the keyworks and what criteria they ascertain is 
necessary for a management control system. This directly addresses the first research 
objective by investigating the concepts of professionalism and management control 
through the literature. 
The importance of researching management control in a historic context is then explored 
in section 3.4. This highlights the emerging new field of academia, demonstrating the 
limited volume of academics who have focused upon understanding the importance of 
applying 20th century concepts to historical applications. Of which, no scholar has 
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previously addressed these concepts to the navy in the seventeenth century. 
Finally, Section 3.5 will address the link between professionalisation and management 
control and details how management control can be implemented in order to work 
towards organisational professionalism.  
Therefore, this chapter will provide the appropriate theoretical underpinning to support 




Some of the most notable names in the field of professionalisation include Larson, Eliot 
Freidson and Andrew Abbott.  Freidson reimagines the understanding of professionalism 
as a concept (Freidson, 2004).  He creates a ‘logical model’ for professionalism, stating 
that its foundation is rooted in the ‘world of work’, “because, like all occupations, they 
cannot exist without some way of gaining an income” (Freidson, 2004, p.5). Freidson 
himself states that his work is different from the two previous leaders in this field; Larson 
and Abbott.  Larson asserts that historically, professionalisation has occurred as a result 
of the financial benefit to be gained through increasing the societal position afforded to 
experts by attempting to control and reduce However, Freidson argues that Larson does 
not develop the logic of  this theory far enough and asserts that his research is 
necessitated by this lack of scrutiny, because he “abstract[s] them into a model of 
interconnected institutions whose realization depends upon the conjunction of a limited 
number of contingencies” (Freidson, 2004, p.6). 
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Additionally, he credits the work of Abbott, who is sceptical of the existence of a specific 
professionalisation process. Instead, Abbott focuses his work on how professions gain, 
keep and potentially lose a monopoly over their expertise. 
Freidson breaks his own concept down into two key principles; firstly that ‘professional’ 
work is so specialised that it requires extensive training and experience and the absence 
of such training renders the work inaccessible to the general populace. Secondly, he 
theorises that this knowledge and expertise “cannot be standardized, rationalised… or 
commodified” (Freidson, 2004, p.17) 
One point that Freidson places particular emphasis upon is the ‘division of labour’, 
specifically the method in which labour is coordinated when employees are undertaking 
‘different but related tasks’, therefore he uses “the concept of the division of labour to 
represent the organisation and coordination of the relations between workers performing 
different but interconnected specialisations” (Freidson, 2004, p.37). 
Freidson also describes the necessity for training programmes. He declares that for a 
profession to receive ‘official recognition’ a clear requirement is that they must have 
undertaken the learning of a substantial body of knowledge that is underpinned by 
theoretical concepts (Freidson, 2005, p.82). This recognition can come from the general 
public, paramount power or state. 
This training should  be a distinguishable feature that enables the worker to perform tasks 
that are above and beyond what could be expected of any capable adult who lacks the 
training. Additionally, it is stipulated that this training should be vocational in nature. 
(Freidson, 2004, pp. 84-6).  
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It is noteworthy that Freidson asserts that the training necessitated within a profession 
should have university affiliation (Freidson, 2004, p.93). This is a view shared by other 
academics, such as Lewis Meriam, who states that it is necessary that entrance into the 
profession should require the post holder to have achieved a degree or equivalent from a 
university (Meriam, 1937, p. 59). Although this is most certainly true in a modern sense, it 
is one of the examples of this theoretical understanding potentially not extending into a 
historical context. in the 1660’s university education was  rare and typically reserved for 
those seeking to enter very specific professions It is important that this is noted when 
applying this theory outside of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.  
Abbott presents an alternative view on the concept of professionalisation. He argues that 
the concept is generally misrepresentative because it does not place sufficient emphasis 
on the ‘the contents of professional life’. The focus had previously been on licensing and 
ethics codes, where as he argues that the personal side is missing and the focus should be 
on “who was doing what to whom and how” (Abbott, 1988, p.2). Abbott focuses upon the 
need for competition, moving from an individualistic to a systematic view of professions. 
He states that “Control of knowledge and its application means dominating outsiders who 
attack that control. Control without competition is trivial” (Abbott, 1988, p.2).  
However, Abbott only makes two fleeting references to military professions within his 
work. Firstly, he implies that there is some competition with domestic military forces. An 
example of gives is of the American Air Force; “The technology of airplanes revolutionised 
the tasks of the war. Yet the air arm of the American military became separate from the 
Army only after an internal battle of several decades, and it lost a similar fight with the 
navy” (Abbott, 1988, p.92). 
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His second reference can be seen when he describes some professions as being built 
upon ‘fading values’, with an emphasis on personality instead of technique. His examples 
are the French army officer corps, who “until at least the seventies a legitimation based 
on tradition, courage, personal glory, service of the patrie, and the brotherhood of arms” 
(Abbott, 1988, p.192). 
Additionally, Abbott places a large emphasis on coalescence into a group or association 
(Abbott, 1988, p.11). This work then seems to suppose that professionalisation only 
occurs in groups that charge for their services, for examples Lawyers or Accountants. This 
preconception, would explain that lack of references to the military in professionalisation 
literature. The military does not have competition, because it is state governed, and as 
such there cannot be numerous navies within one state’s jurisdiction. As such, not all of 
these concepts can be seen as relevant in a historical military context. 
Therefore, when considering the value of these theses, Friedson’s and Abbott’s focus on 
the importance of free markets and competition in their theses render them less useful as 
a benchmark for professionalisation in the context of the 17th Century Navy and, 
therefore, in the context of this research. Therefore, the scope of this review was 
expanded outside of the academic field leaders to examine the views presented in  
sources that are more applicable to this research. 
The first publication analysed was located from the National Research Council, 
assimilated from a conference of academics relating to the Nation’s Cybersecurity 




In a modern context, the conference agreed that the following criteria were essential: 
1. Educations, training and other activities that transform a worker into a professional 
2. Social processes by which an occupation becomes a profession. 
 
The research council also sets out the historic conditions for professionalisation. Their 
paper does not stipulate what is meant by historic, however it does state that this list 
includes elements found in the literature on professionalisation.  
“Historically, professionalization has had one or more of the following goals 
1. To establish standards that enhance the quality of the workforces 
2. To regulate workers whose jobs can affect the health, safety or property of 
 others 
3. To enhance public trust and confidence 
4. To enable compliance with regulatory or legal requirements 
5. To enhance the status of an occupation 
6. To establish a monopoly or otherwise regulate the supply of labour to 
 advance   the interests of its members 
7. To guide the behaviour of practitioners in the field, especially when it 
 comes to morally or ethically ambiguous activities 
8. To establish and standardize roles (and the associated knowledge, skills, 
 and abilities) and pathways so as to better align supply and demand, 
 increase awareness of career paths, and facilitate recruitment and 
 retention by employers”. (National Research Council, 2013). 
Similarly, to those definitions provided within the academic literature, one might equally 
question the relevance of this description, . However,  its context within an official 
pamphlet authored by America’s cybersecurity workforces, it is argued that its relevance 
is significant given that this workforce clearly has a government and military focus. It is 
important to note the phrase  “one or more of the following goals” included in the 
description. As such, there is no onus to establish a case for all eight of goals included but 
may still assert that some of these goals were demonstrated by the Navy during the 
process of professionalisation.  
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Hall also highlights this notion within his own research on professionalisation. Firstly, he 
describes the following as being key attitudinal attributes to professionalisation; 1. The 
organisation becoming a ‘major reference’ for ideas and judgements, 2. The benefit of 
this service to the public, 3. Self-regulation, because the people most qualified to judge is 
a fellow professional, 4, ‘a sense of calling to the field’ and finally, 5, autonomy- no 
pressure from external pressures (Hall, 1968, p. 93).  
However, one of the key points taken from Richard Hall’s research is that he describes the 
act of professionalisation as “movement toward correspondence with the professional 
model” (Hall, 1968, p.92). Therefore, it should be noted that professionalisation is a noun; 
describing a process. Therefore, it is not imperative for an organisation to be completely 
akin to a professional model for professionalisation to have occurred. Instead, simply 
progression towards this more ideal state.  
Norbert Elias’ research describes the evolving nature of a profession within the navy. He 
describes how the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can be described as the 
‘formative years’ of the development of a navy profession (Elias, 1950, p. 294). He 
describes how book learning was not essential because it was “of little avail” (Elias, 1950, 
p. 293), but he states that young boys getting experience on the ships as early as possible 
was the most important element.  
Elias is describing an apprenticeship style system instead of an academic qualification. He 
also describes how officers should have been seen as men of breading. They were 
expected to be fluent in multiple language in order to represent their countries (Elias, 
1950, p. 294). However, Elias does not reference any of these claims with sources, which 
makes it academically problematic.  
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In his PhD thesis, Mclean also discusses the literature surrounding the idea of 
professionalisation for his project which spans the time period 1660-1749. In his work he 
compares three main theoretical frameworks to aid his definition of ‘professionalisation; 
George Ritzer, Trim and Michael Lewis. Mclean’s ideas have been compiled into a 
comparative table (Mclean, 2017). 
Ritzer’s criteria Trim’s criteria Lewis’s criteria 
Power a discrete occupational 
identity 
A continuous flow of entry of young 
officers, of the required material and in 
the required numbers. 
Doctrine, or general 
systematic 
Knowledge. 
formal hierarchy There must be the provision of an 
adequate system of training the young 
officers as they enter 
 
Rational training. Permanence There must be the provision of regular 
employment for the officers thus trained. 
Employment must be as regular as 
possible, and when not forthcoming, the 
officer's professional connection must be 
maintained through half-pay. 
Vocational 
qualifications 
a formal pay system There must be the provision of reasonable 
chances for the individual officer in rising 
gradually in professional, financial and 
social status as he becomes capable of 
bearing greater responsibility and thus 
giving more to the service and the state, 
e.g. rank and promotion. 
Specialization a distinctive expertise and 
means of 
education therein 
There must be provision for a steady 
exodus at the other end of the service. 
Officers not suitable for promotion to 
command or flag rank need to be able to 





efficiency in execution of 
expertise 
Pecuniary provision for retired officers or 
dependants 





Salaries   
Promotions   
Professional duties   
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A distinctive way of 
life 
  
Table 1- A cross comparison of Sam Mclean's theoretical framework for the definition of professionalisation. 
Taken from his 2017 King’s College London PhD thesis. 
 
Ritzer elaborates on the three differing sociological approaches to reaching a definition on 
professionalisation; structural, processual and finally, the power perspective. He describes 
the structural approach as being the explicit comparison of characteristics held by 
professions that are not held by non-professions. His description for processual is the 
historical path that an occupation must take to reach becoming professional and finally, his 
description for power perspective is the monopoly granted to their work tasks (Ritzer, 
1975, p. 630). 
However, Ritzer states that this should not be seen as mutually exclusive from the previous 
two approaches, because “we can see power as both the motor force behind drives 
towards professionalisation as well as one of the defining characteristics” (Ritzer, 1975, p. 
630). 
Finally, Lawrence Hrebiniak describes professionalisation with arguably the most different 
definition to his fellow scholars. He describes it by placing an ‘ethos’ on the staff. He states 
that employees should require less control. “The use of professionals implies a greater 
reliance on internalized standards and expertise or knowledge to control behaviour rather 
than bureaucratic or administrative mechanisms” (Hrebiniak, 1976, p. 664).  
The debate over the definition of the terminology professionalisation is a large field of 
academic discipline. The accepted ‘popular’ view according to the Oxford English Dictionary 
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standard is that professionalisation “Give[s] (an occupation, activity, or group) professional 
qualities, typically by increasing training or raising required qualifications.”  
As can be seen from the information summarised in this literature review, the current 
definitions of professionalisation are broad, somewhat disparate and often specifically 
tailored for an individual field of study or timeframe. Therefore, for the purposes of this 
research, none of the pre-existing frameworks are suitable in their entirety as such, it has 
been necessary to establish an original framework that encompasses elements of pre-
existing definitions, that are appropriate for the application to seventeenth century 
research 
The methodology used for constructing this original framework, consisted of applying a 
mode-average analysis of the most popular criteria present from across the literature 
review to establish an academic consensus of the criteria that constitute 
professionalisation. 
By including the individual criteria that are referenced more frequently than others, the 
following criteria are what could be considered as the most relevant in defining 
professionalisation; 
 
1. The occupation having permanence and full-time employment 
2. A formal pay system and salaries  
3. The requirement of specific knowledge and expertise  
4. The necessity to undertake formal training or have achieved specific qualifications. 
(The literature does not agree on the level or type of qualification, disagreeing on 
whether it should be university level, vocational or apprenticeship) 
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5. The understanding of a public perception or ‘status’ relating to an occupation and 
the need to uphold it.  
6. The guiding of behaviour and establishing of standards within each role.  
 
Therefore, having completed a review of both the field leaders as well as a breadth of 
alternative sources, this research has conceptualised the above original framework that 
best represents an academic consensus of the definition of professionalisation. This original 
framing will be used for the purposes of this thesis. 
 
3.3 Management Control 
 
This chapter will now explore the literature surrounding management control, to 
understand what is defined by this term. This definition has been researched alongside 
professionalisation, because it became apparent whilst undertaking the data collection 
for this thesis that the accounting practices implanted by the Navy Board during the given 
time period could be characterised as management control. This management control 
aided in the professionalisation of the Royal Navy. Naturally, the Navy Board in 1660 were 
not using this same terminology that modern business academics use today, however, 
they thought about it as a system that needs putting into place – regardless of the 
terminology. 
Firstly, this section will explore the definition of the term control, before moving onto the 
broader notion of management controls. Langsfield-Smith gives a detailed definition of 
the term control. It states that they can be both formal and informal- including rules as 
well as standardised operating procedures (Langsfield- Smith, 1997, pp.221-228). They 
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can also be output or behavioural controls, meaning they have a feedback nature and 
generally financial in nature. This includes the measurement of specific results, and the 
implementation of corrective actions upon failure to achieve specific targets. These can 
also include Human Resource management, which includes behavioural controls. 
This differs from informal controls, which are usually less academically researched, due to 
their less visible nature. These include unwritten policies, which are usually as part of a 
workplace culture, including organizational norms and shared values (Langfield-Smith, 
1991, pp.208-9). 
Ferreira & Otley prefer the term Performance Management Systems in preference to 
Management Control Systems because it identifies a more complete approach to the 
supervision of an organization’s performance, with Performance Management systems 
incorporating all the definitions that sit under management control (Ferreira & Otley, 
2009, p.264). 
They debate the various definitions that pre-exist because it is ‘difficult to establish’, 
ultimately concluding that Performance Management Systems are the processes 
established within an organization for filtering down to all employees the management 
structure’s aims. This is achieved through “analysis, planning, measurement, control, 
rewarding, and broadly managing performance, and for supporting and facilitating 
organizational learning and change” (Ferreira & Otley, 2009, p.264).  
Ferreira and Otley develop this further by stating that it is the duty of managers to take 
the responsibility for setting this aims in order to fulfil the expectations of all ‘relevant 
stakeholders. They also analyse Otley’s seminal 1999 work; in which he creates a 5-piece 
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framework for Performance Management. Firstly, the organization’s key aims should be 
identified, alongside the appropriate methodology implemented within the organization 
to assess the success of these aims. Secondly, Otley evaluates the importance of 
processing forward thinking strategies, alongside performance measurement. Thirdly, 
Otley describes the importance of target setting, including both how these are set as well 
as at which management tier this is appropriate. Fourthly, the application of a rewards-
based system as a method of performance management. Finally, Otley details the data 
required and the information flows necessary to accurately and efficiently manage and 
monitor performance. 
Ferreira and Otley then develop their own theoretical framework with the following 
concepts; 
Concept Description of concept 
Vision and Mission This includes ascertaining the 
organization’s vision and mission and how 
this is filtered through across the 
organization to all of its members. 
Key success factors This establishes what the organization 
identifies as its central and key factors for 
future success and again, how this filtered 
across the organization to all of its 
members. 
Organizational structure This asks the important questions; “what 
is the organization structure and what 
impact does it have on the design and use 
of Performance Management Systems?” 
Strategies and plans This concept aims to understand what 
strategies have been implemented by the 
organization, and what procedures have 
been applied to support the success of 
these strategies. Again, this concept 
assesses how this is communicated across 
the organization. 
Key performance measures This concept identifies what measures for 
performance relating to the organization’s 
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aims are applied. How are these 
communicated across the organization 
and are they important when evaluating 
performance. 
Target setting This concept aims to identify what an 
organization needs to achieve as part of 
the above Key Performance Measures, in 
turn how are these targets set and how 
difficult are they to attain. 
Performance evaluation  This concept questions what processes are 
available within an organization to 
evaluate performance, including overall 
organizational performance, individual 
and team. 
Rewards systems This concept assesses if rewards are 
available based on performance targets. 
Will these hold a financial incentive, or 
conversely are there penalties for failure 
to attain targets? 
Information Flows, Systems and 
Networks 
This specifically questions what 
information flows an organization has to 
support the implementation of its 
performance management systems. 
Performance management systems use This concept queries how the information 
gained through the above controls is used 
at different hierarchical levels across the 
organization. 
 
Performance Management Systems 
Change 
This evaluates change to pre-existing 
systems and are they made in a proactive 
or reactive manner. 
Strength and coherence This final concept evaluates the strength 
of performance management systems and 
how they are implemented. 
Table 2- A table that summarises Ferreira and Otley's theoretical framework (Ferreira & Otley, 2009, pp.267-
276). 
 
These concepts highlighted by Ferreira and Otley details concisely the definition of 
performance management/ management control. Berry et al also undertook a review 
paper relating to management control systems. Their assessment of what is defined as 
performance in management control yields similar results to Ferreira and Otley. They 
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state that performance management in Management control includes the following; 
“examining objectives, strategy10, measures, incentives and information flows as well as 
contextual issues, e.g. external environment, organisational culture, social controls and 
history” (Berry et al, 2009, p.4). 
Neely et al. (2005) also discuss the field of Performance management, which they state is 
lacking quantity of academic reflection. Their definition is initially much broader, stating 
that from a marketing perspective this means to perform one’s goal with more “efficiency 
and effectiveness” than one’s competitors (Neely et al. 2005, p.1228). They justify this by 
describing how “a performance measure can be defined as a metric used to quantify the 
efficiency and/or effectiveness of an action[1]. . A performance measurement system can 
be defined as the set of metrics used to quantify both the efficiency and effectiveness of 
actions[2],” (Neely et al. 2005, p.1229). 
 
10 Langfield-Smith reviews what is meant by the term Strategy. She states that some define it as “a pattern 
of decisions about the organization’s future which take on a meaning when it is implemented through the 
organization’s structures and processes” however, another definition states that “strategic decisions occur 
at many levels of managerial activity. They are concerned with the long-term direction of the organization, 
the scope of the organization’s activities, the matching of organizations to its environment and resource 
capabilities, the allocation of major resources within the organization and consideration of the expectations 




Table 3 Taken from (Neely et al, 2005, p.1230) indicating typical monthly performing measures. 
The above table is taken from Neely et al’s work and details specific examples of 
performance metrics that can be used on a monthly basis to assess effectiveness and 
efficiency. We can extrapolate the data from this table and apply it in a historic context. 
As this thesis will explore in the following chapters, we can see examples of these control 
metric’s in place. For example, the monitoring of excess and waste, absenteeism, salaries 
and benefits. Therefore, even though the terms performance management and 
management control were not in place in the late seventeenth century, this does not 
mean that the concepts were not being to be used at this point. As such, we can 
retrospectively, apply the terminology to the developments during this time period. 
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The model used for the original framework defining the criteria regarding 
professionalisation relates to occupational professionalisation. The Duke of York, 
Coventry and Pepys have individually demonstrated the movement towards becoming 
professionalised, however they have also taken this one step further by making the 
organisation more professional through the application of management control. 
Therefore, each concept links and feeds into the next, overall achieving a movement 
towards organisational professionalism.  
 
3.4 What is the importance of researching Management Control in England in 
the Seventeenth century? 
 
Very little is written on management control in the seventeenth century, or indeed in a 
historical capacity overall, which once again demonstrates the value of the research this 
thesis has undertaken. One piece of scholarship that has been undertaken relates to a 
sixteenth century farmer; Henry Best. Mclean’s research upon best explores that notion 
that landowners in the sixteenth century has established that for a farm to be effective 
and profitable, strong supervision of farm labourers was essential. In order to teach his 
eldest son how to manage the farm, Best wrote an instructional manual in 1645. Mclean 
narrates Best’s analytical and systematic approach to employment and labour 
management (Mclean, 2009). In a similar approach to this thesis, it is clear that even 
though the modern terminology was not being applied in 1645 when we understand the 
definition, we can see that management control was used in agriculture in the 




There is no current research relating to management control in the Navy in the 
seventeenth century, or in the English military as a whole. However, one of the nearest 
pieces of research within academia can be seen in Peter Brown’s research relating to 
command and control in the seventeenth century Russian army.  
Brown describes command and control as being “extension of authority over distance and 
reductively described to issuing orders and trying to control outcomes” (Brown, 2012, 
p.249). He highlights that the terms are modern, but the concepts are ‘timeless’. 
‘embedded in any historical military organization. Brown describes command control as 
the protocol in which the management structure, in this case the military commanders or 
differing levels of seniority, implement military decisions and how they achieve and 
evaluate outcomes. Brown asserts that this covers logistics, battle organisation, 
recruitment, transportation and deployment (Brown, 2012, p.25).  
Another example of the retrospective application of modern terminology to timeless 
concepts can be seen in Lee’s investigation of internal controls and historical examples of 
their implementation. Lee describes the definition of internal controls in the following 
way; 
“Internal accounting control comprises the plan of organization and the co-ordinated 
procedures used within the business to (1) safeguard its assets from loss by fraud or 
unintentional errors, (2) check the accuracy and reliability of the accounting data which 
management uses in making decisions, and (3) promote operational efficiency and 
encourage adherence to adopted policies in those areas in which the accounting and 
financial departments have responsibility, directly or indirectly” (Lee, 1970, pp.150-1). 
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Lee has found examples of summaries prepared, which are examples of internal controls, 
from as early as Sumerian scribes circa 3600 BCE as well as the treasuries of Egyptian 
pharaohs, under the Greek and Roman empire through the control of government 
receipts, the tally stick and pipe roll under Henry I, the Domesday book and bookkeeping 
in Genoa and Milan in the Dark ages (Lee, 1970, p.151). However, the only reference to 
the seventeenth century relates to Geijsbeek's book, in which a government engineer; 
Simon Stevin, acted as an accountant and auditor. He wrote a book in 1604 describing 
internal controls. Lee describes the controls instituted in this book, specifically the 
measures relating to military administration. 
“Payrolls should be sent direct to the auditors for immediate verification by them. (2) The 
cook should report independently to the auditors on the number of meals served by him to 
the troops; Stevin advocated the use of a budgeted cost per meal to ensure no fraud or 
error was occurring in the cookhouse. (3) Arrears of rent should be reported monthly to 
the general treasurer for suitable action” (Lee, 1970, p.157). 
Overall, historical application of management control principles is neglected within the 
current academic literature. We can see examples of management and internal control 
being discussed, with one reference to a foreign military and 2 references to the 
seventeenth century. However, this thesis is the only work that looks at applying the 
definitions of management control in England in the seventeenth century. 
Funnel identified numerous potential topics within his review of the current academia 
that holds promise for future accounting historians; these include; “how developments in 
the military reflected the evolution of cost accounting practices in the private sector, the 
influences that the military might have had on business accounting, the opportunities that 
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war created for women to work as accountants, both in private practice and in 
government agencies such as the army pay corps in Britain, and the contribution of 
accounting to the operational success of armies” (Edwards & Walker, 2010, p.575). 
Although these are very exciting, he does not highlight the lacking literature and 
promising research potential amongst military history and management control. It is a 
subject that is neglected within naval history, business history and accounting history, and 
as such demonstrates very clearly why this research is important and novel. 
Conclusively, Management control is the top layer of management information, it 
explains how to get people to achieve targets that have been set as part of management 
accounting. This includes performance, budgets and key performance indicators. To 
exemplify, Management accounting sets budgets, whereas management control works 
out how to implement them. It is synonymous with performance management; involving 
the writing of procedures and staff appraisals. This usually involves the writing of a 
manual. This is a timeless concept with a modern terminology. This research will apply 
the definition of management control to the behaviours of the Royal Navy in the 
seventeenth century to demonstrate how they were moving to become a more 
professionalised body. 
It should be stated clearly at this point, that there is very little within the current 
academic accounting history literature relating to management control within historical 
contexts. This will be because management control is a 20th century term, and accounting 
historians have not yet begun to ascertain whether the concepts here can be seen within 
different time periods and potentially have the accounting terminology backdated. Even 
though historical figures were not using the modern terminology, this thesis has found 
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numerous examples with archival evidentiary support within the late seventeenth 
century of the implementation of performance measurement, which is an element of 
management control. No other scholar has yet to document this development. 
 
3.5 How does Professionalism and Management control link? 
 
Within the current literature, the link between professionalism and management control 
is seldom explored. One scholar who does identify the connection is Evetts (2013). She 
states that in modern society there appears to be two different strains of professionalism 
that are developing; organizational and occupational. Under the heading of organizational 
professionalism, Evetts describes how this includes traditional elements of management 
control; “It incorporates rational-legal forms of authority and hierarchical structures of 
responsibility and decision-making... increased standardization of work procedures and 
practices and managerialist controls. It relies on externalized forms of regulation and 
accountability measures such as target-setting and performance review” (Evetts, 2013, 
p.787).  
This idea is compared to the concept of occupational professionalism, that holds the 
more traditional notions of professionalism; similar to those seen in the earlier literature 
review; most notable vocational training and education. This occupational 
professionalism is built around the concept of collegial authority. The below table, taken 
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from Evetts’ paper, demonstrates the difference.
 
Table 4- A table taken from Evetts which conceptualises her theory of the two different forms of 
professionalisation (Evetts, 2013, p. 788). 
Additionally, Evetts builds upon this point by stating that some modern professions 
construct their professionalism ‘from within’. She compares the professions of law and 
medicine, medicine is generally regulated externally, whereas Law is rare within modern 
professional occupations as it still “constructs professionalism ‘from within’” (Evetts, 
2013, pp 789-90).  
However, it is important to address here that, as stated by herself, Evetts is discussing the 
issue in relation to a modern society. No previous academic has identified this link to 
historical societies. This thesis will demonstrate that even though there is an absence of 
modern terminology, we apply the same concepts to a historical time period and 
demonstrate that management control was being implemented in order to 
professionalise the organization. 
Therefore, building upon Evetts statement that modern occupations can either be 
regulated externally or from ‘within’. Chapter’s five and six have demonstrated that the 
three case studies under investigation; William Coventry, Samuel Pepys and the Duke of 
York have all implemented managerialism, performance reviews and standardized 
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procedures to support the Royal Navy in working towards organizational professionalism 
from within the organization.  
In an additional publication by Evetts, she once again builds upon her own concept of 
organizational professionalism. It is described that managers can appeal to the concept of 
‘professionalism’, which acts as a personal motivator to employees to act and behave in a 
certain way, enabling the management to be able to manage ‘at a distance’. In summary, 
the aim would be for the staff to self-regulate in order to preserve the notion of 
professionalism. However, she describes the concept as having a different reality. 
Manager tend to actually manage through “bureaucratic, hierarchical and managerial 
controls rather than collegial relations…budgetary restrictions and financial 
rationalizations; the standardization of work practices rather than discretion; and 
performance targets, accountability and sometimes increased political controls” (Evetts, 





This chapter has provided the thesis with a framework detailing the criteria for 
professionalisation, based upon a consensus across the literature, compiled through a 
thorough review. This chapter also reviews the terminology relating to management 
control and performance measurement. These reviews support the research objective to 
investigate the concepts of professionalism and management control through the 
literature. 
Additionally, this chapter ascertained that although these terms were first used in the 
20th century, scholars have started to apply the concepts historically. Therefore, this 
thesis is building upon a pre-existing and burgeoning field of academia, but is the first to 
apply these terms to the navy in the 20th century.  
This chapter has defined the terms, we will see the analysis regarding the application of 
these terms in chapters five to seven.  However, before that is explored, the subsequent 
chapter will provide an overview with the state of the Royal Navy up until this thesis’ 
given time period of 1660-1688. This is in order to be able to see the difference in the 








The previous chapter has provided this thesis with a conceptual and theoretical 
understanding of management control and professionalisation. In order to see the effect 
of management control systems applied by the three individuals as seen in the case 
studies, we must establish the situation in the navy prior to 1660. This research objective 
supports the overall research aim because it will enable the subsequent chapters to see 
the difference made by the implantation of management control systems, as well as the 
necessity in instigating them. 
This chapter begins with an introduction to the international context of developing naval 
power then introduces Tudor and early Stuart naval administration, highlighting the 
problems facing the navy as well as the changing shape and structure of the 
organisation.  Subsequently, section 4.3 explores the administration of the navy during 
the interregnum time period (1649-1660), discussing the effects of the English Civil war 
and the First Dutch War. Section 4.4 then moves into changes in the restoration time 
period, covering 1660 to 1688, the time period covered by this thesis. This section 
discusses the discourses, as written by Slyngsbie and Holland, and give the relevant 
historical context to the problems facing the navy and its administration during this 
period.  
This review is important because it gives the historical context relating to the subsequent 
three chapters. It shows the problems facing the navy and will supply the relevant 
understanding as to why the reforms made by the Duke of York, Coventry and Pepys were 
necessary and worthy of our attention. 
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4.2 Comparing international navies 
 
To place the developments of the naval administration between 1660-1688 into context, 
it is necessary to understand the international development of navies in the earlier part of 
the seventeenth century. Bruijn’s (2000) comprehensive article compares the 
international development of ‘ocean going warships’ from the late 1500s. He states that 
for the first time we can quantifiably compare the development of international powers 
(Bruijn, 2000, p.69)11.  Bruijn compares Spain, England, France, and the Netherlands (but 
stipulates that until 1640 Spain included Portugal).  
 
Table 5- A graph demonstrating the changing fleet size between1585and 1790 of France, 
England, Spain and the Netherlands. 
 
11 Bruijn does state that there is debate as to what should be considered within this data. For example, 
should we include any vessel that is acquisitioned by the navy? Or should it have held a certain volume of 
guns? Modelski and Thompson theorised that pre-1650 it should be any ship utilised by a navy, however 
post 1650 the consensus is that for a ship to be named a ‘ship of the line’ it needed to hold a minimum of 
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Bruijn notes that it is important to see that each state has individual fluctuations in fleet 
size and that they do not all progress in a continuously upward trend. 
However, out of the 10 datapoints, in 5 we can see that England has the biggest navy, 
with the other 5 biggest datapoints the title of the biggest navy is split across Spain, 
France and the Netherlands. Interestingly, in 1625 the Netherlands has 114 ships, nearly 
double the volume of the next closest runner up; Spain who has 60. Bruijn states that in 
1640 the Dutch spent nearly 90% of their state budget on war related spending (Bruijn, 
2000, p.71-2).  
In the 16th century, Spain also did not hold a permanent navy. In times of conflict, they 
requisitioned, either by force or volunteering.  Crown subsidies encouraged ship building 
that benefited the state and the crown also held a full monopoly over armament 
production.  This contrasted the Spanish Netherlands, from 1583 they turned Dunkirk into 
a naval port with a two navy policy, “a Flemish fleet and next to this regular navy, a 
rapidly increasing force of privateers” (Bruijn, 2000, p. 74-6). This dual challenge was 
immensely successful, but it also demonstrated a sign of the State’s weak finances as they 
could not maintain a full mobile fleet alone.  
The Dutch republic had a different approach. They had five separate admiralties due to 
being governed by a confederate of seven princes all sharing one army and navy. Each 
admiralty was ruled by a board of 9-12 councillors and each was responsible for securing 
its own income with some government subsidies from the State’s general (part of their 
governing institution).  This is important because it demonstrates clearly that England’s 
navy was not alone in having a problematic access to finances during this era. 
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4.3 Tudor Naval administration 
 
The notion of a permanent navy was relatively new to the Stuart monarchs. Historically, 
the monarch did not purchase naval ships, previously the standard procedure had been 
for merchant ships to be requisitioned by the navy, armed and then utilised as fighting 
ships (Wilcox, 1966, p.7). Upon cessation of hostilities, the fleet would then be disbanded 
and returned to their owners.  
Recruitment for the fleet was generally fulfilled via impressment12. This method of 
recruitment constituted one of the biggest problems for the Royal Navy at this point. This 
was due to the organisational difficulties associated with having to rapidly mobilise a fleet 
in response to conflict. In addition, impressment also led to a high staff attrition rate. 
Richard Blakemore states that in the 1630s, there were increased levels of impressment. 
Archival evidence demonstrates that there were grievances from the fleet’s captains 
regarding men who had absconded from active service. In response, there were decrees 
banning and warning the impressed men from doing so (Blakemore, 2014, p.258).  
However, aside from the lack of discipline and authority that this engendered, an even 
more problematic outcome was the constant replacement of these men. Blakemore 
references a journal by sea captain Pennington. This journal covers his years at sea in the 
 
12 Impressment is described by Collins English Dictionary as the “the commandeering or conscription of 
things or men into government service”. 
https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/impressment (accessed on the 23rd September 
2018). Davies discusses impressment in further detail stating that it was the crown’s prerogative, and 
although people were critical of it at times, it was not questioned legally and it became an ‘occupational 
hazard’ to the seamen (Davies, 1991, p.71). 
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1630s and laments the need for regular impressment to cover the constant flow of men 
he was discharging. This ultimately led to a fleet crewed by inexperienced sailors. 13 
However, the reign of Henry VIII saw significant structural and administrative change for 
the Royal Navy resulting in the navy becoming more professionalised and organised. This 
was a result of the increasing prominence of guns within naval warfare across the 
European theatre. Therefore, the utilization of merchant shipping was no longer an 
effective or suitable method of mobilising a fleet. Moving forward the navy necessitated 
purpose-built ships.  
This can be seen in the drastic increase in ships owned by the crown. At the beginning of 
the reign of Henry VIII, the crown had five ships within permanent ‘royal service’. At the 
end of his reign, forty-seven more had been constructed and thirty-five more acquired14. 
This dramatic increase in the size of his navy by one-thousand five hundred and sixty 
percent resulted in a need for a more structured form of naval organisation.   
Lambert also asserts that the reign of Henry VIII was a pivotal moment in England’s 
transformation into a ‘sea power state’. He states that when England underwent the 
reformation of its church and broke from Rome, Henry broke from the ‘European 
System’. Subsequently, this also enabled Henry to access the vast financial wealth of the 
monasteries after he dissolved them in the 1530’s. This money “filled the royal coffers 
and released timber, stone and bronze for national defence projects” (lambert, 2018, 
pp.268-9). 
 
13 Sir John Pennington fought in the First Dutch War as Vice Admiral of the fleet, he also held the office in 
1639 of Admiral of the Channel Fleet (Naval Biography, 1895, pp. 354-356) 
14 Henry VIII reigned from 1509-1547. 
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Scott- Wheeler praises the Tudor Naval era for its success, “Henry VIII used the navy 
successfully as his first line of defence against the French and Spanish and as an offensive 
instrument against Scotland in the 1540’s” (Scott- Wheeler, 1999; 23).  
Additionally, as a protestant country there was an increased threat to Elizabeth I from 
neighbouring Catholic states, as witnessed with the Spanish Armada (Lambert, 2018, p. 
271). Therefore, we can see a clear rationalisation for the increased armament and 
military development under Elizabeth. 
This dramatic and swift increase in size led to a requirement for the efficient and rapid 
development of naval administration, in order to cope with the increased demand. This 
can be seen in a table detailing the increased naval shipbuilding under the Tudors, taken 
from the research of M. Oppenheim (Oppenheim, 1988, p.118)15. In 1559, only six ships 
were built, rising to twenty-two in 1601 with particularly high years of thirty-three ships 
being built in 1588 and 1599. This demonstrates the clear rise in the commissioning of 
Royal Navy ships throughout this era.  
In 1509, the only official naval administrator was the ‘Clerk of the Ships’, a post which had 
been filled since 1495 by Robert Brigadine16. This office had no real financial authority 
because the sovereign still had to approve all naval expenditure. Davies argues that the 
Royal Navy could still not be characterised as professional during this early Tudor era, 
because it was not manned during peace time (1965, p.268-277).  
 
15 Please find a table detailing increased naval shipbuilding under the Tudors in the appendixes of this 
thesis.  
16 Also spelt Brygandyne. Brigadine worked in this role between1495 and 1523 covering “a transitional 
period of the change from the medieval to the beginnings of the modern navy”. He was of Yeoman class 
from Wachenden in Kent. He retained the foremost position in naval matters during Henry VIII’s reign. 
(Oppenheim, 1896, pp. xvii-xix) 
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Henry VIII was not the only Tudor to focus administrative and financial attention towards 
the Royal Navy. Using the example of the Spanish Armada, Geoffrey Parker describes the 
success of Queen Elizabeth I (Parker, 1996, p.284). He cites the concentration and 
location of guns on her ships, making them larger and more streamlined. However, he 
also prominently addresses the “crown’s sustained financial commitment to the fleet”. 
Parker describes how the Elizabethan fleet, in comparison to Phillip of Spain’s fleet, 
benefited from “almost a century of relatively heavy investment by the state in its navy” 
(Parker, 1996, p. 286). This was essential, due to the time-consuming nature of mobilising 
a fleet. Therefore, Elizabeth invested in ship-building and the training of a permanent 
resident crew for her ships.  
However, In contrast, Scott-Wheeler highlights Elizabeth I’s inefficiencies with her navy, 
drawing attention to her reputation of underfeeding the fleet and lacking payments for 
the crew upon completion of deployment, he states that “Elizabeth earned reputation for 
tight-fistedness the old fashioned way- by doing everything as cheaply as possible” (Scott-
Wheeler, 1999; 23).  
There was a commission established in 1618 that attempted to reform the navy’s 
administration. This commission pointed “out the direct responsibility of the principal 
officers for the waste, peculation and neglect which had prevailed since 1603”, resulting 
in the proposition of measures to curb abuse within office, which they deemed to be the 
primary source of dishonesty (Andrews, 1991, p. 145)17.  
 
17 This 1618 commission was first mentioned in the privy council on the 4th June 1618 and guided by Sir 
Fulke Greville. However, Buckingham had shown an interest in it by August of the same year. At the 
beginning of the year, the 28-year-old Buckingham had turned down the role of Lord High Admiral citing 
inexperience, but obviously his interest had increased by the end of the year, as he took part in the 
commission as well as taking up the role of Lord High Admiral. This commission found significant abuses by 
two of the King James I’s Favourites; Nottingham and Mansell.  
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Leslie Wilcox argues that it would be fair to describe victualling as a system of abuse due 
to the fact that “all who could were making money out of it” (Wilcox, 1996, p.119). 
Kenneth Andrews counters this, asserting that it was also “The poverty of the crown 
[that] was responsible for bad victualling, pay arrears and mutinous conduct” (Andrews, 
1991, p.145), not just abuses and fraudulent practices.  
Upon the ascension of the early Stuart Monarch’s the navy entered a period of neglect. 
There were only 30 warships, which were frequently laid up and only manned by a 
skeleton crew of ships keepers. Scott- Wheeler asserts that James could have afford to 
sustain a maintained peace time navy “but James chose not to spend enough of his 
income and personal time for that purpose” (Scott-Wheeler, 1999, pp.26-28). 
 
4.4 Interregnum administration (1649-1660) 
 
James Wheeler collated data relating to naval expenditure between 1600 and 1699. He 
explains that “the growth of the annual costs of the navy during the seventeenth century 
are another reliable guide to the magnitude of the military revolution at sea” (Wheeler, 
1999, p.203). He also explains that between 1600-1635 the state owned thirty warships, 
between 1650 and 1688, this had rocketed to between eighty and one hundred 
permanently state-owned warships (Wheeler, 1999, p.203). 
Period War or peace time Naval Cost (£) Per Annum (£) 
1600-09 W/P 678,405 67,000 
1610-19 P 591,630 59,000 
 
This commission Enquired into; additional allowances granted to senior naval captains and admirals and 
their dead pays, enquiries into increased expenses of naval sites, surveying provisions, analysis of historic 
enquiries to help avoid future abuses and more (McGowen, 1967, pp. 10-16).  
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1620-29 P/W 1,214,925 121,000 
1630-39 P 1,436,770 143,000 
1640-50 W 2,901,802 290,000 
1651-60 W 6,302,671 663,000 
1660-69 P/W 6,610,620 661,000 
1670-79 P 6,061,678 606,000 
1680-89 P 5,013,843 501,000 
1690-99 W 17,632,863 1,763,000 
Table 6- A table Taken from (Wheeler, 1994, p.204) that demonstrates Peace and Wartime spending in the 
Seventeenth Century navy. 
The overall structure of the administration within the navy did not change on a large scale 
for a long time period, however, the English Civil War led to many temporary changes to 
the structure18. The Navy Board became known as the Navy Commission, this was the first 
change the Parliamentarians initiated to take control and gain power within the navy 
(Aylmer, 1973, p. 10).  
Oppenheim details the changing nature of the Navy Board stating that it was the primary 
administrative body of power between 1546 and 1618, however during the era of 1618 
and 1619, “we have a transitional period when the Navy Officers, Commissioners of the 
Admiralty, Parliamentary Committees, Lord Admiral and the King were all at different 
times, and occasionally simultaneously, ruling and directing” (Oppenheim, 1988, p. x).  
 
18 The English Civil War took place between 1642 and 1651 between the Cavaliers (Supporters of King 
Charles I) and the Roundheads (Parliamentarian supporters of Cromwell) that eventually resulted in a 
Cromwellian victory and the execution of Charles I. It is estimated that between one third and one quarter 
of 16-60-year-old men were raised to arms for all or part of the civil conflict (Wankyln and Jones. 2014, p.3). 
The period of time between the execution of Charles I and the restoration of the monarchy in 1660 is 
referred to as the ‘Interregnum government’. 
 
82 
 It was also the Parliamentary Navy Commission that began to bequeath finances to the 
Treasurer (Rodger, 2006, p. 33 and Wilcox, 1966, p. 19). This Interregnum period proved 
challenging for administrative bodies within the navy as a result of conflicting 
Parliamentarian and Royalist loyalties, affecting both serving captains as well as the ‘civil 
servant’ figures within the boards. A knowledge of the historical context of the 
Parliamentary and Royalist conflict is essential because it illuminates why Parliament 
were often difficult in bequeathing support and financial provision to the restoration 
navy. 
The majority of the fleet joined the Parliamentarian cause by mid-1642, which led to 
significant personnel changes. For example, the King discharged the Earl of 
Northumberland from his position as Lord Admiral due to his Parliamentarian 
sympathies19. In response, Parliament placed the Earl of Warwick into this position, both 
for his sympathetic views as well as his maritime connections; collected from his 
‘privateer and colonial voyages’ (Blakemore, 2014, p. 254-5).  
King Charles I attempted to ‘buy’ the loyalty of his fleet by giving his sailors their first pay 
rise since Queen Elizabethan I. Blakemore argues against the conventional narrative that 
the sailors were solely motivated by financial gain, instead asserting that their 
questionable loyalty to the Royalist cause was due to the historic poor management of 
the fleet, including bad victuals (Blakemore, 2014, p.254-5). However, it is worth noting 
that Blackmore balances his argument by stating that there was a lack of complaint from 
sailors in the 1640s regarding mistreatment.  
 
19 The Earl of Northumberland gained military experience under Elizabeth I, fighting in the Low Countries 
with Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester. His navy experienced was gained under the Lord High Admiralship of 
Charles Howard (who served 1585-1619). He was accused by James I of being involved in the gunpowder 
plot, however he was released from the tower in 1620. (Naval Biography 1805, p.291) 
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The Commonwealth Parliament also decided to substitute the ‘Derby House Committee’, 
also known as the ‘Committee of Both Kingdoms’ for a Council of State. The Derby House 
Committee was comparable to a Privy Council, because their authority was executive 
instead of consultative, “Except for the raising and issuing of money, it could initiate and 
carry through an almost unlimited range of business”. Its powers included issuing 
instructions to the army and navy as well as international diplomacy. These powers 
encompassed those of the Lord Admiral, which were transferred to a subcommittee 
entitled the ‘Admiralty Committee’. The Navy Commissioners came underneath this 
committee, although “its relation to the Navy Committee of the house itself was less 
clear. The preparation of estimates for Parliament and of schemes for financing the navy 
was probably that committee’s main role”. In addition, the roles of Clerk of the Acts and 
Comptroller were omitted from the new Navy Board all together (Aylmer, 1973, p. 18-40).  
Rodger describes the inadequacies of the regime during this time period (1649-1660), in 
particular with the Dutch War revealing the limitations of the administration (Rodger, 
2006, p.34)20. He states that “Men of proven ability and experience had been replaced by 
others chosen for religious and political loyalty”.  
The First Dutch War was also responsible for highlighting the need for a more efficient 
and simpler structure. “The Parliamentary Navy Committee was eliminated, Admiralty 
 
20 The Anglo-Dutch Wars were a series of conflicts that led to both Dutch and British defeats between 1652 
and 1674. They were instigated in 1652 in reaction to the British Navigation Act of 1651 that was created in 
an attempt to curb the Dutch growing dominance in international trade. This act formally stated that the 
Channel was an English waterway and as such foreign ships should lower their ensigns in submission to 
England as well as be prepared for the British perceived right to ‘stop and search’ within the channel. This 
led to increased tensions that results in the arming of Dutch merchant shipping and their accompaniment of 
warships through the channel and ultimately in a series of battles to gain dominance between the British 
and the Dutch. (Palmer, 2005, pp. 39-52) 
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authority was given to a new (and smaller) Admiralty Commission, and administration 
remained in the hands of the navy commission” (Cock and Rodger, 2008, p.25).  
During the First Dutch War naval spending increased, reforming the previous policy of 
restrained military spending. “These pressures and general dissatisfaction with the 
existing procedure led to a new department in December 1652/January 1653. This was 
comparable to the appointment of the six new Admiralty and Navy Commissioners. There 
were to be four new commissioners for inspecting the treasuries, with powers to 
reorganise them as they saw fit. All of these commissioners were also MPs” (Aylmer, 
1973, p. 25-26). 
The Protectorate’s failures in terms of the administration of the Royal Navy are often 
seen as so overwhelming, that they distract from the successes of the protectorate. For 
example, the Commonwealth accumulated mammoth debts, as a result, this failure often 
overshadows a notable change in the tax system. In 1645 a new form of taxation was 
established that changed the financial situation for the state because it meant that they 
could now borrow against themselves in a short-term capacity (Rodger, 2004, p.38). 
Previously, the state would have to levy a new taxation to pay for an upcoming 
expenditure such as a war or battle. Patrick O’Brien describes the taxation in post-
restoration England as steadily increasing to meet the demands of the increasing financial 
burden of conflict. He states that between 1660 and 1815 taxation was increased 18 
times (O’Brien, 1998, pp. 1-2). 21 
 
21 “While Poll taxes, annuities, and lotteries were resorted to by English governments from 1660-1770 to 
provide some of the financial sinews of power, the three regular taxes of the Interregnum- that is customs, 
excise, and assessment- proved to be the most reliable and acceptable ways to make money well into the 
eighteenth century” (Wheeler, 1999, p. 241) 
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John Beckett describes the changing attitudes towards taxation in the late seventeenth 
century; 
“The long-held belief that the King should ‘live of his own’, and that extraordinary 
direct taxation ought to be raised only for emergencies such as war, had been restored 
in 1660, perpetuated in 1685, and –in an attenuated form- continued at the revolution. 
The land tax however, was a direct tax levied year in and year out in peace and war, 
and as a result the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary taxation became 
increasingly blurred” (Beckett, 1985, p. 285). 
 
Figure 2- A table showing the contribution of taxation for the overall revenue required to partake in 
international conflict during the reign of William and Mary (O’Brien, 1988, p. 4). 
 
At this same time period a second form of financial change was introduced. A new 
payment method was introduced by the Treasury. New negotiable bills were issued, 
“payable ‘in course’ (meaning in numbered sequence of issue)”. The Navy Commission 
also used this system for their own payments on credit. As these bills were described as 
negotiable, the price could be inflated or discounted by contractors, who in turn would 
necessitate increasing their own prices to accommodate the previous discounts (Rodger, 
2006, p. 41). “The bills and warrants were endorsed in a manner somewhat similar to a 
cheque, anticipating the exchequer orders as described by Chandaman [who says that] 
these orders ‘actually created credit’” (Wheeler, 1996, p. 458-460).  This system was 
 
86 
clearly not integrated into administrative practices effectively during the Interregnum 
government because this was re-introduced again during the restoration under the 
administration Samuel Pepys. This is researched in depth in the final case study of this 
thesis.  
During part of the era of the Navy Commission, specifically 1649 to 1651, the Navy 
Commission took on the responsibility of victualling for the navy. This was achieved by 
gathering a ‘syndicate of victuallers’ under the authority of Colonel Pride, who to achieve 
success within their roles, had to utilise their own Credit and reputation for the navy’s 
Finance and supplies acquisition. As there were multiple victuallers, they worked in 
partnership with each other, rather than as a one man supply system (Wilcox, 1966, p. 
120). From 1654, there was only one gentleman left from this syndicate; Thomas Alderne. 
His role developed and he was given an official role, accompanied by a permanent salary 
until his death three years later.  
This was financially a problematic time for victualling and the Royal Navy as their credit 
was diminishing due to their lack of monetary support from parliament. However, the 
new commissioners; Francis Willoughby, Nehemiah Bourne and Robert Thomson 
continued a new system which focused upon attempting to purchase their supplies 
internationally. This invariably meant that they were “Undercut[ing] The London 
Merchants” (Rodger, 2006, p.43). This led to a reduction in the cost of victuals by thirty-
nine percent. Rodger debates this point, arguing that this could potentially be attributed 
to ‘incidental bountiful seasonal harvests’, however, he compares the average price 
reductions nationally (sixteen percent) with the navy’s price reduction of thirty-nine 
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percent and demonstrates that although this allows for the Harvest it also suggests that 
international purchasing aided in the reduction in prices of victuals.  
However, even with this in consideration, the credit of the navy had declined to such 
extreme lows that victualling was becoming near impossible and by 1670 there were 
ships within the fleet that were literally starving due to lack of provisions.  
These financial issues proved a wider concern than just victualling. The entire navy was 
nearing bankruptcy. Rodger gives examples of the one and a quarter million pounds debt 
as well as ship’s companies who had not been paid for as long as four years (Rodger, 
2006, p.95). During the Interregnum period, victualling was supplied through ‘contracts’ 
along with the supply of timber and naval stores (Aylmer, 1973, p. 40). Timber in 
particular proved a difficult commodity to source across Europe, with mass shortages 
becoming a common occurrence, with all countries attempting re-afforestation, 
Specifically, England enclosed all of the royal forests to preserve the timber for ship 
building (Harding, 2002, p. 217).  
The attempts to revive the Navy Commission during this era led to complications. The 
Navy Commission was restructured with members of Parliament; however, these men did 
not prove popular with the senior naval officers, who submitted “complaints of 
malpractice” (Rodger, 2006, p.43). This led to a successive restructure resulting in the 
elimination of many guilty parties. This led to only five remaining officers; John Holland, 
Robert Moulton, Thomas Smith, Peter Pett and Robert Thomson. “Holland resigned and 
Moulton died in that year [1652], leaving Smith as the only survivor of the pre-1649 
Commission” (Rodger, 2006, p. 43). Necessitating the addition of Willoughby, Hopkins 
and Bourne to complete the commission. 
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Prior to the English Civil war (pre- 1642), there was a period of low investment in the 
navy, due to James I’s ‘peace-loving’ nature. This went as far as withdrawing the English 
from the Spanish War22. According to a letter from the Mayor of Plymouth, this deprived 
the men of the potential financial gain of prizes. Additionally, this lower investment 
enabled foreign navies to assert their control in English waters. The Mayor states that the 
Turkish Navy captured in excess of one thousand men and in the ten days preceding this 
letter they had captured twenty-seven ships and two hundred men. This resulted in 
growing fear amongst merchant ships and fishermen for their safety (Wilcox, 1966, p. 33-
4).  
In reaction to this, Charles I commissioned a small fleet. However, it was Cromwell, in the 
Interregnum years, who made the largest changes to the size of the fleet. He understood 
the significance of maritime trade and as such re-built the navy, resulting in the fleet 
expending to the size of two hundred and twenty-nine ships. Prizes had been a necessary 
component of the government combating the ‘agency’ dilemma of the captains having 
full control at Sea of vast and expensive Ships of War23. These prizes were rewarded on 
successes and maintenance of their posts at sea, the prizes were usually granted from the 
‘spoils of war’.24 Douglas Allen states that this system was problematic, because as much 
 
22 A series of conflicts fought between Spain and England, between 1585-1604, including the famous naval 
battle; The Spanish Armada. These conflicts ended after James I ascended the throne succeeding Elizabeth I 
and withdrew from the conflict. 
23 Agency Theory is a sociological theory that has been used by scholars in business related fields since the 
1960s. The Theory asks the question of risk when one party (the principal) delegates work to his agent. 
Issues arise in this relationship for 2 reasons; firstly, when the desires or goals of the principal and agent 
enter into conflict with each other and secondly when it becomes too costly or arduous for the principal to 
accurately monitor and verify the work of the agent. (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 57-74). This can be seen when a 
naval ship is on deployment in foreign seas and their work cannot be verified by the Navy Board. 
24 Prize money was awarded as an incentive to the men for taking or sinking an enemy ship. When sold, the 
value of the ship was distributed, 1/8th was awarded to the commander in chief, ¼ was awarded to the 
Captain, 1/8th was awarded to the master and lieutenants, the warrant officers and the petty officers with 
the final ¼ granted to the rest of the crew, including the marines. (Rodger, 2004, p. 522) 
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as it worked as a motivator it also diverted the captain’s attention towards hunting “for 
lucrative prizes instead of pursuing more strategic objectives” (Allen, 2002, p.206).  
 
4.5 Restoration administration (1660-1688) 
 
The ‘restoration’ is the specific time period relating to this research, the post 1660 era in 
which the monarch (King Charles II) was restored to power after the Cromwellian and 
Protectorate governments- who ruled England after the English Civil War. The restoration 
administration faced many problems when they took over the handling of the Royal Navy. 
Firstly, the new administration under the Stuart monarchy inherited debt and disorder 
from the Interregnum administration. It is estimated that they received roughly £750,000 
worth of accumulated Interregnum debt (Thomas, 1982, p. 19)25. The second problem 
faced by the restoration government was the political power struggle between 
Parliament and crown. The crown held the executive powers for the navy, however 
Parliament held the financial and legislative abilities (Ranft, 1952, p. 368).  
Parliament had historically held the right to grant taxation since the Magna Carta was 
implemented in 1215 to curb the powers of King John II. Therefore, theoretically this was 
not a new political or financial system. However, since the Civil War and the Protectorate 
government’s establishment of authority in the United Kingdom, Parliament gained an 
increased level of power, those of which had previously sat within the monarch’s 
prerogatives- even after the restoration of the monarchy. Frank Fox describes this power 
 
25 In modern monetary value this is equivalent to £78,881,175.00. This was calculated using the National 
Archives ‘Calculating Purchasing Power’ calculation. Accessed from 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency-converter/ (25.09.2018)  
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struggle by stating that in theory normal naval spending should have been covered by the 
crown’s fixed revenues, most notably Customs receipts. However, these were insufficient 
to fund the necessary costs of ‘ordinary spending’, for example the victualling and 
manning the of fleet. Therefore, this difference and any ‘extraordinary’ spending was to 
be granted by Parliament. Extraordinary spending included war and ship building (Fox, 
2009, p.15).  
Ranft holds strong views relating to the Interregnum administration, of which he can 
often be unforgiving and severe. He believes that they had an impairing lack of expertise 
in technological matters that prohibited it from “performing any useful function” (Ranft, 
1952, p. 368). Although severe, Ranft’s view is interesting because, in the era of the 
restoration administration, parliament held an enhanced level of power due to their 
ability to restrict finances. However, as Ranft states, unlike the Stuart monarchs; King 
Charles II and King James II, the interregnum leaders were not expert in naval matters.  
Conversely, Davies attempts to see this problem from the perspective of parliament. He 
argues that a motivation for Parliament withholding money from the navy could be the 
lack of trust held for the navy and the Crown. Parliament believed that the navy was “the 
Trojan horse of arbitrary power” that could entice the Crown to forever banish 
Parliament (Davies, 1993, p. 274). This consideration aids our understanding of the 
growing mutual fear, however it led to some of the biggest issues facing the navy during 
this time period. The most notable include; a crippling lack of financial support, 
corruption and abuses as well as ill-discipline with the fleet.  
Corruption and abuses are one of the more frequent complaints of this era. Edmund 
Spragge argued that it was not immoral to partake in abuses for private profiteering 
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because if he was not personally receiving these ‘bonuses’, then somebody else would 
instead, but either way, the money would not return to the King’s exchequer (Pepys, MS 
2851, pp. 225-6).   
Tanner describes the 1660-1673 period as being the least important in the history of the 
Stuart navy, quoting Pepys as saying that the Navy Office was in an unsatisfactory state 
prior to this point (Tanner, 1897, p. 20) 26. Two things are worth noting here. Firstly, 1673 
coincides with James, Duke of York re-releasing instructions for the role of Lord High 
Admiral and the instructions for the management of the Navy Board.27 But secondly it is 
worth noting that this is a quote from Pepys, who tended to be self-aggrandising, and as 
such would surely enjoy claiming that the navy was significantly better after his 
introduction as secretary in 1673. Examples of his self-aggrandising nature can be seen in 
extracts of his own diary. He felt the requirement to ensure that his readers are aware 
that he was “the first that took the pains to bring the victualling-contract (Pepys, 1667, as 
cited in Latham and Matthews, 1971). This is just one of many instances, in which he 
highlights his own achievements. Tanner did not address specifically what he meant by 
the ‘least important’, this could relate to administrative change, this could relate to 
political upheaval, this could relate to the study of naval history as a whole? However, it is 
worth noting, that as Tanner himself points out, due to the Second Dutch War, the 
finances of the navy were in dire straits. He states that between 1655-1666, the navy was 
in arrears to the sum of 2,312,876l (Tanner, 1897, p.82). Therefore, if he is stating that the 
 
26 In comparison to 1673-79 time period and the 1684-88 time period. Tanner categorises these time 
periods using the justification that 1660-73 marked the era of the restoration to the Duke of York stepping 
down due to the introduction of the Test Act. 1673-9 marks the era in which Pepys administered the navy 
as secretary to the admiral, and finally the 1684-8 time frame marks James, Duke of York returning to office 
as Lord High Admiral.  




1660-1673 time period was least important in reducing abuses, it is true that abuses were 
not completely eradicated and the finances were not ‘solved’, but, with the financial 
context of the situation being so complex, the advancements made can still be attributed 
as a real step towards change and thus important in their own right. As will be seen in 
great detail in each of the case studies of this research. 
The Second Dutch War contributed to the progress of administration; because of the 
urgency of manning, victualling and administrating a growing fleet.28 New commissioners 
were appointed to the Navy Board to oversee distant dockyards, including Portsmouth 
and Harwich. They were slightly more junior to the officers representing the London 
dockyards. They were also not senior within the Navy Board and not senior over the 
officers within the dockyards themselves. Rodger describes this phenomenon using a case 
study of the yard commissioner. Their authority enabled them to “supervise, advice, warn 
and report” but this was where their official power ended. The yard commissioner could 
not give explicit orders. Therefore, for him to be successful in his vocation, he needed to 
have a strong personal character to ensure that he could gain respect and acceptance 
from the workers. Naturally, this caused regular disputes amongst senior officers (Rodger, 
2006, p. 104).  
The revival of the Sick and wounded Commission was also another bi-product of the 
Second Dutch War29. However, it was disbanded upon the completion of the war, it 
proved to be unsustainable due to the Navy’s struggling finances. However, it did work in 
 
28 4 March 1665 – 31 July 1667 
29 This commission was first instituted in 1653 for the intention of aiding sick and wounded seamen. J J S 
Shaw describes this as “the first organized attempt by England to ensure medical aid for her sailors”. As was 
the status quo during the seventeenth century, this was hindered to some extent due to the lack of financial 




conjunction with the ‘Chatham chest’- a charity that originated within the Tudor era to 
benefit disabled naval veterans, who were wounded in service (Rodger, 2006, p. 104).  
The Third Dutch War (1672) also created political change in the form of the rebalancing of 
power over the navy between Parliament and Crown. Between the restoration of the 
monarchy and the Third Dutch War, Parliament’s involvement in naval matters had been 
sporadic. Davies describes the relationship; 
 “There had been a few statutes to regulate the service, notably the ‘Act for establishing 
Articles and orders for the regulating and better government of His Majesty’s Navies, 
ships of war and Forces by sea’ (in other words, the first statutory set of articles of war 
for the navy) of 1661. A few naval officers and administrators, such as George Carteret30 
and Sir William Penn31, had sat in the commons, but their Parliamentary careers were 
generally characterised by inactivity, and a noticeable failure to create any noticeable 
change on behalf of the navy. The only period of intensive naval scrutiny of naval issues 
by the restoration Parliament had come in the sessions of 1667-8, when MPs had 
debated the ‘naval miscarriages’ of the Second Dutch War hotly, erratically and 
ultimately, inconclusively” (Davies, 1993, p. 272).  
However, after the Third Dutch War, the Admiralty was passed over to the control of a 
commission headed by Prince Rupert32. Rodger argues that this was a “gesture of great 
importance. Instead of being entirely within the sphere of the King’s prerogative powers, 
 
30 Cartarett was also a Lieutenant on the ‘Royal Prince’ in 1665 and became commander at Oxford in 1666. 
He commanded both the Jersey and Foresight. (Biographia Navalis 1, 1794, p. 157) 
31 Sir William Penn first served as a Rear Admiral in the Irish Station but also served as Vice Admiral in the 
First Dutch War. He left the navy after the Second Dutch War in 1666 and lived a comfortable life in 
retirement (Naval Biography, 1805, p. 469). 
32 Prince Rupert was the first cousin to King Charles II of England. He was a renowned military leader and 
seen as a ‘Cavalier Hero’ after his effort fighting in the English Civil War. Charles II appointed Rupert as 
second-in-command of the British fleet during the Second Dutch War. (Fox, 2009: pp. 3-6). He did not arrive 
in England until the outbreak of the Civil War and offered the Stuart monarchy his support because he 
believed so strongly in their cause (Naval Biography, 1805, p. 416).  
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the navy was now in a more neutral position, somewhere part-way between King and 
Parliament” (Rodger, 2006, p.107). However, this was a change that did not last.  
Due to the ‘Popish Plot’ and the ongoing friction between the Catholics, the monarch and 
Parliament; the King needed to increase his appeasement of Parliament and discharged 
Prince Rupert from his role33. A bi-product of this change was the dismissal of Pepys from 
office, who even though capable, was not seen as a ‘Parliamentarian’. A political crisis arose 
in the aftermath of the unsuccessful Third Dutch war, which necessitated the resignation 
of King Charles II’s brother as Lord High Admiral (Cock and Rodger, 2008, p. 25). It took until 
1684, for Charles II to feel powerful enough to regain control of his Admiralty.  
Using his new powers, he installed an inquiry into naval management and administration. 
The recommendations for this inquiry included the construction of a Navy Commission, 
with the aim for it to work in conjunction with the Navy Board. The Commission would work 
towards restoring the administration and the Navy Board would continue to work through 
their old accounts and documentation (Rodger, 2006, p. 109-10). It is thought that during 
this period, the reason for increased Parliamentary concern in the navy, was due to 
increased paranoia over a possible French invasion attempt. Louis XIV of France was said 
to be fitting out a fleet at Brest. Clearly, only an international enemy in the form of France 
could align both Parliament and Crown’s interests (Davies, 1993, p. 276).  
  
 
33 A fictitious assassination plot against Charles II, devised to swell anti Catholic feeling in England between 
1678 and 1681. 
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4.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has provided this thesis with the historical context surrounding the naval 
administration before and during the restoration of the monarchy in 1660. It has 
chronologically through sections 4.2 to 4.4 reviewed the naval administration through the 
Tudor period, early Stuart, Interregnum and Restoration eras. 
It has explored the flaws and problems in the administration, including the financial issues 
due to the underfunding of the organisation. In turn, this gives the historical context for 
the subsequent three case studies chapters which enables the thesis to demonstrate why 
the implementation of management control systems in order to move towards 
organisational professionalism is important.   
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Chapter Five- Duke of York Case study 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The Duke of York is the first of the three biographical case studies that this thesis will 
investigate in order to establish the extent to which attempts made by three senior 
individuals to instigate management controls were responsible for the organisational 
professionalisation of the Royal Navy in the late 17th century. The previous chapters have 
set the scene for the developments and reforms made by the Duke of York, by 
demonstrating what we mean by professionalisation and management control as well as 
supplying us the historical context necessary to understand the implications of the Duke 
of York’s reforms.  
The aim of this case study is, through the use of archival sources dating to the tenure of 
James as Lord High Admiral, to answer this thesis’ research objective and identify one of 
three key actors and create a biographical case study. This will focus on the reforms that 
he put in place and how these established standardised operating procedures, 
managerialism, control mechanisms and rewards systems. 
The case study will firstly, use primary and secondary literature to attempt to understand 
James’ character, Section 5.3 will investigate the contrasting perceptions of the Duke of 
York across the current scholarship. Section 5.4 to 5.6 will give even further biographical 
and historical context than we saw in chapter 3. It will detail what he achieved during the 
years he held the post of Lord High Admiral, explain the role of the Navy Board as well as 
giving specific details relating the financial difficulties facing the navy at this point and the 
effect this was having as an organisation.   
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 Following this, the case study will then attempt to assess the contributions made by the 
Duke of York in implementing management control in order to work towards 
organisational professionalism. This is achieved by exploring what accounting procedures 
the Duke of York implemented and then assessing which of these can be seen as 
displaying the metrics for this thesis’ framework for professionalisation or management 
control. This will help to contribute towards the overall research aim of assessing how 
one of the three senior individuals who instigated management controls was responsible 
for the organisational professionalisation of the Royal Navy in the late 17th century. 
This will be achieved through in-depth primary source analysis through section 5.7 to 5.9  
The thesis will explore a wide range of sources, however the main source used in this case 
study were the various editions of a set of instructions issued by James, for regulating the 
affairs of the navy. This will be broken down into key themes, these include; the 
implementation of accounting procedures, increased efficiency, the ‘State of the Navy’ 
and the reduction of abuses. Evidence found from within these instructions will be 
supplemented by additional primary evidence including letters, court documents and 
diary extracts. Building upon the discussion in section 2.6 relating to the strengths and 
weaknesses of using primary source material, the validity of these sources will be 
analysed, including dissemination, originality and authorship.   
Finally, this chapter will discuss the state of the navy at the end of the Duke of York’s 
tenure. It will ascertain that the navy was not perfect at this point and address the areas 
that further reform would be required. Because, as stated in the research aims and 
objectives, the Duke of York supported the navy in moving towards organisational 
professionalism, it is not stating that the organisation was fully professionalised in 1688. 
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5.2 Introduction to James, Duke of York 
 
Compared to other British monarchs, comparatively few historians have taken note of 
James Stuart, Duke of York - the future King James II of England and VII of Scotland. Using 
the scant literature surrounding him and references to him in Charles II’s literature we 
can see that James was a complex man, particularly worthy of further research.  
James was born at St. James’ Palace on the 14th October 1633, the second surviving son of 
King Charles I and Queen Henrietta Maria (Lambert, 2008, p.83).34 He spent the 
Interregnum years in Europe after escaping Cromwell’s control in April 1648. He worked 
in the French army but then transferred to the Spanish military after the French entered 
into an allegiance with Cromwell in 1655 (Lambert, 2008, p.85). In addition to this, he was 
granted the governorship of Jersey by his older brother the future Charles II, an island 
that was still retained under Royalist control (Speck, 2009). James proved himself to be a 
capable and popular leader under Spanish employ and was promoted to Lord Admiral in 
1660 (Bryant, 1962). However, due to the English restoration of the monarchy and the 
Duke of York’s subsequent return to the country of his birth, he did not have the 
opportunity to take up the position of Lord Admiral (Speck, 2009).  
In the aftermath of King Charles II and the Duke of York returning upon the restoration of 
the monarchy, their priority was to begin clearing the accumulated Interregnum debts 
and begin reforming the Royal Navy35. James had held the title of Lord High Admiral since 
the age of five, as was common precedent, because it allowed the young prince to draw 
 
34 Please see appendix one for a family tree detailing the Tudor and Stuart succession  
35 Lord Montagu, accompanied by Samuel Pepys collected the King and his brother from Scheveningen in 
May 1660 (Stuart, 1962, p. 292).  
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the wage of the office (Lambert, 2008, p. 3). James was re-granted these honours in a 
ceremony upon the restoration, with his patents of appointments not being issued 
officially until 29th January 1661 (PRO 30/24/3 & Pepys, 1661, as cited in Latham and 
Matthews, 1971). 
James inherited one hundred and thirty ships from the Commonwealth (Speck, 2009). 
One of his first tasks he undertook was to change the names of the Commonwealth ships 
back to those associated with the monarchy. For example, ‘The Resolution’ returned to its 
earlier name ‘The Prince Royal’ and the ‘Naseby’ became the ‘Royal Charles’ (Lambert, 
2008, p. 89) 36 37. 
 
5.3 Contrasting perceptions to the Duke of York’s character and contributions 
 
Throughout the literature on James Stuart, two prominent and contrasting depictions of 
James’ character have emerged. One school of thought is that he was one of the most 
capable royal military leaders in English history. Thomas described James as “the ablest 
naval commander ever to sit on the throne of England” (Thomas, 1982, p. 20). This is a 
view echoed by Lambert, who credits Charles II and James as being “the only English Kings 
to be genuinely expert in naval matters” (Lambert, 2008, p.90). Other historians and 
 
36 The Naseby was named after a decisive battle of the English Civil War that enabled the Parliamentarians 
to find victory in the Civil War (Ross, 1888, p.668). 
37 This instant attempt to dissociate himself with the Interregnum government is naturally associated with 
the very bitter feeling felt by the Stuart brothers. Within his memoirs, James describes Richard Cromwell’s 
“Mock-government” and the execrable murder of his father. And the “happy conduct of the restoration of 




biographers focus instead upon his licentious ways and view him as a young excitable 
womaniser who focused more on his scandalous love life than on any of his official duties.  
Tanner argues in his Biography on James II that there are frequent difficulties that arise 
when trying to ascertain this information, due to the unreliability of primary sources in 
this period (Tanner, 1897, p 60). He quotes both the Venetian Count de Grammont and 
Samuel Pepys regarding James’ womanising reputation38. These sources are frequently 
questioned for their reliability, due to their love of gossip amongst other things, however, 
the corroboration of these two independent sources would lead us to believe there in an 
element of truth in this interpretation of his character. However, it is also worth 
considering the variety of Pepys quotes and sources, he also states the following; 
 “If it had not pleased God to give us a King and Duke that understood the sea, this 
nation had ‘ere this been quite beaten out of it, such was the deplorable condition of 
our Navy when they came in, in comparison to the Dutch” (Pepys, 1673, as cited in 
Samuel Pepys Naval Minutes, 1980, p. 84). 
This demonstrates that even though Pepys is occasionally negative in his attitude towards 
James, he is also complimentary towards his capabilities. This is unsurprising considering 
his diaries span a nine-year time period and reflect his changing mood and 
interpretations.  
 
38 Pepys is famous for keeping his linear diary for nine and half years (Dawson, 2000), which serves as an 
invaluable if not biased primary source for this era. It is thought that he spent his career collecting 
documents with an aim to creating a history of the Navy (Tanner, 1920). However, as Mark Dawson states, 
too much emphasis has been placed purely on his diary in the past, and it should be noted the abundance 
of supporting documents and books that he created. This research will use a compilation of his works as 




Turner asserts that James delegated the majority of his work to his ministers, although he 
does concede that it is normal practice to delegate work to a team (Turner, 1950, p.72). 
Even if his ministers did contribute more heavily than James himself, James still deserves 
credit “for without the support of his great position, and without also his decision of 
character, the vested interests and the conservatism inherent in all public services would 
have defied all attempts at reform”. It should also be worth considering the counter-
argument, that it should not necessarily be the focus that he delegated work and as such 
was not ‘hands on’, but instead that the Duke of York’s delegation is an example of how 
he displayed effective leadership qualities? 
This research also asserts that Turner contradicts his own argument by giving numerous 
examples of James’ diligence and attention to the Navy. He references examples from 
Pepys’ Diary, dated the 24th June 1668, where Pepys complains of the “weakness of our 
office” (Pepys, 1668, as cited in Turner, 1950). James responds to this complaint from 
Pepys by granting him the opportunity to create proposals for more defined definitions of 
their duties. Even if James was not responsible for any of the actual innovations and 
writing per se, he was undoubtedly responsible as a leader, in pushing forward innovation 
and facilitating change. Turner argues that he can only be seen as a “Royal Patron”, acting 
as a figure head, with the real credit more fairly attributed to William Coventry and 
Samuel Pepys.  
Turner also states that James did “little beyond weekly meetings of the Navy Board” 
(Turner, 1950, p.73). Turner clearly disregards weekly meetings as unimportant. We can 
see from the different editions of instructions to regulate the navy, which will be 
discussed in greater detail within this case study, that a meeting that took place at the 
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Court of Whitehall in the presence of King Charles II (AND/30, AND/28, MSS44 & Stuart J, 
1660, as cited in the Oeconomy of His Majesty’s Naval Office, 1717). Senior decisions 
were clearly made at this level, so attendance of these meetings should not be 
disregarded. When Turner discusses James’ involvement in the Second Dutch War, he 
observes that “James spent the whole of his days & the greater parts of his nights with 
that part of the fleet, which were being equipped in the Thames” as well as spending time 
at Portsmouth and Chatham Dockyards (Turner, 1950, p.77). This research asserts that 
this does not seem like someone that was not personally involved, and as such makes 
Turner’s statements paradoxical. 
Speck holds the view that “James was no mere figurehead as Lord High Admiral, but took 
an active interest in naval affairs” (Speck, 2009). Tanner also believes James was involved 
in the day to day running of the navy, arguing that “the numerous references to him in 
the state papers show that while he was Lord High Admiral he bestowed a great deal of 
attention upon the duties of the office”. Tanner does not enter into a debate on this 
issue, he simply declares his competence (Tanner, 1920, p.19). 
There was a hiatus in James’ naval career due to the introduction of the Test Act in 
167339. James had stopped taking communion in 1672, and resigned as Lord High Admiral 
in 1673 because under new legislation, his Catholicism made him ineligible to hold public 
office. However, Pool asserts that James still gave expert advice “behind the scenes” 
(Pool, 1966, p.12).  Some historians believe that his Catholicism was a result of his travels 
 
39 The Test Act was introduced by Charles II in 1673 under growing pressure concerning his moderate 
attitude towards non-protestant believers. This act legislated that all holders of public officer should swear 
an oath to both the monarch and the protestant church of English as well as unequivocally denying the 
Catholic doctrinal tradition of transubstantiation. Those unwilling to take this oath were banned from 
holding public office. https://www.Parliament.uk/about/living-
heritage/evolutionofParliament/Parliamentaryauthority/revolution/overview/catholicsprotestants/ 
(accessed on 09/10/2018)  
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whilst in exile during the Commonwealth era. On his way to France, he stayed at a 
Benedictine Monastery and this is seen as a turning point in his religious views (Speck, 
2009) . The situation in England was worsening for James, who was becoming unpopular 
and feared and there were plans after the ‘Popish Plot’ for him to be assassinated. In 
March 1667, James fled to Brussels to avoid the bad feeling for him in England. Amid a 
rumour of Charles II being sick in 1679, he began a return home , but upon Charles’ 
recovery James settled in Edinburgh as the King’s High Commissioner. James returned to 
England in March 1682 to widespread acclaim for his successes in running Scotland. 
The Catholic fear grew in his absence with newspapers lambasting him as a ‘Popish 
Pretender’ (Protestant (Domestick) Intelligence or News Both from City and Country , 
1681). James eventually ascended to the throne of England himself on the 6th February 
1685, becoming King James II, after the death of King Charles II (Speck, 2009). James once 
again reprised his role as Lord High Admiral, which had been filled in his absence by 
Prince Rupert and subsequently King Charles II.  
 
5.4 The Role of the Lord High Admiral 
 
It is worth specifically documenting what James is responsible for in his role as Lord High 
Admiral. His duties, as stipulated in an order in council memorandum dated 13th June 
1673, state the following; He is at all time to be able to give a ‘perfect account of the navy 
including the ships, stores, yards and persons employed and their services. He is to 
oversee with diligence the providing and issuing of stores. And once a month, or oftener if 
the King requires meet with the principal officers and be learned of their methods as well 
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as receiving their weekly reports. He is not to allow money to be spent on anything other 
than originally intended, or use resources on anything than originally intended. Lastly, in 
all things he is only allowed to work in the known and allowed practise of the Royal Navy, 
with all of his orders and letters kept fair record of by his secretary.  
Michael Oppenheim describes the Duke of York’s diligence as Lord High Admiral by 
stating that the rigour with which he undertook his duties overshadowed the Navy Board 
(Oppenheim, 1988, p. x). 
 
5.5 The Navy Board 
 
Before both the Protectorate and restoration governments, the pre-1642 Stuart 
administration consisted of two main components; The Admiralty and the Navy Board. 
However, in the Interregnum years the navy was governed by a Navy Commission  
(Aylmer, 1973), run by a board of seven men and an Admiralty commission of twenty-
eight men (Tanner, Samuel Pepys and the Royal Navy, 1920). However, upon the 
restoration of the monarchy, the Navy Commission was disbanded and the Navy Board 
was resurrected at Seething Lane (Fox, 2009, p.15). 
The Navy Board had previously been known as the ‘Council of the Marine’ (Cock and 
Rodger, 2009, p.24). The Board formed a hierarchical structure with the Admiralty headed 
by the ‘Lord Admiral of England’ which was fed into by the Navy Board, who in turn were 
fed into by the smaller substructures of administration, such as the Victualling Board and 
the Ordnance Board. Each Board or committee was responsible for different key 
necessities for the Royal Navy, it was not a traditional power hierarchy with each 
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subordinate to the next and each office had primary power over their responsibilities40. 
To explain, the Admiralty were responsible for “Policy, Command and Discipline” (Rodger, 
2006, p.33) whereas the Navy Board were overseeing the construction and maintenance 
of Ships and Dockyards (Cock and Rodger, 2009, p.28). The smaller boards sitting 
underneath the Navy Board also had their own functions, for example; the Victualling 
Board were in control of supplying the men with provisions and the Ordnance Board 
oversaw the supply of guns and armaments for the fleet. One should note that the 
Admiralty, chaired by the Lord Admiral of England, was not a standalone position, he 
worked in consultation with the monarch and his aids. 
                                                          
 
Figure 3- A flow chart demonstrating the hierarchy of the Admiralty during the restoration administration 
from 1660. 
The creation of the Navy board was a slow and gradual. The role of the Lord Admiral in 
the Tudor era had been one of “honour of estimation and profytt, but in practise it had 
 
40 Please see table 3 for a breakdown of who held each position during this time period and table 5 for a 
summary of the responsibly of each office. 
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little connection with the day to day running of the navy”. This then slowly progressed to 
become a more bureaucratic and effective office (Davies, 1965, p. 269).  
James’ new Navy Board consisted of; a Treasurer, Surveyor, Comptroller, Clerk of the Acts 
and three additional Commissioners, who were all paid with salaries instead of 
perquisites (Thomas, 1982, p. 21). The original Treasurer’s post was filled by Sir George 
Cartarett, the Comptroller was filled by Sir Robert Slyngsbie, the Surveyor was filled by Sir 
William Batten41 and the Clerk of the Acts by Samuel Pepys, with the three commissioners 
being; Lord John Berkley, Sir William Penn and Peter Pett (Tanner, 1897, p. 21-22), 
(Rodger, 2006, p. 95). Each officer had his own office and staff. Stephen Gradfish states 
that the Comptroller was responsible for auditing the accounts of the Treasurer, the 
Surveyor and the subsidiary boards (Gradfish, 1980, p.15). Over the years these duties 
had become too onerous for the one man alone, and thus, during the latter part of the 
seventeenth century three more commissioners, a Comptroller of the Treasurer’s 
accounts, a Comptroller of the Storekeeper’s accounts and a Comptroller of Victualling 
accounts were added to the staff.  
Below is a table identifying the holders of the posts of principal officers during this time 
period.  








41 Sir William Batten was a Vice Admiral for the Parliamentarian fleet; however, he sailed the ‘Constant 
Warwick’ to collect Charles II upon the Restoration of the monarchy. He was also responsible for 
transmitting the papers of Lord High Admiral to the Duke of York. (Biographia Navalis 1, p. 1794:8) 
 
107 
1661 Sir John 
Mennes42 
   
1666   Lord Anglesey  
1667  Thomas 
Myddleton 
  
1671 Sir Thomas 
Allen43 
   
1672  John Tippetts   
1673   Sir John 
Warden 
 
?   Sir Richard 
Haddock44 
 
     
Table 7- A table showing the holders of offices within the Navy Board, demonstrating the starting year that 
each individual took up office. 
 
The board that James created exemplifies how he planned to run his navy. Previously, 
there were strong complaints regarding the nepotism associated with employment within 
 
42 Sir John Mennes was from Kent and educated at Corpus Christi College, Oxford. In 1661 under the 
Restoration navy he was made ‘Commander-in-chief in the downs’ and Admiral of the Narrow seas. 
Geoffrey Callender describes his appointment as controller “an appointment which would occupy him for 
the remaining 10 years of his life (Callender, 1940, p. 280).  
43 Sir Thomas Allen (Sometimes spelt Allin) was from Lowerstoft, Suffolk. He fought with the royalist cause 
during the civil war and was rewarded for this upon the restoration of the monarchy. He was given the 
command of Dover in 1660 and made commander in chief of the Mediterranean in 1664 (Naval Biography, 
1805:461). He is also known for keeping a series of journals that spanned the restoration era. We cannot be 
sure of his diligence, in his diaries there is one reference to his work as Comptroller, he “went ashore to 
control the pay of the yard” on the 13th July (Allin, 1940, p. 204).  
44 Haddock was born in 1630. He was made captain of the Portland in 1666. He was made captain of the 
‘Royal James’ during the Third Dutch War (Naval Biography, 1805, p. 4). He goes on to become a 
commissioner at Deal in Kent. 
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the navy, as such inexperienced men from wealthy families were generally employed45. 
However, all of James’ choices, except Samuel Pepys, were men of strong military and 
administrative experience. Cartarett had previous experience as Comptroller under 
Charles I, Slyngsbie was the son of a Comptroller and personally held nearly thirty years’ 
experience serving as a sea captain, Batten was returning to an office that he had already 
held and as such had experience, Berkley was an experienced soldier, Penn had been a 
serving sailor for his entire career and Pett came from the ship building industry (Tanner, 
1920, p. 19-25). This demonstrates that James was attempting to fill his senior positions 
with experienced and capable, with the most potential to make his navy a success 
(Knighton, 2004, p.143). 
The Clerk of the Acts was the oldest of the four posts, traceable to circa 1214, with the 
other three posts dating back to the Tudor era. However, Henry VIII was responsible for 
integrating this position into the Navy Board (Knighton, 2004, p. 142). A. W Johns is 
complimentary to Henry VIII regarding this change, claiming that their introduction is 
“proof of the soundness of the King’s judgement” (Johns, 1928, p. 32-3). He states that 
the role of Clerk of the Acts was a slowly evolving role, which over time incorporated 
other responsibilities such as Keeper of the King’s dock, after the construction of 
England’s first ever dry dock in Portsmouth Dockyard, commissioned by Henry VIII 
(Wilcox, 1966, p. 77).  
 
45 Davies discusses nepotism within his research ‘Gentlemen and Tarpaulins’. He describes the navy’s 
system of employment created to combat this. It consisted of the secretaries within the navy (e.g. William 
Coventry, who is the focus of the final case study of this research) creating lists of potential candidates, 
which are then used as a medium for the King or Lord High Admiral to select from (Davies, 1991, p. 17) This 
system necessitated the acquisition of references from captains to ensure that only those with ability 
advanced within the navy.  
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The role of the Treasurer evolved from an earlier office entitled ‘Keeper of the King’s 
ships. Johns describes the evolution into the role of Treasurer referencing a document 
from December 2nd 1530, in which a Gentlemen named Gonson is described as holding 
the offices “of Deptford Stronde, merchant, Purveyor of stores for the King’s ships, and 
Keeper of the stores,” (Johns, 1928, pp. 36-7). However, his titles evolved to include 
“paymaster of sea matters,” “paymaster of the King’s ships,” or “paymaster of our marine 
affairs,” which shows a gradual change in the focus of his work, slowly becoming more 
fiscally focused. The first individuals to work in this office were from merchant or ship 
owning backgrounds. Johns describes them in contemporary terminology as 
‘businessmen’, which although useful for a financial role, they would often be amiss in 
their knowledge of naval administration (Johns, 1928, p. 40). Therefore, this paved the 
way for the introduction of the third office, the Comptroller. Another motivation for the 
introduction of this post, was an attempt to eradicate and control some of the abuses in 
administration. The instructions created by the Duke of York, which will be analysed 
further within this case study, describe how the duty of “the Comptroller was to sign and 
control the Treasurer, and he was not only first in priority of place but of duty that shall 
sign the Treasurer’s accounts” (AND/30).  
Finally, the Surveyor was responsible for overseeing the design and construction of ships, 
including their refits. His responsibilities also included the management of Master 
Shipwrights as well as the upkeep of “dockyard buildings and equipment”. Due to the 
expansion of the size of the navy, this office required the attention of two joint-
Surveyors” (Gradfish, 1980, p. 15). 
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There was generally a standard practice for recruitment into these positions, for example 
the Comptroller was generally a Captain from the Royal Navy, serving with half pay and 
the Surveyor was a previous Master Shipwright (Cock and Rodger, 2008, p. 28). 
Comptroller A control mechanism, to examine the 
books of the principal officers and make 
payment of wages. 
Surveyor Construction and design of ships, manage 
the Master Shipwrights and attendants. 
Clerk of the Acts Presents the State of the Navy, keeps 
records. 
Treasurer Receive and pay treasure, sign estimates 
and other accounting procedures. 
Table 8- A table to demonstrate the main responsibilities of the principal officers of the Navy Board 
 
There is debate amongst historians as to the hierarchy of the Navy Board, disputing who 
held the most authority. According to Wilcox, the head of the Navy Board was the 
Comptroller, with the Treasurer subordinate to him, with the junior positions being the 
Surveyor, then the Clerk of the Ships to do office work (Wilcox, 1966, p.18). This is 
debated by Gradfish, who argues that the most senior member of the board was the 
Treasurer, owing to his monetary power (Gradfish, 1980, p. 15).  
Davies also describes the confusion of seniority within the navy. He argues that there was 
confusion as to who held the ultimate leadership in the navy, asserting that “the Lord 
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High Admiral’s patent was notoriously vague… certain matters could be ordered only by 
the monarch” (Davies, 2017, p. 100). Richard Hamilton describes how “during the reign of 
Charles II, great disputes had arisen between himself and his brother as to the exercise of 
the large powers of the Lord High Admiral, but, when the latter came to the throne as 
James II, he exercised both the regal authority and that of Lord High Admiral” (Hamilton, 
1896, p.9). 
Davies addressed this hierarchical problem in depth; stating that the issue of seniority can 
be seen in all levels of the navy, arguing that even commissioned officers felt that they 
were only answerable to the King and Lord High Admiral (Davies, 1991, p.43). A situation 
which was exacerbated by the mutual disdain held between the Navy Board and the 
officers.  
It is all worth addressing the role of the Privy Council in governing the navy. Charles II 
took a vested interest in the running of the navy and used the Privy Council to create a 
permanent ‘committee’ for the navy, in which the Lord High Admiral sat as well as Prince 
Rupert, Albermarle and other Secretaries for State (Fox, 2009, p. 15). This committee was 
an opportunity for King Charles II to exert his authority in maritime matters over the Lord 
High Admiral, as such it could be argued that this body should be placed above the Lord 
High Admiral in the hierarchy of the navy.  
 
5.6 Financial difficulties effecting the navy 
 
As already discussed, the Stuart restoration inherited a poor indebted navy from the 
Commonwealth, neglected during a “notorious period of weakness and penury in naval 
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administration”, who themselves had inherited a built-up fleet from their predecessor, 
Charles I (Thomas, 1982, p.19)46. The restoration navy received depleted resources and 
accumulated debts of roughly £750,000. Pepys states that the finances became perilous 
when Charles II ascended the throne, criticising the old practises by saying that as the 
navy had grown in volume, the navy’s increased needs had grown parallel, necessitating 
more staff (Pepys, as cited in British Naval Documents, 1993). This resulted in control 
becoming increasingly difficult and change become requisite. Posts were filled through 
nepotism in preference to professional experience to the “consequence to the service” 
(Pepys, as cited in British Naval Documents, 1993). Pepys states that previously all the 
work had been done by clerks, who showed no loyalty.  
An important aspect that Rodger highlights is that Both King Charles II and King James II 
“were keenly interested in the navy, and in time became expert in it” (Rodger, 2006, p. 
95). The poor State of the Navy upon the restoration led to Charles II and the Duke of 
York focusing far more into the technical minutiae of the navy and administration than 
their predecessors or successors ever felt necessary. However, this extra monarchical 
attention to the navy and its administration did not stop the excessive financial 
difficulties. Parliament had granted the navy multiple financial aids; however, they were 
not enough to eliminate their financial struggles. In addition to this, a bi-product of this 
situation was a feeling of mistrust between the administration and Parliament. The later 
believing that they had gifted a more than apt amount of aid and it must have been 
 
46 Charles I was beheaded in 1649, marking the end of the English Civil Wars. James, Duke of York and 




misused. Pepys declared “God help the King and his cause if the Parliament shall give no 
more than they can be made understand reason for”.  
This led to a series of enquiries into administrative procedure, including; the 
Parliamentary Committee on Miscarriages (1667) 47, the Public Accounts Committee 
(1668-9) 48 and the Brooke House Commission (1667-9) 49. Rodger declares that “the Navy 
Board was the bull’s-eye of every committee’s target”. However, the findings from these 
reports were often short-sighted and arguably ill-understood. One example was that 
“£514,518 8s 81/2d had been spent ‘for other uses than the war’ – meaning other naval 
uses, mainly pre-war debts, but many chose to understand that this sum had been 
illegally diverted into the pockets of the King, his mistresses, or his naval administrators” 
(Rodger, 2006, p. 101). Not only does this demonstrate the severe financial crisis the navy 
was currently facing, but it also exemplifies the royalist and Parliamentary tensions that 
plagued the latter half of the seventeenth century.  
  
 
47 This enquiry was ordered in October 1667 and looked into conduct during the Second Dutch War. The 
overall question propounded to Parliament after hearing the report in February 1668 was “that the not 
timely recalling the order for the division of the fleet, after the intelligence of the coming out of the Dutch 
Fleet, was a miscarriage”. After 2 rounds of voting 122 MPs agreed it was outweighing the 99 that believed 
it was not. (House of Commons Journal Volume 9: 15 February 1668) (Debates in 1667: October) 
48 This committee ran in the late 1660’s and was appointed by act of Parliament to take “account of public 
monies”. They were given 2 seats within the House of Commons and regularly fed back to Parliament their 
findings on public spending. (House of Commons Journal Volume 9:14 March 1668) One such debate 
included the findings of embezzlement by Sir William Penn (House of Commons Journal Volume 9:14 April 
1668) 
49 The Brooke House Committee was responsible for examining financial expenditure during the Second 
Dutch War, ensuring it was not spent on non-war related expenditures. (Beresford Chancellor, 1908, p. 18) 
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5.7 The Duke of York’s instructions 
 
One Criterion for professionalisation that has been developed as part of the original 
framework is ‘the requirements for specific knowledge and expertise’. Therefore, one of 
the main sources that will be analysed for this case study is a set of instructions detailing 
the duties of the principal and junior officers of His Majesty’s Royal Navy, because these 
instructions clearly attempt to standardize roles and ensure that the officers are utilising 
specific knowledge. 
Additionally, according to Ferreira and Otley and their theoretical framework for 
‘performance management’ ascertaining a company’s organizational structure and 
understanding informational flows, systems and networks are both criteria for a 
performance management system (Ferreira & Otley,2009, 267-276). Therefore, the 
publication of the following instructions, which highlights individual responsibilities within 
the Royal Navy and how key information is distributed throughout the Royal Navy are key 
indicators of performance management. This also comes under Langsfield-Smith’s 
description of management control as being the formal and informal rules that are 
instituted to govern an organisation, these rules can include Standard Operating 
Procedures (Langsfield- Smith, 1997, pp.221-228). The Duke of York’s instructions clearly 
constitute a standard operating procedure, and as such we can see management control 
in a form, in use in the seventeenth century. This supports the navy in working towards 
organizational professionalism. Evett also cites ‘standardized procedures’ as being 
indicative of organizational professionalism, she (Evetts, 2013, p.788).  
Thomas states that these instructions demonstrate the “unprecedented professionalism” 
of James’ administration (Thomas, 1982, p. 19-25). Hamilton states that “no [set of] 
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instruction[s] could have been sounder” (Hamilton, 1896, p.10). There are multiple copies 
of this source, however, the standard format for this document is a hardbound book. 
These books generally contain copies of relevant letters, introductions and other 
important information relating to the functioning of the navy. These instructions have not 
previously been analysed in relation to how they demonstrate that naval administration 
was professionalising in the restoration era. As stated in chapter one, this case study will 
analyse these instructions and break down their policies thematically, demonstrating how 
the implementation of specific procedures contributed to the professionalisation of naval 
administration in the seventeenth century.  
At the beginning of AND/30, entitled ‘Duke of York’s instructions for the Navy Office’ 
collected from the Caird library at the National Maritime Museum, is a copy of 
instructions for the role of Lord High Admiral50. The Lord High Admiral’s duty is kept 
separate from the main document detailing the duties of the principal officers. This first 
page of the bound volume, hereafter referred to as ‘the instructions’, is dated 16th June 
1673, stating that it was ascertained and published by the Duke of York, and that this 
piece of the book was written at the Court of Whitehall with a list of notable names that 
were present. These include; The Duke of York, Charles II and Master Secretary William 
Coventry, amongst others. The first five pages detail the instructions for the role of Lord 
High Admiral. However, they are virtually an exact copy of the instructions laid out from 
an ‘order-in-council’, dated 13th June 1673 (British Naval Documents, 1993). The copy is 
almost perfect except for a few minor changes for example the earlier document 
discusses the “pressing or otherwise procuring [of men]”. Whereas the more recent 
 
50 Please see bibliography for full list of where each of the versions of the instructions were located from. 
Generally, in the text of this research, only an accession number will be referenced. 
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document using the alternative “impresting” and similar changes in phrasing such as the 
exchange of “he is without order from His Majesty to command or allow” for “he is on no 
wise to direct of permit”. However, this ‘newer’ version could correlate with the final 
sentence “and it is ordered by His Majesty in Council that the said Instructions be entered 
in the Council Book and a copy of them be sent to his Royal Highness the Lord High 
Admiral of England to be observed accordingly”. Therefore, because one book is dated 
three days later, it could be theorised that this was potentially the copy sent to the Duke 
of York.  
Pepys takes credit for preparing the original draft, before it was confirmed by King Charles 
II (Pepys, 1673, as cited in Samuel Pepys Naval Minutes, 1980, pp. 19-25). The footnotes 
within his naval minutes, compiled by the Naval Records Society in 1926, state that even 
though there are various copies of this original document, this reference by Pepys “is the 
first intimation that the new establishment for the Lord High Admiral’s office had been 
prepared by Pepys”. Pepys again mentions this in his ‘Naval Minutes’, stating that he 
“examined the duty of the Lord Admiral prepared by me and confirmed by the King in 
council in June 1673” (Pepys, 1673, as cited in Samuel Pepys Naval Minutes, 1980, pp. 19-
25).  
One underlying question arising here is how much responsibility can we attribute to 
Pepys? Was it his idea and work? Or simply work that was commissioned by the Lord High 
Admiral, the Duke of York? Regrettably, no answer has at such presented itself. Even 
though there are two references to Pepys writing the Lord High Admiral’s duty, both are 
written by Pepys and neither state whose idea it was. However, what can be taken from 
this is that regardless of initial inspiration, the Duke of York’s administration was 
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responsible for the creation of this document and as he was present at the meeting, was 
clearly involved in the process. 
The first page from the version collected from the archives at the National Museum of the 
Royal Navy (Portsmouth) differ because it was written before the 1673 additions 
(MSS44)51. The document also starts with Whitehall court documents. AND/30 is written 
earlier, and has a court document dated 4th July 1660. It details who was present at the 
meeting, this time (due to the earlier dates) Coventry and Pepys are not in attendance, 
but The Duke of York, The King, the Lord Chancellor, Montague and others were present. 
These minutes state that they have met to discuss the paper given by the Duke of York 
“for the regulating the affairs of the Admiralty and navy this day read at the board”. They 
appoint and authorise the commissioners and principal officers and revoke the authority 
of the previous Treasurers and Commissioners, requiring them to return their books, 
records and furniture to Samuel Pepys (British Naval Documents, 1993 & AND/30). The 
Duke of York states that the previous Treasurer’s books should be given directly to 
Cartarett, however, the Victualling Board are temporarily allowed to keep their posts and 
books “till further order provided”. This is interesting because the Duke of York is not 
completely overturning the previous administration as he is enabling specific officials to 
retain their posts, however, he has given the caveat to this instruction which enables him 
to change this in the future.  
An anomaly within the instructions is that within the version of instructions accessed 
through the National Museum of the Royal Navy’s archives at Portsmouth Historic 
 




Dockyard (MSS 44, 1662) there is an additional handwritten note pushed into the spine 
between the pages of the instructions of the Treasurer. This note says “remarks on the 
conduct of the treasurer of the navy with regard to the board, use 9th article of the 
treasurer’s instructions”. The ninth article relates to paying the Treasurer a salary instead 
of fees and perquisites. This note is handwritten and is not dated or signed. It clearly 
looks aged and demonstrates someone wanting to investigate further the effects of the 
change in payment of the Treasurer. Although we cannot ascertain exactly who or when, 
this does demonstrate the importance laid upon this.  
This research attempted to gain further clarification on this note through consultation 
with the archivists at the National Museum of the Royal Navy as well the Admiralty 
Library, however as the Admiralty Library was not established until 1797 this is simply 
how they received it and cannot ascertain exact dates or authors. Therefore, we cannot 
make any definite assertions with this additional note, but what can be ascertained is that 
at some point, post 1662, somebody with access to this document took extra interest in 
the change of payment method for the Purser.52 It should also be noted that not 
everybody had stopped receiving fees and perquisites, but it is a step in the right 
direction for the Navy Board in moving towards becoming a more professionalised body. 
This is because it clearly demonstrates one of the criteria established for 
professionalisation; the introduction of a formal pay system and salaries.  
Another example of this can be seen in a letter dated 17th January 1662 from James to 
John Fowler, the Judge Advocate of the fleet. This source is not attached to the 
 
52 Thank you to Heather Johnson (National Museum of the Royal Navy) and Jenny Wraight (Admiralty 
Library) for their assistance in this matter.  
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instructions, instead it has been accessed from a compilation of primary sources relating 
to James II (Stuart, J, 1662 as cited in Memoirs of the English Affairs, 1729). The Duke of 
York grants Fowler his warrant that describes that he will be paid by “an allowance of 
salary, fees, perquisites, and other considerations as usually hath been, or that shall be 
thought meet to be allowed to a judge advocate of His Majesty’s fleet”. With this example 
we can see a wider movement away from the payment via perquisites.  
 
The ninth page of AND/30 includes a letter dated 28th Jan 1661, which accompanies the 
book of instructions. The instructions are issued for the “duty of the several officers 
belonging to his Ma[?] Navy”53. Other copies are available in (D/Lons/L13/7/2/16, British 
Naval Documents, 1993, MSS44 & Stuart, J, 1660-73 as cited in Memoirs of the English 
Affairs, 1729). In this letter the Duke of York explains his delay in publishing these 
instructions, explaining that there had been such a “want of money” for the navy that it 
had emboldened and caused little “hope of their amendment” of those that were corrupt 
in their negligence and abuses. Therefore, until money became available and the King 
could pay and discharge the worst offenders it would prove futile to attempt reform. He 
re-iterates how negligent men are not to be given continued employment within His 
Majesty’s navy, ordering a search within His Majesty’s yards for ‘impotent men’ more in 
need of a hospital than active employment. He is not callous in his attitude to these men, 
 
53 The use of [?] was a methodological choice on the part of the researcher whilst transcribing primary 
sources. A question mark was inserted when a letter or word was either illegible or distorted in some way 
instead of making assumptions on what the letter might represent.  
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suggesting that many were wounded in the last Dutch War and as such should be 
benefitting from the Chatham Chest instead of employment54.  
He also desires an account of the ‘behaviours’ of the men within the yards, he wants 
offenders to be suspended and then to be personally informed so that he can give 
“orders as such deters others from the like abuses”. He commands the Master 
Shipwrights to be inspected and ensure that they have not made frivolous and 
unnecessary repairs for personal financial gain. Additionally, he stipulates that if any 
storekeeper or officer who has the responsibility of ascertaining the state of the 
‘condition of stores’ has broken the trust of their position and given a false report of the 
quality, as such signed for bills for stores which were useless, should be punished. Any 
cases in which these instances go unpunished “will reflect upon you” [the principal 
officers] as “you have proved to expend upon his Ma [?] Treasure in goods unfit for the 
service”. He recommends that the Navy Office focus upon the timely acquisition of goods, 
but not to “rely wholly on the judgement of purveyors or any single person, but to use all 
means to be fully inform’d”. In the larger contracts of greater value, he recommends that 
they spend “some days in enquiry before concluding the contract”. 
The Duke of York then makes a further request that whenever His Majesty’s ships return 
to port from their overseas deployments, an examination will take place to assess the 
professional conduct of all staff. If anyone is found lacking in their ability to perform their 
duties then the Lord High Admiral is to be informed. The letter ends stating that a book of 
instructions accompanies this letter, along with the promise that there will be adequate 
 
54 The Chatham Chest was an institution founded in 1590, initially starting as a voluntary donation, then 
from 1626 became a compulsory payment from all seamen’s wages to fund the forerunner of the military 
pension (Powell, 1922) p174 
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financial support to execute his wishes. This letter is essential because it shows that good 
housekeeping and administration cannot be achieved without sufficient capital. In 
addition, it also shows James’ attempt to curb abuses, make efficiencies and his 
willingness to use strict punishments to achieve reform. Additionally, it is worth noting 
that he repeats himself in this letter and the main body of the instructions. This 
recapitulation demonstrates the gravitas he placed upon the severity of these issues and 
the passion he placed upon reforming it, Thus, helping us to reach the conclusion that he 
was actively trying to professionalise the navy from the beginning of his tenure.  
Additionally, the implementation of a system that punishes employees, is an example of a 
rewards system under performance management. This system does not have to always 
be incentive based rewards, it can equally be penalties for failures (Ferreira & Otley, 
2009, p. 267-276). This example of performance management demonstrates the practices 
that supported the navy in working towards organizational professionalism.  
In an additional letter found preceding the main body of the instructions (AND/30, 1673) 
(MSS 44, 1662), James once again explains his rationale for publishing the duties of the 
principal officers. He states that there are “frequently doubts and disputes”, therefore 
this letter is to prevent the “growth or continuance of those of the like inconveniences 
arising from the ignorance or neglect of the duties belonging to the several officers I have 
thought fit to ratify and confirm certain orders”. He states that he understands that 
previously a set of instructions had been issued by the Earl of Northumberland when he 
was admiral (1638-42), but finishes his letter by stipulating that all officers working for 
the Royal Navy, either in ships of yards will adhere to these rules or “answer to the 
contrary”. This demonstrates that even though he knows that discipline has historically 
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been lax, the Duke of York is ensuring that people understand that a policy has been 
implemented and it will be enforced.  
 Again, this letter is dated 28th Jan 1661 to the principal officers and commanders of His 
Majesty’s Navy. This repetition of correspondence from James shows the importance he 
personally laid upon these instructions, they clearly weren’t written on a whim and 
forgotten about. For the Lord High Admiral to take such a personal interest in the 
dissemination of this letter is telling. This letter is signed from the command of His Royal 
Highness but then also countersigned by W. Coventry.  
For clarity in explaining which versions of these instructions contain additional 
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MSS 44 ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
D/LONS/L13/7/2/16 ✓ ✓  ✓   ✓   
AND/30 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
SLOANE MS3232 ✓         
NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY, 
BRITISH NAVAL DOCUMENT, 
1204-1960, VOL 131** 
 ✓ ✓ ✓      
MEMOIRS OF THE ENGLISH 
AFFAIRS, CHIEFLY NAVAL** 
   ✓      
AND/28   ✓ ✓ ✓     
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PRO 30/32/1          
THE OECONOMY OF HIS 
MAJESTY’S NAVAL OFFICE.** 
✓  ✓ ✓ ✓    ✓ 
AND/29 ✓     ✓ ✓   
ADM 7/827* ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓    ✓ 
Table 9- A table depicting what documents are contained in each set of instructions and where they are 
located 
 
*ADM 7/827 also has a detailed breakdown of the expenditure of the Royal Navy 
including salaries  
** These sources are published in modern compilations, those without are accessed in 
archives.  
*** Ins. Is an abbreviation for instructions. 
It cannot be argued that these bound volumes of the instructions were bound at a later 
date, because many have Pepys’ signature, confirming that they are a true copy. In 
addition, Pepys references the bound volumes in his diary on the 18th April 1669. 
Therefore, they have to have been copied and collated within his lifetime (Pepys, 1669, as 
cited in Latham and Matthews, 1971). 
 
5.7.1 The main body of instructions 
 
There is an abundance of data found within the instructions attributed to the James II. 
This research will organise the data using a thematic approach, breaking the analysis 
down into the following themes; reduction of abuses, accounting procedures, improved 
efficiency and the “State of the Navy”. This will support the research in explaining how 
the introduction and/or enforcement of these policies aided in professionalising the Royal 
Navy during the restoration administration. For simplicity, each relevant instruction will 
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only be analysed once, but reference will be made as to how it also demonstrates 
alternative themes, rather than duplicating analysis under each theme.  
These instructions in theory remained in place for the administration of the navy until the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, when the Admiralty was restructured (Tanner, 1920, 
p. 26). Coats addresses this by stating that “the fact that the instructions of 1662 were 
not superseded, but modified periodically until the reorganisation of the navy board at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, demonstrates their continuing relevance, if not 
their complete success” (Coats, 2000, p. 35). This demonstrates real longevity to what the 
restoration administration had created. Although, credit does need to also be given to his 
predecessors for this achievement. An interesting source from the eighteenth century 
entitled ‘The Oeconomy of His Majesty’s naval office containing the several duties of the 
commissioners and principal officers thereof’, is a version of the Duke of York’s 
instructions which was transcribed and printed in 1717. In the preface, which does not 
have an author attributed, it states that “the regulations, here made publick, to be drawn 
up, which have ever since been a standing rule to that office, being so perfect in 
themselves, that it has not been thought requisite to alter them to this day” (Stuart J, 
1660-1673, as cited in the Oeconomy of His Majesty’s Naval Office, 1717). However, some 
bias needs to be considered here, in view of the terminology used by the author, 
describing the restoration is “the usurpation” instead of Cromwellian, Commonwealth or 
the Protectorate government eras. As this was published in 1717, the reigning monarch 
was George I, a cousin of James II. It is natural that the anonymous writer would want to 
be ingratiating towards the crown’s historic achievements and use derogatory language 
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towards those who had unseated a monarch, because this would have been the ‘safer’ 
option in England at this time. 
 
5.7.2 The Earl of Northumberland’s document 
 
As has been referenced twice within the analysis of the instructions, it is worth noting 
that a similar version of these instructions existed written under the command of the Earl 
of Northumberland during his tenure as Lord High Admiral, between 1638 and 1642 
(Davies, 2017, p.36)55. Although one could then say that all of the above is the work of 
Northumberland and his team instead of the Duke of York and his team, this research 
argues against this for the following reasons. Firstly, only one version of the Earl of 
Northumberland’s instructions has been found by the researcher (Sloane MS3232). 
Whereas, multiple differing versions exist of James’ set of instructions, as can be seen in 
the table above. Therefore, the argument could be made that even though the original 
instructions were not written in full by James and his team, the fact that he amended the 
instructions as will be seen next, and widely disseminated them across the country with 
so many surviving copies extant today, it can be argued that he put far more emphasis on 
implementing these instructions than his predecessors. Although there is no way of 
definitively proving this, with the consideration that there are scant references to 
Northumberland’s instructions and probably only one known existing copy, it is a 
 
55 An additional set on instructions was created by George Villiers, the Duke of Buckingham who held the 
office of Lord High Admiral between 1619 and 1628. This research has chosen to purely focus on 
Northumberland’s instructions, because this is the newer of the two and as such we can see what has been 
implemented by the Duke of York’s administration.  
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reasonable assumption that these were not disseminated effectively across the navy. And 
as such, not implemented to any major degree by the navy.  
Additionally, looking at the discourses written before the Duke of York’s tenure as Lord 
High Admiral, as will be discussed further within this chapter, the navy was in a disarray 
with a multitude of neglect and abuses which James tried to overcome. One could ask the 
question, why would he overcome this by implementing the same procedures that were 
being used before? As such it is a valid argument to query whether these were being 
enforced thoroughly before?  
There are also many amendments made by James and his Navy Board to the original 
instructions. There are changes to wording such as the continual use of the wording Lord 
Admiral instead of the later terminology of Lord High Admiral, but as these are subtle and 
do not affect the overall output of the document these will not be mentioned any further 
here. Instead, this research will demonstrate the larger differences, such as the addition 
of large sections to the instructions and the deletion of other large sections. With the 
overall theme being that he is adding more specific financial processes than his 
predecessors. This will enable the thesis to answer the research question- clarifying if 
through the introduction of administrative procedures, whether the navy became more 
professionalised during the restoration administration.  
Within the opening instructions for the principal officers, it is stated that they are 
personally or by purveyor, to seasonably enquire as to the market price of the provisions, 
so as not to tie themselves to specific contracts and not to take provisions without first 
assessing them within the yards to make sure that they are of the quality and quantity as 
agreed in contract. Pool argues that this instruction is largely redundant, because it 
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assumes the access to cash for a financial transaction, whereas “the Navy Board were 
hardly ever in a position to offer a cash payment” (Pool, 1966, pp.6-7). 
Also, creating weekly invoices, as mentioned in the analysis of James’ instructions, in the 
theme of accounting procedures, to ensure that they are not taking provisions on the 
notion of there being a lack of alternatives. With the fate of merchants misinforming the 
Navy, the Lord High Admiral is to be given notice so that both the officers purchasing can 
be dismissed from service to ensure that unfit commodities and exorbitant prices are 
avoided. Also, within the opening instructions, the Duke of York has removed a chapter 
which allows their powers to be delegated to their deputies. Obviously, attempting to 
ensure that only the most trusted, qualified and experienced are working within these 
important duties. Also, as Pepys had highlighted that incompetent clerks were showing 
no loyalty. This demonstrates that James had listened to the advice of his counsellors and 
implemented it through established procedure. 
It should also be noted that according to Evett’s conceptualisation of professionalisation, 
the presence of a hierarchical structure of authority and decision making is indicative of 
organizational professionalism (Evett, 2013, p.788). Therefore, we can extrapolate from 
this management structure that the Duke of York is using management control to work 
towards organizational professionalism.  
An entire additional set of instructions to the Treasurer of the navy that detail the 
procedures for weekly accounts and certificates is not present in Northumberland’s 
instructions. However, these additional instructions also stipulate that the Treasurer 
should now be paid by salary instead of perquisites and sinecures and the procedure of 
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having the men’s money deducted for contribution to slops and the Chatham chest. It 
could be argued that this is a response to the abuses that built up during this era.  
In a letter to the Navy Board dated August 25th 1666, James berates the board for not 
sending out timely payment to the slop sellers which resulted in them not being able to 
clothe the sailors (Stuart, J, 1666 as cited in Memoirs of the English Affairs, 1729). He also 
reminds them to make their payments to the Chatham chest. This again shows that the 
Duke of York is following up on the instructions and involving himself with the detailed 
tasks of leading a navy. But, also by amending the later versions of the instructions, he is 
adding in the changes that have proven themselves necessary since the last edition.  
In the Surveyor’s duty, there is an additional paragraph stating that the business of the 
navy has increased so drastically that the Surveyor cannot undertake the mammoth 
volume of work solely, therefore he is to use ‘his instruments’ to undertake the work in a 
timely fashion. However, the Surveyor’s deputies are not delegated full responsibility. The 
instructions state that for the security of the navy, there are not permitted to give 
warrants, nor pass accounts without the counter signature of both the Master Attendant 
and Master Shipwright or in extraordinary situations the fellow principal officers may be 
acquainted with it.  
The entire section of the duty of the Comptroller of the Treasurer’s accounts and the 
Comptroller of Victualling and stores is absent from Northumberland’s instructions. All of 
which relate to the passing of accounts and financial methods of control. These include 
the storekeeper’s instructions for in-stores, conversions of stores and out-stores, which 
are also not present in the Northumberland instructions. Again, all of these are primarily 
focused on the accounting procedure of their role. Therefore, emphasising the 
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importance he laid upon the introduction of accounting procedures to the Royal Navy. 
Conclusively, even though James utilized earlier versions of regulations of the navy, he 
clearly made impacting and relevant alterations, which aided in professionalising naval 
administration during his tenure. Tanner discusses the earlier instructions, and compares 
James’ set with an even earlier edition by Buckingham56 “as compared with these the 
instructions of 1661-2 are much more detailed and elaborate” (Tanner, 1897, p. 28).  
 
5.8 Thematic analysis of the Duke of York’s instructions 
 
5.8.1 Reduction of abuses and stock control 
 
The most prominent theme to arise within the analysis of the instructions is the reduction 
of abuses and stock control. Fox describes the 1660s as a period “ript and ransack by 
corruption”, ranging from embezzlement, bribery, poor quality victuals and fraud (Fox, 
2009, p.16). Davies also addresses abuses within the restoration administration, stating 
that captains regularly made excuses, stating that they claimed they had lost their paper 
work or not received adequate instruction as a method of covering their abuses (Davies, 
1991, p.45). Upon reflection of how widespread the participation in abuses was within 
the navy, it is understandable why there are so many attempts made by the Duke of York 
and the restoration administration to attempt to rectify this. This theme will briefly 
 
56 George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham held the post of Lord High Admiral between 1619 and 1628. He held 
many other influential titles including warden of the cinque ports and warden of Hampton Court Palace 
during the reign of James I and continued to retain royal favour under the succession of Charles I. He was 
assassinated on the 23rd August 1628 by John Felton in Portsmouth (Naval Biography 1, 1805, pp. 357-361) 
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address what contemporary authors document as the abuses affecting the navy before 
moving on to the policies made by the Duke of York to combat this.  
A memorandum from the Navy Board, located in the Cumbria Archive Centre, shows the 
extent of mismanagement whilst James was away in exile. It is a concise list of 
recommendations from the Navy Board for the retrenchment of the navy. It gives 
nineteen different examples of how the navy can save money. With just a few examples 
including; reduce the number of commissioners attached to the board; revoke the 
Treasurer’s right to have clerks and reduce the volume of clerks for the Comptroller and 
the Comptroller of victualling’s accounts to four clerks each. These are drastic measures 
and show the dire straits that the navy was in (D/lons/l13/7/2/18)57.  
Tanner discusses the many abuses that are highlighted within the various discourses of 
the navy (Tanner, 1920, p.5). “They bring into relief the remarkable durability of naval 
abuses”. The Pepysian library in Cambridge carries multiple discourse and 
documentations of abuses dating back to 1578, so the idea to write a discourse into 
abuses is by no means a new idea, but acting upon it was not always the outcome of a 
discourse.  
Holland discusses the State of the Navy in his second discourse of the navy, written in 
165958. In an introductory letter to James II for his work, he states that his discourse was 
written through observation and experience gained through thirty years’ service. He 
claimed to have “discovered few of the many obliquities of that government” and hinted 
 
57 Dated, 29th December 1679. 
58 Holland wrote 2 discourses on the navy during the Interregnum. His experience of abuses was gained 
through his employment in the navy; he held posts as Clerk to Captain Downing from 1624, Clerk of the 
Cheque at Portsmouth and from 1635 he was the paymaster of the navy (Tanner, 1896, pp. ix-xi).  
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at ways for its future regulation. Since 1618, there had been many commissions ordered 
to regulate the navy, however according to Holland, these often were a guise for men 
seeking to augment their own private gain usually undertaken by inexperienced men. 
These commissions were costly and timely, but “crumbled to nothing”. Holland argued 
that when the commissioners of customs were paid with salaries rather than fees they no 
longer worked with their former zeal (Holland, 1896, p. 155). He gave the advice that 
muster books by the Clerk of the Cheque will prevent the abuse of the Pursers. This is an 
instruction we can see has been acted upon, demonstrating James was willing to heed 
advice.  
Holland also discusses the abuses towards impoverished seamen from slop sellers, 
recommending that they not be charged for their first two months of service (Holland, 
1896, pp. 131-159). He states that records should be kept of defective victuals and 
returned. Once again, this is addressed by James, Duke of York in (AND/28, 1660). Holland 
asserts that the lack of timely notice for ordering victuals is a contributing factor, which 
James attempts to address by requiring regular surveys of the “State of the Navy” to give 
advance notice of what is required and when. Holland highlights the need to take note of 
the deliveries keeping  
“an exact account whether their number answered the content or card, and then 
comparing the number and weight together (abating the tare of the cask) to see 
whether they be made both for weight and number according to the statute, yea or 
not” (Holland, 1896, p. 260).  
Finally, Holland addresses material wastage, such as the over conversion of timber into 
chips. This is another recommendation from Holland that is addressed by the Duke of 
 
132 
York, with multiple attempts to rectify this. Notably, this is addressed within the porter’s 
inspections of the men as they leave the yards after their shift finishes.  
Sir Robert Slyngsbie is one of the most famous discourse writers, writing his discourse of 
the navy in 1660. He discusses the main issues with the navy as including defects on the 
ships, confusion growing within the navy, “tardy and disorderly supplies” 59. This 
confusion is clearly a pre-cursor to the need for the instructions to be amended and re-
distributed so that each of the men know what is expected of them with the duties of 
their office. Slyngsbie discusses the Earl of Northumberland’s attempt to set down 
instructions for the navy, but he states that Northumberland had taken great pains in 
enquiring into the ancient offices and makes various references to its good points even 
though it is overly verbose (Slyngsbie ,1896, p. 337).  
It could be argued here that the publication of self-reflective discourses of the navy are an 
example of performance management. Ferreira & Otley define a criterion of performance 
management is ‘Performance Management Systems Change’, this criteria states that an 
organization should evaluate changes to pre-existing systems and it should be discussed if 
they are made in a proactive or reactive manner (Ferreira & Otley,2009, 267-276). We can 
see from these discourses, that there are examples of proactive investigation into their 
current systems. 
The Duke of York clearly understood the need for reform and attempt to address the 
abuses and negligence as seen above within the instructions he disseminated to regulate 
the navy. In the introductory section of the instructions there is an overview to the 
 
59 Sir Robert Slyngsbie was the son of a Comptroller who served in the civil war as a royalist captain and 
went on to become a Comptroller during the restoration administration from 1660 (Tanner, 1896, p. LXXII). 
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principal officers about what is expected of them. It is stated clearly that the principal 
officers should work jointly to advance the service of the Royal Navy, without “any private 
or indirect end”. Methods of obtaining this include transparency, that is achieved through 
public meetings. Their regulations stipulate that any discussion regarding the acquisition 
of provisions and the creation of new contracts are to take place in public meetings, to 
reduce potential for private gain. No “considerable quantity” of provisions can be 
purchased without entering into a contract following this protocol. Control is also 
exercised upon delivery, on arrival all provisions are to be checked for quantity, goodness, 
dimensions etc. Once “maturely scann’d” and passed, a copy of this report is to be sent to 
the Clerk of the Cheque and the storekeeper subscribed by the Clerk of the Records. This 
report is then to be cross analysed with the original contract, to ensure that the quality 
and quantity is sufficiently comparable to the pre-agreed contractual obligations. At 
which point, if this does not correlate, the policy ensures that the provisions are to be 
refused and not paid for from His Majesty’s treasure. This point is echoed on numerous 
occasions with the instructions clearly stating that no bill whatsoever should be paid 
without following this protocol (AND/30).  
In the same introductory section, it states that the principal officers are responsible for 
ensuring that the ‘inferior ministers’ of the navy such as Clerks, Shipwrights and Gunners 
know how to govern themselves and perform their duties and be “honest, diligent and 
active in His Majesty’s service” compared to those who “are careless, unfaithful and 
remis”. Those who are the latter are to be referred to the Lord High Admiral, who will 
decide upon an appropriate punishment, including suspension or dismissal from service. 
The terminology of the words honest and unfaithful, shows that this is not just a 
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procedure enacted for efficiency, which it clearly is, but also establishes the reduction of 
abuses and private exploitation. This is a clear example of professionalisation according to 
this research’s original framework, it exemplifies ‘The guiding of behaviour and 
establishing of standards within each role’. 
Lastly, within the introductory section of the instructions, the use of bills is discussed. It 
states that the principal officers cannot pass bills “by innovation beyond their office” 
without the expressed permission of either the Lord High Admiral, or after an open and 
serious debate at a full public meeting in which they would have to demonstrate the 
necessity of this decision. The instructions explicitly state that the rationale for this is to 
ensure that money is not “wasted by the private opinion or favour of one or two”.  
Within the specific instructions for the role of the Treasurer, there is a severe instruction 
regarding the limitations of the Treasurer’s office. It stipulates that neither he, nor his 
deputy, is allowed to pay or allow payment for any bill in which the King will be adversely 
affected. Although, this appears to be a fair instruction, it is worth considering that his 
fellow principal officers may be given permission to deputise. Thus saying, that even 
though some of the principal officers are allowed to use their discretion, this does not 
extend to the Treasurer. This clearly aims to reduce the capability of any wrongdoing on 
his part.  
Additionally, within his instructions, it states that for the Treasurer to be able to make any 
payments, he needs a warrant from at least three of his other principal officers and 
commissioners of the navy. The only exception are tickets, which are made in the 
Comptroller’s office and the set protocol is that in his absence any single principal officer 
may make payable. However, even with this exception, the instructions then reiterate 
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clearly that this is the exception and no other payment may be warranted by the 
Treasurer without following the aforementioned procedure. If the Treasurer is found to 
have contravened this procedure the Comptroller is not to allow his payment and is to 
inform the Lord High Admiral and the Navy Board in writing and wait to receive 
instructions on how to deal with this misdemeanour. This clearly shows a strong policy 
made to remove any opportunity for abuse by the Treasurer, and as such it is 
demonstrating how the Duke of York is moving towards a less corrupt and more 
professionalised navy. Although, it should be considered that we do not know exactly 
what the repercussions for a breach were likely to be. 
 These controls would naturally make the work of the principal officers more burdensome 
and presumably make the procedures take longer than previously. To attempt to counter 
this, even though these control mechanisms are put into place to avoid abuses, effort was 
still being made to make sure that the administration and as such the running of the navy 
still runs as smoothly and efficiently as possible. It is stated that in the above situation, no 
bill, ticket, book or warrant signed by the Treasurer should be delayed or denied for any 
time longer than necessary to complete an investigation of the error that had occurred. 
Lastly, within the Treasurer’s instructions it states that the wages of the Treasurer will 
take a different format, including that “for the future be paid by salary, & not by 
poundage”. This attempt to move away from perquisites and sinecures is once again, a 
clear example of the Duke of York fulfilling one of this thesis’ criteria; the introduction of 
a formal pay system and salaries.  
Within the Surveyor’s Instructions; he is charged with the duty of keeping an account of 
all provisions issued by his fellow officers, including himself and both naval and private 
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captains- where applicable. This account is to be accredited by storekeepers, clerks and 
captains that warranted or issued the loan. Therefore, at any point he is informed on 
what has been lent from the stores and what has been returned “and if not, be return’d - 
it may be”. This policy is clearly a control to prohibit private profiteering and theft from 
His Majesty’s stores, at the expense of His Majesty’s treasure. The instructions for the 
Surveyor also make alternative plans for situations in which the Surveyor is absent. These 
plans clarify that due to the Geographical spread of naval sites and the increasing size and 
demand of the navy, it is not always possible for it to only be the Surveyor who personally 
signs off warrants for issues or accounts. Therefore, his deputy (the Clerk of the Survey), 
would be given permission to sign these warrants, with the caveats that they are also 
countersigned by the Master Attendant or the Master Shipwright, and only in extreme 
circumstances and with the permission of the Surveyor. This strict protocol, ensures that 
there is a ‘plan B’, so that abuses could not occur in the necessary absence of the 
Surveyor.  
The instructions for the Clerk of the Acts60 state that the Clerk is to acquaint himself with 
the current market price of the provisions purchased by the navy. An emphasis is placed 
upon the timely acquisition of provisions currently required by the navy, in order that His 
Majesty is not disadvantaged and placed in the position of purchasing overpriced goods 
and being defrauded due to lack of current information regarding the market. He explains 
that this would stop them taking “the commodity without choice from one man whereas 
diver’s men that have the same materials would gladly serve cheaper and better.”  
 
60 Sometimes referred to as ‘Clerk of the Navy’ 
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The monitoring of purchase price data can be seen as a clear example of Neely et al’s 
control metric for performance management; variances and purchase price (Neely et al, 
2005, 1230). Therefore, again demonstrating that although the modern terminology of 
performance management or management control is not being used, this is another 
distinct example accessed from within the archival evidence of the Duke of York 
implementing performance management in order to work towards organizational 
professionalism. 
The Clerk of the Cheque’s responsibility entails the mustering of men. This should be 
undertaken numerous times and as a control, at multiple and varied locations, to check 
those in His Majesty’s employ are in attendance. This acts to prevent disingenuous 
working practices within the dockyards. The variety of mustering locations is to remain 
flexible so that the men cannot predict his musters and therefore hide their abuses. In 
addition, he is to ensure that the Boatswain, Gunner and Purser are present on their ship 
as part of their three nightly rota that is prepared for the security of the ship. Again, 
specifying that he should not undertake the mustering at set time to allow for the 
element of surprise and spontaneity. Then, at the end of each month, he is to assess 
these muster lists and adjust wages accordingly to ensure they are deducted of both 
victuals and wages and to publicly report “the neglect of men”.  
This check against absenteeism, is also a clear example of a metric devised by Neely et al 
of a performance measurement system (Neely et al, 2005, 1230). 
A further control against this abuse is seen in the regulations published within the duty of 
the Master Attendant, who is to “upon the neglect of the Clerk of the Cheque to must in 
the night”. Similarly, he is to ensure that the Porter is not allowing malpractice at the 
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gate, and that he is sufficiently documenting occurrences of lateness or early departure 
and that the dockyard staff are not leaving with items belonging to the navy. For example, 
ensuring employees are not leaving with Timber instead of wood chips. We can see from 
a letter, dated April 22, 1662, that James was aware that people were continuing to 
disobey this rule, he “desire you in the future totally to prohibit” (Stuart, J, 1662 as cited 
in Memoirs of the English Affairs, 1729). James then commanded the Navy Board to 
oversee their duties in a strict and diligent performance and expects that if they have 
found anyone to have broken this rule then they are “to expect the severest punishment 
that their offences shall deserve”. This additional letter, collected from outside of the 
bound volumes of instructions, demonstrates that the Duke of York was improving upon 
the initial instructions and attempting to update these methods to ensure that the most 
effective procedure for reducing abuses was in place. Again, this clearly demonstrate the 
movement towards a professionalised body, according to this research’s criteria for 
professionalisation, it is an example of the Duke of York ‘guiding [the] behaviour and 
establishing of standards within each role’. 
This assiduousness towards the reduction of waste of wood chips can be seen as a clear 
example of Neely et al’s control metric for performance management; the monitoring of 
waste and excess (Neely et al, 2005, 1230).  
This same diligence can be seen in another letter dated, in which James wrote to the Navy 
Board saying that he had been informed that at night, men were sailing down the 
Medway to Chatham, under the pretence of fishing with the actual aim of embezzling the 
stores (Stuart, J, 1661 as cited in Memoirs of the English Affairs, 1729)61. Therefore, in 
 
61 Dated, January 28th 1661. 
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response, he created a rule to ban fishing amongst His Majesty’s ships from Rochester 
Bridge to the lowermost ship in the river. With a further issue to instruct the Mayor of 
Rochester the same. Again, this displays that James was not idle in the introduction of the 
rules, as new ways were found to steal from His Majesty he attempted to close these 
loopholes. It should be noted that these two letters are not bound into the instructions, 
therefore these letters were circulated separately to the instructions. This demonstrates 
that the Lord High Admiral was consistently improving his instructions and they were not 
merely a whim or box ticking exercise. 
 The Clerk of the Cheque was also to ensure that at the commencement of additional 
works or services, no staff such as labourers are to be employed without a warrant signed 
by two of the principal officers. Acting as an additional control mechanism against 
unnecessary employment the waste of His Majesty’s treasure. The Master Attendant has 
an addition control in terms of employment, it is his duty to ensure that all men working 
are of an able and efficient standard. Stating that he will have to answer to the contrary if 
there are decrepit men who are incapable of performing their labour, maybe for reasons 
such as decayed fortunes.  
The Master Shipwright also takes on this similar duty, in assessing when it is appropriate 
to discharge employees and ensure that “not too many servants or boys to be entered 
upon the works proper to their command and care”. The Purser is also responsible for 
ensuring the correct payment of wages on his ship, keeping an exact cheque book of his 
seamen and to include entry and discharge, those that have run away, death and absence 
of every single person belonging to the ship. To ensure that victuals and wages are not 
being paid unnecessarily and exploited for individual gain. Between these different 
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specific instructions, we can clearly see that the Duke of York is ensuring that abuses 
through recruitment cannot occur. 
Within the instructions for the Comptroller’s duty it is specified that he should keep a 
distinct account of those impressed into the service of the navy, to balance this he should 
abate the account of those who have left the service to ensure there is no double 
payment. Although this is clearly, a procedure created to enable the accounting of the 
navy to work more proficiently, it is also clearly under the theme of the reduction of 
abuses, because it enables the Comptroller to work as a control on the Treasurer’s 
accounts, and when it is unclear enables the Comptroller to call “the parties to balance 
their accounts”. Therefore, creating accountability and reducing the excuse of confusion. 
A letter accessed from the Bodleian library, Oxford shows another example of James 
attempting to reduce abuses. In 1672 James wrote a letter given permission for men to 
be impressed on to ships with specifics of their salaries. However, he adds a caution “in 
the execution hereof you are to take care, that neither yourself, nor any authorised by 
you, do demand or receive any money, gratuity, reward or other consideration 
whatsoever for sparing, changing or discharging any person or persons impressed or to be 
impressed by virtue hereof” (MS Eng. Hist./c.478/fols.216-7). Stating that they will answer 
the contrary “at their perils’’, showing James once again trying to reduce abuses and 
private gain within the navy.  
In another letter, dated May 14th 1661, James writes to the Board after he was informed 
that after a ship has been built additional sleeping cabins are being constructed for the 
officers (Stuart, J, 1661, as cited in Memoirs of the English Affairs, 1729). James states 
that this is both an unnecessary expense but also wastes stowage space. He gives the 
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order to reduce the abuses in extravagant over spending he adds a control measure that 
before any additional cabins can be constructed they should need to permission of at 
least the flag officer but more importantly “that the officers be content with such 
accommodation as were in the former voyage”. These letters demonstrate that the Duke 
of York is not only reducing abuses through the implementation of these instructions, but 




The threat of punishments is an infrequent, but none the less clear theme that is evident 
within the instructions as a method of enforcing the rules set in place, within the 
introductory letters, as already stated above. The Lord High Admiral places the full 
responsibility of punishing any infractions at the hands of the principal officers and any 
neglect in doing so will reflect upon themselves and for the entirety of those employed 
within the navy if they do not follow these rules they will have to answer “to the 
contrary” (AND/30, 1673). However, within the instructions there is only one example of 
a reward being distributed if duties are committed properly, instead of a punishment if 
they are not, this is found within the Clerk of the Cheque’s duties. It states that within the 
accounts kept by the Clerk of the Cheque for extra works, houses, wharfs etc. if he has 
managed to prove that “the expense be exorbitant, to know where to lay the fault, and 
from whom to require an account thereof, or if there has been any thrift or good service in 
that action to whom to extend their encourage rewards & c- “. However, there are also 
examples of punishment within the Clerk of the Cheque’s duty, his duties include looking 
through muster books and if sailors are absent for longer than given permission they are 
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to be assigned the title of runaway and have their wages forfeited, any penalties placed 
on them as per the law. The same shall be if they take longer than their granted leaves 
they shall have their payment book spoiled with a “R for a runaway on his books, & leave 
his wages blank till the officers upon examination of the business at the pay table, shall 
give further order therein” (AND/30). 
In a letter to the Duke of Albermarle, dated April 20th 1665,62 James discusses defective 
and lacking victuals, he gives a concise detailed list of the victuals that the fleet has and 
the victuals that the fleet needs (Stuart, J, 1665 as cited in Memoirs of the English Affairs, 
1729). He puts his name to the council of war, to ensure that more victuals are granted 
the fleet. Noting that if more money for victuals are not granted than the fleet will never 
be set to sea. This is an ominous threat to parliament as the second Dutch war is looming. 
He used the power and status behind his name for the good of the navy.  
 
5.8.3 The ‘State of the Navy’ 
 
The third theme that is prevalent within the instructions is the numerous requests, made 
through multiple directives, for an accurate description of the current “State of the Navy”. 
This is necessary for various reasons, it ensures that the employees are answerable and 
held accountable for their work, but it also enables the higher command to quickly 
ascertain what is missing and what needs work. For example, if a potential conflict was to 
 
62 The Duke of Albermarle, George Monck was a royalist civil war general, born of the Devonshire nobility. 
However, after being captured by Cromwell’s forces he was converted to be a Parliamentarian military 
leader, eventually taking command of Scotland. Monck sent an escort to aid King Charles II returning from 
exile upon the restoration of the monarchy in 1660. He had a successful career under Charles II. Fox 
describes him as having even more influence than the Duke of York regarding the influence of the 
distribution of public offices. (Fox, 2009, pp.5-8) His family line descended from the time of Henry III (naval 
biography, 1805, p. 386),  
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arise they would quickly know whether they are in the position to fight or what area 
needs quick investment for preparation.  
The introduction of the instructions direct that a general survey is needed for all of the 
dockyards, ships and stores also assessing what magazine is needed to ascertain “what is 
wanting” in the navy. They are also requested to yearly “under their hands” present to 
the Lord High Admiral an estimate of the navy in harbour for victuals in wages, 
differentiating what the charges are for each yard. With the rationale for this being that; 
with this done quickly and efficiently in the first place then there will not be a need for 
“clamours from poor men for want of their money” (AND/30, 1673). Yet again, this 
demonstrates one of the criteria for professionalisation through the introduction of a 
“formal pay system”, as such this is a clear demonstration of the Duke of York 
professionalising the navy during his tenure as Lord High Admiral.  
Within the Treasurer’s duty it is required of him to remonstrate “under his own hands” to 
the Lord High Admiral the state of the service, the state of finances and assignations at 
least once a year rationalising that this will enable the more efficiently and timely 
payment of bills. In the Comptroller’s duty he is given an even more frequent deadline, he 
is instructed to take a general audit of all accounts, provisions and services rendered 
categorised into each particular service every quarter and annually.  
The Surveyor’s duty state that he should annually create a report to be presented to the 
rest of the Navy Board of “what he [has] conceived a fit proportion of hemp, tarr, masts, 
canvas, deals, timber, boats anchors & other provisions for a magazine for His Majesty’s 
navy for the year succeeding” as well as demonstrating how much of the above is found 
with the stores, to enable a survey of the navy and ascertain what needs to be supplied in 
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the forthcoming year. The Clerk of the Cheque is required to be answerable to the Lord 
High Admiral for financial expenditure on victualling “proper to that year”. This is more as 
a method of control because it states that this will allow the Lord High Admiral not to pay 
more than needs to be paid. Lastly, within the instructions for the Master Shipwright and 
their assistants it states that a yearly survey of His Majesty’s ships need to take place, 
specifying the defects and specifying what they recommend the requirement for fixing 
said defects “and putting each ship into a serviceable condition for 2,3,4,5 or 7 years to 
come more or less”. This is clearly a very accurate and detailed account that shows many 
variables to allow the Lord High Admiral to work out what would, short or long term, be 
the most financially viable option. These instructions also allow the Master shipwright to 
enrol the rest of the officers in this surveying task, demonstrating the creed and 
importance laid upon this task by James.  
Examples of this instruction being used can be seen in Pepys’ diary extracts, when Pepys 
describes how himself, Batten and Penn had a meeting with James to describe the State 
of the Navy and the lack of money63. Pepys describes how “he is much troubled at it, and 
will speak to the King and Council of it this morning” (Pepys, 1661, as cited in Latham and 
Matthews, 1971). This is interesting, because it shows the instructions being used, and it 
also shows an active participation from the Duke of York when confronted with the ‘State 
of the Navy’. Another example of this can be seen on the 28th December 1661, in his 
diary, Pepys states that he has been at his residence all morning writing and all of the 
board in the office have been writing an estimate of the debts of the navy, at the request 
of the Duke (Pepys, 1661, as cited in Latham and Matthews, 1971). Therefore, this is a 
 
63 Dated, 14th-15th August 1661. 
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clear example of the Duke of York taking a vested interest in enforcing the instructions 
and personally monitoring the behaviour of his navy Board. 
 
5.8.4 Accounting procedures 
 
The next theme that arises within the main body of instructions is the introduction of 
accounting procedures into the duties of those in the employ of the navy. In the 
introductory section for the principal officers it is stated that they are to create a weekly 
invoice from the customs house of goods, with the details of merchants, so that there can 
be no opportunity for the purveyor to state that there is a lack of choice. Also, in the 
same section it is stipulated that petty warrants should be taken greater care of and are 
to be more traceable. With levels of control, that they can be traced “first the accounts by 
the warrants then the warrants by the sea-books and then sea books, by the muster 
books, which often times vary”. This should then be examined so that savings can be 
found for the King’s treasury, in terms of incorrect numbers in varying capacities, 
therefore, anything returned or abated by the victuallers should be charged to their 
accounts. This shows good administrative record keeping so that they can better inspect 
the transactions of others therefore showing both this theme with accounting procedures 
as well as control mechanisms and the reduction of abuses. This is extended by the need 
for them to attend the payment of all wages, the making of contracts, passing of 
purveyor’s accounts and expenses for water and travelling charges.  
At the end of the year it is then their duty to sign the accounts and then cancel their own 
warrants. With the same procedure for the storekeeper’s accounts. The specificity of the 
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procedures is great, the document details the need to attach the storekeeper’s certificate 
to the bills “and to charge the storekeeper open and balance of his accounts”. As this is 
not the first time this is mentioned, we can really see the importance laid upon the 
activation of accounting procedures. Their procedures can be seen also in the command 
to keep counter books of the Clerk of the Cheque for volumes of men mustered to sea 
and their petty warrants issued.  
From a letter written by James on May 9th 1661 to the Navy Board, in which he intervenes 
on behalf of the Master shipwright at Deptford, he states that it has been drawn to his 
attention that the exchequer is paying him 20d per diem (Stuart, J, 1661 as cited in 
Memoirs of the English Affairs, 1729). It takes great lengths to obtain this and James 
states that this should instead be paid from the Treasurer of the navy, which would be of 
no loss to the King, but greatly aid the Master Shipwright. This is a clear example of firstly, 
how James is approachable and clearly men within his employ feel they can approach 
James with an issue for him to champion, but secondly that he is actually taking part in 
menial matters within the navy to help organise it more efficiently and ensure payments 
are made correctly (Stuart, J, 1661 as cited in Memoirs of the English Affairs, 1729). 
 
A similar notion can be seen in a letter from May 23rd 1661 to the Principal Officers from 
James (Stuart, J, 1661 as cited in Memoirs of the English Affairs, 1729). He attempts to 
reduce abuses of unnecessary overspending that before any repairs are carried out within 
the His Majesty’s yards “an estimate of the charge of the said repairs be by them sent up 
unto yourselves”. There is a caveat that if the estimates are too high when compared with 
historic estimates, they are to be forwarded to James himself to oversee and give 
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direction, otherwise they are allowed the discretion themselves. This is an important 
letter, because it clearly demonstrates that when James had issued the instructions this 
was not him finished with his work in regulating the navy. He was still updating and 
sending out new individual instructions for the better regulating of the navy. It was a 
work-in progress, allowing him to see where things didn’t work and where they did.  
There is a letter to the principal officers from James, dated 28th sept 1660, in which he 
clarifies that there has been doubt amongst the Clerks of the Cheque regarding 
accounting procedures.  
“How the quarterly books are to be made up, and whether to be rated according to 
salaries and Allowance given of late years; confidering as well the greatnefs of the 
prefent service, as the consequence it may be to his majefty, that all occasion of 
repining to be removed from such as are employed in the navy; I have thought fit to 
direct that you continue to allow all wages and salaries, according to later practise, 
until farther consideration be had thereof, and you received order to the contrary” 
(Stuart, J, 1660 as cited in Memoirs of the English Affairs, 1729). 
 
This shows his practical hands on approach to naval finance. There are multiple other 
sources demonstrating this practical approach to the navy’s day to day administrative 
queries. Within the sources contained with his memoirs of English affairs chiefly naval, 
there are examples of him discussing the residence of the Clerk of the Survey as well as 
his finance allowances and a letter regarding the sale of one of His Majesty’s ships. James 
personally tells the principal officers where to send the money and how to document this 
in the accounts’ “510l. may be paid into the hands of Sir George Carterett, treasurer of his 
majefty’s navy; who is to strike a tally for the said sum in the receipt of his majesty’s 
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exchequer”. This shows his personal involvement in the accounting and administration of 
the Royal Navy (Stuart, J, 1660-73 as cited in Memoirs of the English Affairs, 1729). 
 
Within the Comptroller’s instructions (AND/30), he is given the duty of attending the 
payment of all wages to seamen, shipwrights, caulkers etc. Under consultation with the 
other principal officers he is to rate all the wages. He is to be informed of the “rate all the 
commissions for the ships are sold in [the] market” and the standard rate for 
workmanship and labour and to ensure that the wages being paid does not exceed the 
usual standard wage. This diplomatically states “in the King’s or their own wrong”. Thus, 
engaging in the standardisation of wages, and ensuring that people aren’t being paid 
above and beyond what is appropriate for their role. The Comptroller is also to keep a 
‘compter book’, which verifies what is in the Treasurer and Victualler’s books. This is to be 
kept exact, and he should be able to answer to the Lord High Admiral at any point and 
state what and how much has been issued by the aforementioned. As has been seen 
previously, a professionalisation criteria, as theorised by this thesis is the introduction of a 
formal pay system. James’ determination here to ensure the wages were standardised is 
a clear example of the movement towards a more professionalised navy. 
The Clerk of the Act’s instructions also clearly detail the accounting procedures associated 
with his role. He is asked “To keep an exact record of all conclusions, orders, petitions, 
debates, estimates, warrants, letters, answers &c. agitated at all meetings” with the 
rationale being stipulated that this will enable the board to consult these notes in future 
decisions to work on precedent. Additionally, if any accidents befall the originals, a true 
copy is always kept with the Clerk of the Acts. 
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In a letter, dated December 17th 1666, James again writes to the Navy Board regarding 
accounting procedures (Stuart, J, 1666 as cited in Memoirs of the English Affairs, 1729). 
He references previous instructions he has sent out in this matter, which we can assume 
are the instructions that this research is currently analysing, He reminds them that in the 
first week of January next year that they have a deadline and will need to present an 
account of the bills mentioned in the weekly accounts, which have been signed between 
the 1st January 1665 and the first of January 1666. As well as an account of returns sent to 
them by the Treasurer “of moneys received and paid by him. So that he can have a view of 
the debts of the Navy. He also states that if over the year they find accounting methods 
that would be even more suitable for displaying these debts e.g. inconveniences in the old 
method or supplements to it, he would like to hear their recommendations. With a final 
reminder to pass the victualler and Purser’s accounts which “I believe may be of good 
advantage to the Kings service”. This shows that he is improving upon the instructions to 
ensure they are being carried out. But, also that he is willing and happy to listen to new 
ideas, anything that would aid the King’s service. This echoes a similar letter that had 
been sent out at the beginning of the year reminding the Board in advance that no bills 
are to be paid until they had first been entered into Brounker’s office and reminds them 
to keep the Treasurer and Comptroller’s accounts with a note of the navy debt on the 
side (Stuart, J, 1665 as cited in Memoirs of the English Affairs, 1729). Again, it should be 
noted that neither of these letters were disseminated in the bound volumes containing 
the instructions, we can assume they were circulated separately.  Also, this is another 
clear example of the Duke of York being hands on with the administration and not acting 
as merely a ‘Royal Patron’, as discussed earlier within this chapter.  
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Although the main source being used to analyse the Duke of York’s focus on 
administrative reforms is the instructions issued periodically throughout his tenure, we 
can see clearly through the variety of alternative sources also demonstrate this point that 
James consistently followed up on these policies and ensured accounting procedures 
were being actively used by navy personnel. In a letter to the Navy Board from James sent 
on the 23rd November 1666 after the laying up of the fleet, he instructs those on board to 
utilise winter to pass the accounts of all the Pursers in harbour, with the additional 
information required of the volume of men present on each ship and how this exceeded 
the expected numbers. The threat of punishment by the King is given for non-compliant 
Pursers. James also requires the victualler’s accounts be passed because “he has been 
informed” that he has money remaining which would make the King’s declaration of 
needs to Parliament for the following year a lot easier (Stuart, as cited in British Naval 
Documents, 1993). This source shows he is keeping abreast of the situation and still 
looking for surveys of the navy and not allowing negligence and attempting to keep it an 
efficient machine.  
Within the additional instructions for the Treasurer (D/Lons/l13/7/2/16; MSS 44, 1662) 
which are not present in all of the versions of the instructions, it stipulates that he should 
give the principal officers an account of moneys spent in that week. Interestingly, as will 
be discussed later in this chapter, this section is not within the Earl of Northumberland’s 
instructions for the Navy Board (Sloane MS3232) and this additional set of instructions 
adds far more clarity to the duty of the Treasurer. 
“what moneys or assignments for money he had received in the said week, and how 
much the said money’s or assignments, or any former money’s or assignments are at 
that day remaining in his hands, specifying also as well the particular fond, or 
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assignments on which they said Moneys was paid him, as the fond upon which every of 
the assignments so received or resting in his hands are placed” (D/Lons/l13/7/2/16) 
(MSS 44, 1662). 
 It give specific dates for the Treasurer to submit his account to the board “shall upon 
Saturday in the every week”, it also states that it should be in his own hand, whereas the 
Northumberland version states that his clerks are also capable of undertaking the 
responsibility, it states that the account given should be ‘perfect’ and the actual duty is 
far more specific, instead of just documenting that petty warrants should be cancelled 
after being added to the accounts, he describes this in more detail;  
He also requires that the exact certificates also to be delivered to the board each week, 
stating who the warrants were paid to, their value, delivery and details of what the 
warrant is. However, in this addition, it commands that these should be given to a specific 
person after they have been given to the board; Lord Viscount Brounissier, who was 
Comptroller of the navy. It adds the caveat of any other Comptroller of the navy with the 
duty of Comptrolling the accounts of the Treasurer. But this is a rare anomaly within the 
instructions, the status quo is to only reference the title of the office, not the holder of 
the office.  
The storekeeper is directed in relation to the issue of stores that once he has received a 
warrant signed by two of the principal officers, he is able to issue the stores. However, he 
is to “lay up the same with all convenient safety, respecting either the waste or decay of 
it, or the stealth purloining [?] Embezzlement thereof”. This is a point, exactly copied in 
the storekeeper’s duty relating to the receipt of out-stores. It is also stipulated that due to 
the great trust placed upon them with their office and the difficulty to “trace him 
therein”, it is essential that storekeepers undertake their duties personally and do not 
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deputise, with the only exception being extreme necessity such as sickness. These 
deputies have to be men of good report in demeanour and trust and ultimately the 
storekeeper will retain accountability for his juniors at all times. This point is clear and re-
iterated several times, within the duties for issues it is again stated that it is too great a 
trust to deputise to boys or common labourers, again unless under extreme necessity. 
However, these instructions do not clarify how demeanour and trust can be judged. 
Feeding the navy was an expensive and all-consuming task, in the majority of remaining 
account books the highest short-term debt was “the money due the victuallers for the 
provision of food and beverage for the fleet”. The navy developed a system which 
allowed a certain financial buoyancy. Ships were paid at the end of their deployment, 
meaning that there was ‘float’ of temporarily expendable petty cash to be borrowed 
against, which often gave short term financial reprieve.  
Previously, as the Royal Navy and England had only used ‘ordinary tax revenue’ to fund 
their fleet, change was becoming a necessity (Wheeler, 1996, PP. 460-462). The Navy 
Board and Victualling Board worked with another financial system, the use of bills. This 
meant, that in conjunction with the Navy Board, they could run their own “public debt 
system”, away from the management of the Treasury. This was an effective method, as 
long as they were cautious to ensure that they did not ‘threaten investors’ confidence’. 
Rodger suggests that theoretically there was a lack of funding, but in reality, they 
managed to remain self-sufficient because of this method of borrowing against 
themselves. He also highlights how the navy would have no intention of drawing 
“attention to the illogicality of a system whose effect was to allow the navy complete 
freedom to spend its income as it wished, and a considerable measure of elasticity to 
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increase it when needed” (Rodger, 2006, p. 292-3). Additionally, to answer financial 
problems, the Cavalier government made the decision to disband the Army and utilise 
their finances to supply and decrease the debt of the Royal Navy, which was certainly a 
successful temporary measure.  
 
4.7.4.1 The use of a ledger 
 
The most common accounting practice that appears within these instructions is the use of 
the ledger. Therefore, due to its frequency it has been kept as a separate theme. A ledger 
is a book in which accounts are traditionally kept. McLaney et al state that it is regularly 
split into subsections because it allows for multiple users. They also state that it allows 
the multiple staff to focus on individual accounts relevant to their own work which leads 
to “more accurate and efficient record keeping” which in turn reduces the potential for 
fraudulent activity (McLaney et al, 2014, p.722). One criterion for professionalisation, as 
conceptualised by this thesis, is ‘the requirements of specific knowledge and expertise’, 
therefore, it could be argued that use of the ledger is a clear demonstration of the Duke 
of York moving towards the navy becoming a more professionalised body. This theme will 
explore examples of the Duke of York implementing the use of the ledger within his 
instructions.  
Within the introductory section for the principal officers it states that the principal 
officers are to supply petty warrants for extra services rendered annually. They are then 
to sign their accounts and have them fairly entered into a ledger book. This is also stated 
within the Treasurer’s specific instructions in which it tells him to digest his accounts into 
a ledger book, “fairly written for the rest of the officers”. With the notion being that there 
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should be an accurate list of all books and bills for all provisions, accurately documented 
so that it can be demonstrated how much has been spent on each sector for that year. 
This also demonstrates an attempt to regularly demonstrate the current ‘State of the 
Navy’.  
Again, this is discussed within the Comptroller’s duty, with his duty requiring him to sign 
all of the Treasurer’s accounts before it is processed into his ledger book. This will ensure 
that there is a control over his wilful neglects and oversights.  
Within the Duties of the Comptroller of the Treasurer’s accounts- and of the Comptroller 
of the Victualling and stores (MSS 44, 1662), there is an additional segment that is not 
present within AND/30, it states that he should be working as an “auditor” balancing the 
state of the Treasurer’s accounts for the present year to ascertain if any of the King’s 
treasure remains with him, with the accompanying instruction being that if a remaining 
balance is found, he should alert the Lord High Admiral. The same instruction if also given 
to the balance as an Auditor to the Victuallers accounts. However, rather than combining 
them in one instruction, he has two identically phrased paragraphs at the beginning and 
end of his set of instructions. His instructions are also similar to those for the Clerk of the 
Acts. 
The Clerk is told to copy “To Copy all estimates, privy seals, assignations, or other 
orders for Money from (?) time past and allowed into the Treasurer for any service 
whatsoever and once every quarter or oftner, if he thinks fit to consult the Treasurer’s 
accounts and see what and how much of the money assign’d he hath reciev’d that he 
may by his warrants Bills or Compter Books, compare the Issues & receipts together 
and be able to satisfy the Lord High Admiral the state of the present services in the 




This is interesting because this section is also not present in the Earl of Northumberland’s 
version of the instructions, which show the emphasis placed upon the implementation of 
accounting procedures by the Duke of York to a level not seen before by his predecessors. 
It is most notable that he has given the same control mechanism instructions to multiple 
people, this signifying James’ dedication to activating and enforcing the participation in 
accounting procedures.  
Within the Storekeepers Duty relating to the receipt of in stores (AND/30, 1673), there 
are many duties relating the accounting procedures within the navy. Firstly, it should be 
noted that in the later version (MSS 44, 1662) this title of this subjection of the 
instructions has changed to “Instructions to be observed by the storekeepers of His 
Majesty’s Yards for a method in keeping & balancing their accounts- the receipts of 
stores”. Clearly, before analysing this subsection in any technical depth, we can assert 
that the Lord High Admiral was clarifying the importance of accounting procedures in the 
Storekeeper’s duties.  
It is also worth noting, that these instructions are not present in any form within the Earl 
of Northumberland’s original instructions to the Navy Board (Sloane MS3232). Therefore, 
it was seen in 1660 of vital importance to add the installation of accounting procedures to 
the original instructions laid out by the Earl of Northumberland. The Duke of York’s 
amendments in his 1662 version (MSS 44, 1662), show that he continued his work to 
professionalise the Royal Navy via the introduction of accounting practises, he did not 
simply re-distribute previous instructions laid down by previous Lord High Admirals. As 
these instructions are also found in versions published later in the 1670s 
(D/Lons/l13/7/2/16), it seems likely that these duties were active through the whole 
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decade of the 1660s at least. Within the instructions relating to the storekeeper and in 
stores, we can see that the accounting procedures that he is tasked with include; keeping 
a book he updates daily regarding the quantity and quality of goods received, the same 
shall be done for goods received by him from other yards and counter signed by the Clerk 
of the Cheque on a weekly basis. He is also instructed to keep an additional book which 
states the returns of stores and their quality and quantity from the Boatswain and 
carpenters, which is to be weekly countersigned by the Master Attendant and Master 
Shipwright. This same format is to be used in a book for the locksmiths, iron works, 
plasterers and block makers also. Monthly, he is then to send these accounts to the 
Comptroller of the Storekeeper’s accounts. A book is also to be kept regarding the 
conversion of stores e.g. timber to plank and the repurposing of old sails. The previous list 
of books which are to be kept for the receipt of in stores is also to be replicated for 
receipt of issuing of stores. All are required to be counter signed. It is only within the 
issues of stores, that an exception is made to the storekeeper, in which it is stipulated 
that in the case of his “necessary absence” his assistant or the Master Shipwright shall be 
able to sign for the issuing of stores and also to sign the weekly books. Finally, it is 
stipulated that he is to create a book which will serve as the men’s account and in this 
book, it shall be documented where he is to be a creditor “and be made debtor for what 
bills shall be given him”.  
However, the Comptroller is also to keep his own ledger book of the Treasurer’s and 
Victualler’s accounts. Acting as a control so that he may be better able to trace their 
transactions. And it is available in his office to be used to consult on both the rate of 
provisions as well as the precedent of past provisions for the use in future procurement 
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of provisions. An additional ledger of control is seen within the Duty of the Comptroller of 
the Treasurer’s accounts, in which he is twice asked to keep an additional version of the 
exact same ledger. Again, this addition is not in the instructions issued by the Earl of 
Northumberland. This demonstrates that the Duke of York wanted to create another 
layer of control over the Treasurer’s accounts of petty warrants through the use of a 
ledger book. Once again, this is indicative of his determination to implement accounting 
procedures in a thorough manner through the Royal Navy, thus creating a more 
professionalised and less corrupt organisation that makes better use of the money 
allocated to it through Parliament.  
 
5.8.5 Improved efficiency 
 
Another theme that is prevalent within the main body of instructions is the introduction 
of rules aiming to increase and improve efficiency within the navy. Examples of the Duke 
of York striving the make the navy more efficient can be seen very early within the 
instructions. Within the introductory overview to the principal officers it is specified that 
the principal offers should calculate what ordnance or cordage used for a ships rigging is 
necessary to sustain the fleet for 6 months. Thus, creating a procedure that plans in 
advance so the fleet already has the equipment needed, instead of waiting till the 
provisions have been exhausted and then re-ordering. 
The Treasurer is given various specific examples pertaining to improved efficiency within 
his duty and the service. Firstly, it is stated that upon the passing of all estimates (both 
ordinary and extraordinary) he needs to pass the privy seal proper to each estimate, and 
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settle these estimates. This is to ensure that the service is not ‘retarded’ nor men 
discouraged due to lack of money. This is furthered by stating that in respect of his ‘trust’ 
or office he is to conduct “more speedy payments”. Showing delays and inefficiency will 
no longer be tolerated. This is reiterated in relation to the payment of wages that the 
treasure be “truly and punctually paid”. This includes the payments to the Chatham chest 
and other payment for the sailors because “the service often suffers in the unhealthiness 
of his seamen aboard by the want of clothes arising”. Lastly, within the Treasurer’s duty it 
is stated that he should sign all estimated and contracts for the Lord High Admiral and his 
fellow principal officers to warrant his payments, with the addition of written clarification 
of his judgements for the ease and efficiency of future payments.  
It could be argued that these contributions towards the Chatham Chest can be seen to be 
part of a wider implementation of a ‘formalised pay structure’- a criterion for 
professionalisation. 
Another example of the introduction of what can be argued as a formalised pay structure, 
can be seen in a 1665 proclamation for prize money (Adm. Sec. In letters, 5246)64.This 
document details the exact payment of men for prize money. It states that instead of 
prize money, in lieu of this those serving on ships will receive a financial supplement from 
His Majesty. It explicitly states that this if for “every ship or prize they shall lawfully take”. 
This is to the value of ten shillings for every tonne the said ship shall measure. This is then 
distributed according to “their respective places and offices within the ship” … “within ten 
 
64 However, this research located this source from the NRS publication ‘Laws and Customs, 1916’ 
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days after the payment of the wages of such seamen” (Laws and Customs of the Sea, 
1916, p. 51). 
Within these instructions, it also states that they are allowed take as prizes any 
merchandise from upon or above the gun deck (Laws and Customs of the Sea, 1916, p. 
52). However, we can see from an extract written from the Prize Commissioners to the 
King in 1665, that this has encouraged the men into more abuses. “upon pretence of this 
they have not only taken all goods on the orlop, but broken bulk and taken away in all 
ships of best value, great and considerable proportions” (Laws and Customs of the Sea, 
1916, p. 65) 
In Pepys’ diary, he describes being instructed by the Duke of York to “prepare a draft of 
the present administration of the navy, and what it was in the late times- in order to his 
being able to distinguish between the good and the bad” (Pepys, 1669, as cited in Latham 
and Matthews, 1971)65. It shows that Pepys was the Duke of York’s point person, and the 
monarchy was also interested in reform. It also goes on to say that they showed the Duke 
of York both Mennes and Hosier’s proposals for the balancing of storekeeper’s accounts. 
These were put into practise and according to his diary on the 7th March 1669, this was 
passed in council. Latham and Matthews explain that this amendment allowed for the 
employment of nine additional clerks, five to assist Mennes and four to be placed within 
the dockyards (Pepys, 1669, as cited in Latham and Matthews, 1971). It shows that they 
listen to advice for increased efficiency and prioritise the practicalities of implanting 
strong accounting procedures. However, it also shows us that there are other important 
 
65 Dated, 12th February 1669. 
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figures outside of these case studies. This whole era was showing a culture of reform and 
change.   
It should also be noted that the theme of improved efficiency can be seen to be in conflict 
with the Duke of York’s goal to reduce and abuses. The additional controls, as analysed 
within the previous section, may have an adverse effect on efficiency if they are too 
onerous.  
 
5.9 Disseminating the instructions  
 
The style of the writing in all versions of the instructions is also worth analysing. The way 
each section is written is clear and laboriously explained. Considering that the versions 
still extant are in the format of bound books, there is a strange phenomenon within the 
instructions, they are repetitive with each different office having overlapping instructions; 
for example, the Boatswain, Gunner and Purser are to lodge on board the ship, when in 
port, every third night so that it is always manned and thus the security of the ship is 
higher. However, rather than stating this in one statement, each instruction for each 
singular officer states that he (for example the Purser) must do this with the Boatswain 
and Gunner. In the Gunner’s instructions it states he must do this with the Purser and 
Boatswain. Therefore, one could assume that even though there are complete copies of 
the instructions bound and distributed across the country, either it was the plan, or it was 
achieved but there are no existing versions, that each individual office holder was meant 
to have a copy just of their duties. The way the document reads, it assumes the Purser 
has not read the preceding instructions for the Boatswain and Gunner, and as such we 
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can assume that he may not have had access to them. Again, an argument for this could 
be, that the extant versions were held by senior members of the board, but the individual 
copies of their specific duties may not have survived because these people did not have 
permanent office on shore.  
When discussing the effectiveness of the dissemination of the instructions one source of 
note is a letter to the Duke of York from Captain Thomas Booth. Booth states that he did 
not receive the instructions from James, but that he is very sorry for any neglect he may 
have caused in his commission on the Prince Rupert in the Second Dutch War (ADM 
106/321). This shows the gravitas placed on these instructions and the need to uphold 
them. And the assumption from Captain Booth that the reason for a delay in his payment 
must be him not conforming to these instructions. Davies argues that this was a common 
complaint amongst officers in the navy (Davies, 1991, p. 46) 
Davies also highlights that these instructions were not always practical to carry out. He 
highlights the requirement for mustering men once a week and sending the results to the 
Navy Board as a control mechanism to ensure that the men being paid were actually 
working. However, captains working on ships on long term deployment overseas stated 
that it was not possible to send with frequency their muster books and additionally, when 
in the middle of the ocean becoming ‘Absent With Out Leave’ was not possible, so they 






5.10 The requirement for further reform 
 
It is essential to admit that although James was working upon reform, was not perfect, 
there were mistakes still being made, hence the necessity for amendments to the initial 
instructions and the financial difficulties they faced. The Medway raid highlighted to the 
country the difficulties being faced by the Navy Board66. It also meant that the men were 
disenchanted after long periods of not receiving money and were beginning to show 
discontent. To remedy this the Duke of York and twelve other men formed a commission, 
with the purpose of listening to the seamen’s grievances. This resulted in the removal of 
Cartarett from his post as Treasurer, replaced by the Earl of Anglesey (Tanner, 1897). 
Cartarett was also investigated by Parliament for his behaviour. A committee appointed 
by the House of Lords was favourable to him, in contrast to the House of Commons who 
suspended his seat (Carlyle, 1912).  
The Navy Board was also being rebuked by the Duke of York, although this shows 
negligence from the Duke of York for allowing problems to progress to this stage, it also 
shows serious attempts were made to remedy the situation afterwards. Pepys documents 
how he wrote a letter to the Duke of York explaining that after the want of money, the 
single biggest problem arising in naval administration at this point, was the instructions 
he issued in 1660 not being carried out (Tanner, 1897, p. 41). This is two sided, firstly it 
shows the importance of these instructions, but secondly, they are not being adhered to 
 
66 The Medway raid was commanded by De Ruyter in June 1667. The Dutch sailed down the Thames, 
attacking Sheerness fort en route. Three of the biggest ships of the Royal Navy; the Royal James, The Royal 
Oak and The Royal London were attacked by fireships. With the flagship; the Royal Charles towed away as a 




strongly enough. Which could explain why there are examples of them being re-issued in 
1667. Tanner discusses in great length the financial difficulties of the navy during this 
period in his work; ‘The administration of the Navy from the restoration to the 
revolution’. He discusses the decline in credit available to the navy, because there was 
such mistrust at the prospect of this being duly paid. And when creditors would offer, 
they would charge largely inflated prices to reflect the risk. In October 1665, Pepys gave 
the suggestion that he should take on the duty of Surveyor-General for the additional 
wage of 300l per annum. This was granted and did show an improvement to the current 
situation (Tanner, 1897, p. 88).  
With the Medway Raid and the decline in morale within the navy we can see with 
dissemination of amended instructions that the Duke of York did not become complacent, 
when his board had become idle after the first surge of change, he persevered. 
 
Although often critical of the Duke of York, Turner asserts the following; 
“James brought to his Admiralty duties in the years of 1668 and 1669 a resurgence of 
reforming zeal, admonishing the board members for neglect, and instituting additional 
resident commissioners at Portsmouth and Harwich, a decision clearly motivated by De 
Ruyter’s raid into the Medway” (Turner, 1950, p. 32) 
This can also be seen by the fact that in 1688 Pepys references a commission headed by a 
gentleman called Deane who was looking into the State of the Navy and has the following 
suggestions; they need to make up old accounts, finish current works and accounts and 
review, perfect and establish body of instructions (Pepys, as cited in British Naval 
Documents, 1993). Again, showing that the Duke of York was again willing to re-address 
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the effectiveness of these instructions. He did not expect them to stay unchanged 
indefinitely. Potentially, the Duke of York saw the instructions as a work-in progress that 
can always be bettered.  
 
5.11 The Navy after the Duke of York 
 
The Test Act of 1673 and the retirement of James from his post as Lord High Admiral 
meant important changes for the navy. During the period that Charles II took over the 
Lord High Admiral’s duties, he mainly passed them on to twelve commissioners; including 
Lord Chancellor, Lord Treasurer and the Lord Privy Seal. However, the Duke of York, 
although retired, was still present in effect in naval affairs at this point. Tanner argues 
that this can be confirmed by numerous references to him within the Admiralty letters 
(Tanner, 1920, p.30). 
Pepys describes the changes made under James II’s successors; William and Mary after 
James was exiled after the Glorious Revolution in 1688. He compares their administration 
to that of the Charles II and the James II. In reference to Ship building during the reign of 
William and Mary, he laments much better it was under the restoration administration.  
“[James II and Charles II], Whose personal concernments for and knowledges in that 
affair led them not only to the giving a liberty, but even encouraging all men of that 
trade, beginners as well as old practisers, and even assistants and foremen as well as 
Masters-Builders, nay, down to the very barge-maker and boat-maker, to bring their 
draughts to them, and themselves vouchsafed to administer occasion of discoursing 
and debating the same and the reasons appertaining thereto. Not only to the great and 
universal encouragement of the men, but improvement of their art to the benefit of the 
state: themselves taking delight to visit the merchant-yards as well as their own, and 
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both honour and assist with their presence no less the merchant builder at his 
launchings of a new ship of any tolerable consideration, and enquiring after the proofs 
of them at their return from sea, than his own Master-Builders. But how this is made 
good under a Prince whose genius seems bent to land-action only, and consequently 
what obligations, inducements, or indeed regard is now had to the keeping up of that 
emulation, and consequently the hopes of our still further advancing in the science of 
shipbuilding, whether by any applications used towards it by those who have the 
charge of the Admiralty, or the officers of the Navy, or in particular by the surveyor 
thereof (if he may yet be admitted for sufficient to judge of the work of a Master-
Builders, who was so lately condemned of insufficiency in his duty as an assistant) I am 
out of the way of knowing” (Pepys, 1688, as cited in Samuel Pepys Naval Minutes, 
1980, pp. 19-25). 
 Although as afore mentioned there is a high potential for bias within Pepys’ work, it is 
indisputable the effect Duke of York had on the administration in the Royal Navy. Even if 
this is exaggerated by Pepys on any level, the fact that a compliment to James comes in 
the form of his administrative capacity could be argued as very telling of his priorities and 
focus during his ducal and monarchical tenures.  
When James ascended to the throne in 1685 after the death of his brother, he returned 
from Scotland and became King James II (Lambert, 2008, p. 7). It is documented that the 
first thing he did was begin repairing the navy, along with improvement of trade and 
paying off navy debts. Macaulay documents the poor state the navy had declined into yet 
again asserting that it had sunk into “degradation and decay” with Captains who were 
selected from the aristocracy instead of for their experience (Macaulay,1953, p. 225). 
“the way in which these men lived was so ostentatious and voluptuous that, greedy as 
they were of gain, they seldom became rich. They dressed as if for a gala at Versailles”. 
When the Duke of York returned from Scheveningen, his first priority was reform, 
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showing the passion, he had for the navy. He could have delegated his duties as Lord High 
Admiral to other people, but instead he took the post up again alongside his Kingship. 
Macaulay is very complimentary of what he managed to achieve between his ascension 
and the Glorious Revolution in 1688. He describes the navy as being more efficient and 
well managed, and this needs to be accredited to James because “He had appointed no 
Lord High Admiral or Board of Admiralty, but had kept the chief direction of maritime 
affairs in his own hands, and had been strenuously assisted by Pepys” (Macaulay, 1953, p. 
226).  
 
5.12 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has supported the research aim and given one of the three biographical case 
studies that will attempt to establish the extent to which attempts were made to instigate 
management controls in order to move towards the organisational professionalisation of 
the Royal Navy in the late 17th century 
This case study has dispelled the theory that the Duke of York was merely a “Royal 
Patron” (Turner, 1950, p. 73). It has instead documented, through thematic analysis of 
primary source material, the administrative advancements and implementation of 
accounting practices he made during his reign as Lord High Admiral.  
The analysis of the instructions, issued by the Duke of York, provides us with examples of 
him instituting control mechanisms established through accounting procedures;  the use 
of the ledger; the introduction of formalised salaries in preference to fees and 
perquisites; stipulations of who could delegate to reduce the potential for fraud and 
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abuses; the use of bills as payment in course with especial focus on the reduction of 
abuses seen in inspection of men, working hours and quality of work. These reforms 
demonstrate clearly concepts of management control systems, of which supported the 
navy in moving towards organisational professionalism. In a broader sense, the publishing 
of a set of instructions we have seen demonstrate the publishing of standard operating 
practices, which, according to the metrics devised by Neely et al can be seen as another 
example of Performance management (Neely et al, 2005, 1230). 
The analysis of the originality of the instructions in comparison to earlier versions 
published by the Earl of Northumberland, as seen in section 5.7.2, demonstrates that the 
Duke of York focused his professional responsibilities in his role as Lord High Admiral on 
the reduction of abuses and implementation of accounting procedures. He pursued this 
goal throughout his tenure by improving upon the instructions with letters, updated 
instructions and memorandums, demonstrating that this was not a singular activity as he 
entered office, he worked hard to ensure the navy was moving forward throughout the 
time period.  
The following chapters will explore the subsequent two biographical case studies; William 
Coventry and Samuel Pepys. The overall comparison and compilation of the findings of 
these is seen in chapter eight.  
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This chapter builds upon the research analysed within the previous case study for the 
Duke of York. It uses a similar analytical framework to build a second case study in order 
to support the research aim that will attempt to establish the extent to which attempts 
were made to instigate management controls in order to move towards the 
organisational professionalisation of the Royal Navy in the late 17th century. 
The chapter begins by introducing William Coventry as a case study. As a relatively 
unknown figures, for historical context it is necessary to introduce his role as a celebrated 
naval administrator.  This will include the exploration of pre-existing historian’s 
perceptions of Coventry, with this chapter asserting that he was astute, professional and 
receiving appropriate sinecures according to the 17th century social norms that he was 
working within. Section 6.4 will then explore Coventry’s ongoing feud with the Earl of 
Clarendon that led to the latter's impeachment. In turn, as discussed in section 2.6, this 
conflict will be used as context to discuss the reliability of using Clarendon’s primary 
source material as archival evidence. 
The subsequent sections of this chapter, covering 6.5.1 to 6.5.5 constitute the body of the 
archival data collection and thematic analysis. This format will take a similar approach as 
seen in sections 5.7 and 5.8 of the Duke of York’s case study. 
The administrative reforms implemented by Coventry are assessed for their perceived 
motivation and categorised as either; accounting procedures; increased efficiency, state 
of the navy or retrenchment. In turn, it is then highlighted which of these reforms display 
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the metrics for this thesis’ framework for professionalisation or management control. This 
will help to contribute towards the overall research aim of assessing how one of the three 
senior individuals who instigated management controls was responsible for the 
organisational professionalisation of the Royal Navy in the late 17th century. 
Additionally, this chapter builds upon the analysis of the Duke of York’s instructions, as 
seen in chapter five. Unlike the other administrators and officers within the navy, 
Coventry, as Secretary to the Admiralty, was not given a set of duties within any of the 
versions of the Duke of York’s instructions for the regulation of the navy.67 This case study 
has used primary sources from his own collection of documents based at Longleat 
house68, as well as evidence from the Calendar of State Papers and diary extracts from 
Samuel Pepys and the Earl of Clarendon in order to ascertain for the first time what 
Coventry’s role consisted of and what his responsibilities and focuses were.  
This chapter will assert that, unlike the Duke of York and Samuel Pepys, the evidence 
suggests that Coventry’s primary focus was retrenchment. Although the other case 
studies demonstrate examples of this within their professional responsibilities, they do 
not focus on it to the same extent as is demonstrated by Coventry. 
6.2 Introduction to William Coventry  
 
William Coventry was born in 1627, “the youngest son to a very wise father, the lord 
Coventry, who had been lord keeper of the great seal of England” (Clarendon, as cited in 
the life of Edward, Earl of Clarendon, 1827, Vol II, p. 201) and studied at the University of 
Oxford in 1642, but left without completing his bachelor’s degree (Lee and Kelsey, 2004). 
 
67 Please see Case study One; The Duke of York for a full explanation. 
68 However, this research accessed them via microfiche at the Institute of Historical Research, London. 
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During the English Civil War, he sided with the Royalists and had command of a foot 
company (Lee and Kelsey, 2004). He later joined Royalist exiles in Paris (Cruickshanks 
(1954). However, before the end of the war he had made his peace with the Interregnum 
administration, which, according to Cruickshanks was probably encouraged through the 
intervention of his Parliamentarian brother-in-law; Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper. However, 
prior to the restoration of the monarchy, Coventry went to The Hague and offered his 
allegiance and services to the Duke of York (Lee and Kelsey 2004; Cruickshanks (1954)).  
Lee and Kelsey argue that the Duke of York’s acceptance of William Coventry and 
promotion to the office of private secretary was probably due to the high esteem 
William’s brother Henry Coventry held within the Stuart court (Lee and Kelsey, 2004). 
William Coventry also led the royal entry into London upon the restoration. Therefore, 
Coventry’s family connections supported him in both Parliamentarian England as well as 
Stuart England. 
William had an eventful and varied career, in addition to his role as private secretary to 
the Duke of York, he held the following positions; in 1661 he became a Member of 
Parliament for Great Yarmouth, in 1662 he was appointed as a Commissioner of the navy 
and subsequently, in October of that same year, Commissioner for the government of 
Tangier.  
In 1665, he was appointed to the prestigious position of Privy councillor. Cruickshanks 
asserts that Coventry was a very active member of Parliament; present at three hundred 
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and ninety-eight different committees during his tenure, chairing twelve of them 
(Cruickshanks, 1954).69  
Vale researched Coventry in 1956 describing how, upon the restoration of the monarchy 
and the installation of the Duke of York as Lord High Admiral, “it fell to Coventry to 
execute the wide and ill-defined range of business connected with the ancient 
prerogatives of that office” (Vale, 1956, p. 107). Vale then highlights some of the 
associated duties, including; employment appointments, dispensing of justice, movement 
of ships and traditional Admiralty jurisdiction “with its machinery in London and the 
maritime shires”. Additional duties were added in 1662 including; Commissioner of the 
Navy Board and Lord Admirals advisory council (Vale, 1956, p. 107-8). Vale describes his 
work by saying the following of his career: 
[It began] “like most of his colleagues on the Board as an amateur, Coventry rapidly 
gained such a mastery of the minutiae of naval business that when the day came that 
he sat with them no more they felt, said Pepys ‘like fools’ without him, the proceedings 
‘mighty flat and dull to what we used to be when Sir William Coventry was among us” 
(Vale, 1956, p. 108).  
However, as much as his career was clearly bright and successful, it was also turbulent, 
with Coventry stepping down as Navy Commissioner. Volume CLXXXVIII of the Calendar of 
 
69 Primary sources also detail his early career steps. The Kingdome’s Intelligencer newspaper in London 
dated March 25, 1661 - April 1, 1661; Issue 13: proves that William Coventry esquire, became secretary to 
the Duke of York. Additionally, Mercurius Publicus Comprising the Sum of Forraign Intelligence (London, 
England), April 4, 1661 - April 11, 1661; Issue 14 also references William Coventry’s new-found status. A 
court document accessed through State Papers Online. VOL. LIV dated May 12 1662 describes 
the appointment of William Coventry as a Commissioner of the Navy, with the power to sit with the 




State Papers, dated January the 8th 1667, contains a warrant for the submission of the 
office of commissioner of the navy. Coventry was then imprisoned in the Tower of 
London in 1669, petitioning for a royal pardon on the 9th March, and was finally released 
on the 20th March 1669. During this time period, he was lampooned in a 1669 play 
entitled ‘The Country Gentlemen’ of which his was characterised as ‘Sir Cautious Trouble-
all’. After his imprisonment, he refused to serve again under Charles II’s administration 
and he eventually died on the 23rd June 1686 (Lee and Kelsey, 2004).  
 
6.3 Debate over the character of Coventry 
 
Pepys is one of the most famous names associated with the history of the Royal Navy and 
a household name outside of academic circles. However, William Coventry sits, without 
renown, in the dusty corners of history. This seems incredible when one considers that 
Coventry was effectively Pepys’ mentor, and is referenced as being his professional 
superior. In a brief analysis of the literature pertinent to Coventry, Vale echoes this view, 
stating that it was seventy-five years following his time in office, before anything was 
written on Coventry. This reference to Coventry is from an “anonymous contributor, 
potentially W.D Christie, to the Saturday Review of 11th October 1873” and since that 
point “his figure remains discernible only with the penumbrae of brighter bodies” (Vale, 
1956, p.107). Vale highlights that this point is shocking, considering that “none of his 
contemporaries, not even Clarendon, denied him to possess administrative ability of the 
first order”. Yet he was still “at best a transient and rather confused visitor” in the 
histories of more prominent men (Vale, 1956, p.107). This assessment finds the field of 
research regarding Coventry distinctly lacking and demonstrates the necessity for further 
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research in this area, providing a clear justification for the inclusion of such a case study 
within this work, in order to broaden the knowledge and understanding of one of the 
most capable administrators in history. Additionally, as such an understudied figure 
within the restoration administration, it is important to be able to identify his 
contributions towards professionalisation.  
R J A Shelley wrote an article concerning the division of the English fleet in the Second 
Dutch War (Shelley, 1939), in which he discusses a dialogue, between Samuel Pepys and 
William Coventry stating that he agreed with the recent decision to place the fleet under 
the command of Prince Rupert and the Duke of Albemarle. This had been done in 
response to the perceived threat to national security posed by the presence of the Duke 
of York, then heir apparent to the throne of England, being present in battle 70. However, 
for the purposes of this research, the most interesting statement within this paper is 
Shelley’s reference to Coventry as the “real administrator of the navy” (Shelley, 1939, p. 
179). Although, Shelley does not explicitly state to whom he is comparing to Coventry, it 
may be reasonably assumed that the intended target is Pepys, due to the proximity of his 
name within the sentence and considering that this statement represents an argument 
against the prevailing historical narrative that frequently describes Pepys as the sole 
mastermind of seventeenth century naval administration.  
Pool makes an interesting assertion in his study, arguing that if William Coventry had not 
become a member of the Navy Board, it is unlikely Pepys would have had the opportunity 
to reach such seniority within the navy himself (Pool, 1974, p. 106). He states that 
 
70 Fox states that the rationale for dual leadership with both Admirals is firstly, that it provides continuity of 
leadership in the event that one of the admirals is killed in battle. Additionally, he argues that in Prince 
Rupert’s previous military experience for the army he was known to be rash and impetuous, Albemarle’s 
dual leadership was installed to counter that (Fox, 2009, pp. 5-6).  
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Coventry “inspired Pepys with his efficiency and sense of urgency” and as such without 
this inspiration and tutorship, he might “have ended his career as a good, but 
undistinguished, Clerk of the Acts. As it was, the close collaboration that developed 
between Coventry and Pepys was a landmark in the history of naval administration” 
(Pool, 1974, p. 106).  
Carlyle wrote a piece concerning Clarendon and the Privy Council, Naturally, as with any 
research pertaining to Clarendon, it contains reference to Coventry and their dispute, as 
will be discussed in more detail further within this case study (Carlyle, 1912). Carlyle takes 
a more severe view of Coventry and the Duke of York than Vale. In his work, Carlyle 
provides an account of the level of influence that Coventry had over the Duke of York, 
with which he encouraged James, in his capacity as Lord High Admiral, to place himself 
under the sole responsibility of the King and, as such, make himself unaccountable to 
other administrative bodies and retain the nomination of officers solely within his remit. 
Carlyle quotes Clarendon as saying that ‘being High Admiral [James] was to render 
account to none but the King, nor suffer anybody else to interpose in anything relative to 
the navy or the Admiralty’ (Carlyle, 1912, p. 269).  
Carlyle contradicts Vale by asserting that all of the offices in the navy were filled against 
the knowledge of the Privy Council by Coventry, suggesting that he “took advantage of his 
position” in order to install men of his choosing, whom mostly were Royalist men. 
According to Carlyle’s report, Clarendon considered this to be “an immense growth of 
corruption, embezzlement, and, consequently, of inefficiency in the Admiralty and navy” 
(Carlyle, 1912, p. 269). Although, these differing opinions establish how controversial 
Coventry was as an individual, currently the field of scholarship relating to Coventry is 
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insufficiently broad to enable a consensus regarding how he is perceived amongst 
historians 
Carlyle’s opinion on Coventry may be deemed somewhat biased, since his main source for 
all his concerns is Clarendon, who could not be considered an impartial source, 
considering his tumultuous history with Coventry. With this in consideration, the 
methodology used for his work is potentially lacking. Carlyle himself states that 
Clarendon’s “opinion is not borne out by the evidence” (Carlyle, 1912, p. 269) and he 
does not continue by adequately balancing this with enough alternative sources relating 
to Coventry; thirty-six of his one hundred and twenty references are Clarendon’s; 
therefore, one could argue that Carlyle’s work focuses disproportionately on one biased 
source.  
Cruickshank’s also offers a severe opinion of Coventry, stating the following: 
“He was a sullen, ill-natured, proud man, whose ambition had no limits, nor could be 
contained within any. His parts were very good, he had not thought them better than 
others men’s: and he had diligence and industry which men of good parts are too often 
without… he was without those vices which were too much in request, and which make 
men most unfit for business, and that trust that cannot be separated from it” 
(Cruickshanks, 1954). 
He does not however, offer any primary or secondary evidence as a basis for this opinion.  
Gilbert Burnett is far more complimentary in his piece in which he describes Coventry’s 
promotion, by Charlese II, to work within the treasury:  
Coventry “deserved it more than all the rest did. But he was too honest to engage into 
the designs into which the court was resolved to turn, as soon as it had recovered a 
little reputation, which was sunk very low by the ill management of the Dutch war, and 
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the squandering away of the money given to it. He was the man of the finest parts and 
the best temper that belonged to the court” (Burnett, 1724 cited in History of My Own 
Time, 1897).  
These opinions from Cruickshanks and Burnett are directly contradictory and do not 
elucidate the real character of William Coventry. This again, demonstrates the current 
lack of clarity within academia.  
After a disagreement with the Duke of Buckingham, Coventry willingly stood down from 
his offices71. After this, they attempted to encourage Coventry to return to court, by 
offering him some of the best posts, however “he would never engage again” (Burnett, 
1724, as cited in History of My Own Time, 1897, p.479). It should be seen as telling that he 
was frequency asked to return to court, not necessarily for his personality, but for his 
acumen. However, Burnett describes him as having the “best temper”, as Burnett was 
Coventry’s contemporary and as such, was personally familiar with him, it could be 
argued that this negates Cruickshanks’ view that he was ill tempered.  
In a footnote in Burnett’s work there is an explanation as to why Coventry retired after 
the Buckingham affair. Burnett gives a glowing recommendation to him. 
“Sir William Coventry was the most esteemed and beloved of any courtier that ever sat 
in the House of Commons, where his word always passed for an undoubted truth 
without further enquiry…There is a scarcely a dissentient note (if we omit Clarendon’s 
verdict) in the general testimony to William Coventry’s worth and integrity; though 
James himself says that Coventry gave up his post as secretary in order to be free to 
attack Clarendon” (Burnett, 1724 cited in History of My Own Time, 1897, p.479) 
 
71 Burnett states that he does not know the reason that Buckingham and Coventry disagreed, but the Duke 
of York stated the reason he stood down was to be free to attack Clarendon (Burnett, 1724 cited in History 
of My Own Time, 1897, p.479). 
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Burnett then quotes Charles II’s own reaction to Coventry’s resignation in a letter he 
wrote to Henrietta of Orleans.  
‘I am not sorry that Sir Will: Coventry has given me this good occasion, by sending my 
Ld of Buckingham a challenge, to turne him out of the council. I do intend to turn him 
also out the treasurer. The truth of it is he has been a troublesome man in both places, 
and I am well rid of him’ (Burnett, 1724 cited in History of My Own Time, 1897, p.479).  
It should be noted that Burnett had heard this story from Coventry’s family, so this is 
arguably a biased view and explains why it is the polar opposite of Clarendon’s 
derogatory version? However, it could also be argued that the King’s opinion could be 
deemed as impartial72.  
In his only personal reference to Coventry, Sir William Temple describes Coventry as 
having “the most credit of any man in the House of Commons” (Temple, 1836, Vol2, p. 
27). Temple’s biographer; Courtney, who writes the introduction to his memoirs, 
describes Temple as “an incorrupt statesman, who rejected deceit and intrigue”.  
Pool’s view on Coventry is also favourable. He states that Coventry had similar natural 
abilities to Pepys, who although inexperienced within the navy, could grasp “at once the 
essential point in a problem”. He asserts that the success of Coventry could be attributed 
to the value he placed on efficiency, as well as having the support of the Duke of York 
which gave him the authority to implement things that junior officers would not have 
succeeded in doing.  
 
72 Burnett wrote ‘The History of My Own Time’ volume one in 1724, so this was fifty-eight years after the 
events took place. 
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Pool rationalizes his positive perception of the man, citing that Coventry’s attendance at 
Navy Board meetings was exemplary and that up to the 14th Feb 1663, he had only missed 
two meetings in total (Pool, 1974, p. 105). This demonstrates that Coventry was a diligent 
man who did not simply take on additional responsibilities for an increased salary, but 
was active in his duties. Pool quotes an example from the diary of Samuel Pepys, dated 
August 8th 1662, in which Pepys describes Coventry as teaching him the following: 
“His rule of suspecting every man that proposes anything to him to be a knave, or at 
least to have some ends of his own in it… and he that cannot say no (that is, that is of 
so good a nature that he hath, cannot deny or cross another in doing anything) is not 
fit for business. The least of which (wrote Pepys) is a very great fault of mine, which I 
must amend in…’” (Pepys, 1669, as cited in Pool, 1974). 
Pool then explains that as an exercise in this lesson he took Pepys to Deptford Yard and 
uncovered many abuses, of which they could learn from and amend. This example 
highlights that both Coventry and Pepys understood the style of administration that the 
Duke of York was establishing in the Royal Navy, with an emphasis on the reduction of 
abuses, as can be seen from the published instructions for the principal officers, as 
discussed in the first chapter of this work. Even though Coventry does not have a set of 
clearly specified duties, he has taken his own initiative and incorporated the reduction of 
abuses via spot-checks and issuing re-training to the men in the yard under his remit.  
Pool also argues that for the benefit of efficiency within naval administration, Coventry 
“was never afraid to incur unpopularity at court”. Pool references a 1663 bill to validate 
his argument, this bill would have excluded any man who had served against Charles II in 
the English Civil War from being employed in official posts (Pool, 1974, pp. 107-8). 
Coventry ferociously argued against this act, stating that if the navy lost all men who had 
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fought for the commonwealth there would be no one left. Additionally, he argued that 
the newer and younger captains employed within the navy were undermining naval 
discipline due to their unruliness, demonstrating, that Coventry believed ability and 
experience to be far superior than political allegiances.  
Davies and Rodger both also assert positive perceptions of Coventry. Davies states that 
the Duke of York was fortunate to have such able junior officers to support him in his 
administration, explicitly referencing Coventry and proclaiming that his knowledge of 
naval business is swift and masterly (Davies, 2017, p. 98). Rogers echoes this sentiment by 
describing Coventry as “the essential link between the Lord Admiral and the Navy Board 
from 1660 to 1667” (Rodger, 2006, p. 98). These sources do not attest to how personable 
Coventry was as an individual, they simply stress his professional acumen, which 
according to the sources analysed by this research appears to be the consensus within the 
literature.  
Benjamin Kohlmann engaged in an interesting piece of research which challenges the 
natural assumptions about restoration administration (Kohlman, 2010). He uses Samuel 
Pepys as a case study and compares the differing depictions of Pepys as either a sober 
professional civil servant, or alternatively a self-aggrandizing narcissist. He concludes, that 
regardless of satirising their attitude, these restoration officials were y important men, 
whose self-conscious was created due to their very real workload. Naturally for a case 
study that analyses civil servants in the seventeenth century, it would be near impossible 
not to draw upon Coventry, of whom Kohlman is complimentary. When recounting Pepys’ 
“meteoric rise in the navy administration”, he reflects that during the mid-1660s, the 
style of his writing had begun to change, and as such his tone of work demonstrates his 
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‘boosted self-confidence’ especially in letters to senior naval administrators (Kohlman, 
2010, p. 563). 
However, Kohlmann highlights that this is noted especially in his correspondence to 
Coventry and Lord Sandwich73, it could be argued that he is suggesting that he wanted to 
highlight his newer position and responsibility to them, because of the high esteem in 
which he held them. This is a point Kohlmann clearly agrees with, which can be 
demonstrated in his work. When listing royalist naval officials, he discusses both Cartarett 
and Coventry, where he describes Cartarett in a distinctly formal manner, referencing 
only his job titles, in stark contrast, he introduces Coventry as “Sir William Coventry, …one 
of the most influential men of his day and Pepys’s most valued colleague” (Kohlman, 
2010, p. 565). Finally, in the conclusion to his research, Kohlmann describes Coventry as 
“Pepys’ professional idol at the navy administration” (Kohlman, 2010, p. 570). This point 
is particularly poignant and demonstrates the necessity for including Coventry as a case 
study in this research. 
As already mentioned, an adversary of Coventry: The Earl of Clarendon, wrote regularly 
about his relationship and views upon William Coventry. Clarendon describes Coventry’s 
professional manner in relation to an event in 1665: 
“Upon debate and conference with these men, the Duke brought propositions to the 
King reduced into writing by Mr, Coventry; and the King commonly consulted them with 
the Lord Treasurer in his presence, the propositions being commonly for increase of the 
expense, which Mr. Coventry was solicitous by all the ways possible to contrive. To 
 
73 Edward Montagu, Earl of Sandwich was a Knight of the Garter and an Admiral for the British Fleet. He was 
born in 1625, he fought in the Civil Wars and became a Commonwealth naval leader, but became 
disillusioned and lost the favour of Parliament. He left the United Kingdom for the Dutch Court that Charles 
was currently residing at. He died in 1672, whilst serving upon the Royal James when it blew up in the 
Second Dutch War (Naval Biography, 1805, pp. 402-412). 
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those consultations the duke always brought the sea-officers, and Mr Coventry, who 
spoke much more than they, to explain especially what Sir William Penn said, who took 
upon himself to speak most, and often what the others had never thought they durst 
not contradict; and Sir John Lawson often complained, “that Mr Coventry put that in 
writing which had never been proposed by them, and would continue disputing it till 
they yielded”. Every conference raised the charge very much; and what they proposed 
yesterday as enough was to-day made twice as much; if they proposed six fire-ships to 
be provided, within two or three days they demanded twelve: so, there could be no 
possible computation of the charge” (Clarendon, as cited in the life of Edward, Earl of 
Clarendon, 1827, Vol II, p. 356). 
Clarendon’s views of Coventry are reinforced in the following extracts; 
“his parts were very good, if he had not thought them better than any other man’s and 
he had diligence and industry, which men of good parts are often without, which made 
him (?) quickly to have at least credit and power enough with the duke” (Clarendon, as 
cited in the life of Edward, Earl of Clarendon, 1827, Vol II, p. 202). 
& 
“he was a sullen, ill-natured proud man whose ambition had no limits, nor could be 
contained within any” (Clarendon, as cited in the life of Edward, Earl of Clarendon, 
1827, Vol II, p. 202). 
When considering these excerpts, it must be noted that Coventry was an adversary of 
Clarendon and, as such, it is not surprising to receive such a severe depiction of the 
character of Coventry. However, as a surviving, contemporary source, it would be un-
academic to disregard the value of accounts from Clarendon. In particular, the first quote 
provides at least some substance to the points of disagreement with Coventry, rather 
than simply being ad homonym attacks, and it may be assumed that they are 
representative of genuine concerns regarding the conduct of Coventry. 
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6.4 Clarendon vs. Coventry 
 
As has been referenced numerous times within this case study, whilst examining different 
historians’ perspectives on William Coventry, it is clearly observed that he was not 
without enemies. Here, an analysis of the occurrences of peer-conflict throughout his life 
is provided, as these disagreements provide clear context to his rationale for leaving naval 
service and help to further elucidate the personal character of the man.  
Coventry had a Parliamentary career that ran in parallel with his naval career, and in 1665 
he was knighted and placed on the Privy Council (Vale, 1956, p. 108). Vale argues that 
Coventry’s experience of Clarendon’s administration during the Dutch wars led him to 
believe that “[Clarendon’s] removal as a preliminary to wide administrative reforms, 
especially in fiscal machinery” (Vale, 1956, p. 108) would be essential for the success of 
the navy. To achieve this, upon the conclusion of the Second Dutch War, Coventry left 
both the Navy Office and his position of secretary to the Duke of York “to pursue his 
ends” (Vale, 1956, p.108).  
Although Coventry left the Navy Office at this time, this does not represent an end of the 
relevance of his career in the context of the navy, since his decision to leave was based 
upon a desire to achieve fiscal administrative reforms, which would have a substantial 
impact on the navy. Therefore, the study of Coventry career subsequent to his time in the 
navy is equally pertinent to the aims of this study. 
Coventry had been vocally opposing Clarendon since Coventry retired from duties within 
the navy. This naturally created a powerful enemy in Clarendon. By the beginning of 1668 
the Lord Treasurer’s office was reorganised into a commission, with Coventry acting as 
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one of the commissioners. Within a biography of James II, compiled from sources relating 
to memoirs written from his hand, Clarke recounts the incident of Clarendon 
relinquishing greats seal of the treasury and the aftermath that ensued:  
“No sooner was the chancellor removed, when those who had chiefly driven it on, 
began to disagree amongst themselves, each of them pretending to succeed in the 
Ministry. Sir William Coventry, without whose help Buckingham and Arlington could 
never have brought it about, had most reason to expect the place, as having most 
capacity and parts for it: but the other two, tho much inferior to him in qualification, 
were better courtiers then he, and joyning together, they prevailed to get him out of all 
his Imployments; which having done, they strove each against the other, who should 
have most power and credit with the King, whose affaires by their disagreement and 
insufficiency siffer’d very much” (Clarke, 1816, p.433).  
 
The notion that Coventry was an inferior courtier, would appear to bolster the suggestion 
made by Cruickshanks that Coventry was somewhat ill-tempered. In an earlier section of 
this same work, Clarke provides a more thorough character description, in which he 
states the following about Coventry: 
Coventry was “much in favour by reason of his great ability, kept not long well with the 
chancellor; who finding him to be a very industrious man in business, and very capable, 
grew jealous of him and secretly endeavour’d to keep him back, which either was clear 
sighted enough to perceive; and therefore when the opportunity was offer’d, he fail’d 
not to give his helping hand toward laying aside the chancellor” (Clarke, 1816, p.398).  
Again, this description is indicative of a man that is highly motivated, diligent and 
competent, to the extent that others became jealous of his capabilities. 
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When Coventry was placed in charge of the Treasury Commission, Clarendon objected to 
his promotion. Vale describes Clarendon’s arguments for his objection, but is sure to 
emphasise that the rivalry between Coventry and Clarendon, does make his account less 
reliable (Vale, 1956, p. 110). According to Vale, Clarendon accused Coventry of numerous 
offences. He states that he provided new commissions that he was paid liberally for. 
Coventry is also accused of introducing a custom of charging five pound for every warrant 
signed by the Duke of York, of which, previously it was unheard of to receive above 
twenty shillings. Finally, he also accused Coventry of ensuring that all offices belonging to 
individual institutions for example the Navy, yards, Admiralty and ships were now to be 
supplied by the Duke of York, who conferred these according to who would pay him the 
most (Vale, 1956). 
Vale argues that many of Clarendon’s claims are simply untrue. Firstly, he states that the 
commissioning of captains and lieutenants were never within Coventry’s remit. 
Furthermore, he suggests that Clarendon does not understand that the addition of new 
commissioners for the Navy Board was necessary due to the increased demands laid upon 
it, but instead claimed the reforms were imposed in order to reduce the control of the 
treasury (Vale, 1956, p. 144).  
Vale also highlights that Clarendon makes no suggestion that it was improper to take 
gratuities for warrants, but that it was merely the volume and quantity that caused “the 
personal and material inefficiency of the navy during his secretaryship” (Vale, 1956, 
p.115). In 1667, this was also discussed in Parliament when Albemarle and Clarendon’s 
supporters joined together in an attempt to discredit Coventry. Following accusations 
being laid against him in Parliament, Coventry wrote a defensive rebuttal, of which three 
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rough drafts exist in MSS CI. FOS. 225-40. He describes within this defence that the 
authors of the initial complaints, regarding the improper use of gratuities, are not familiar 
with naval procedure. Coventry pointed out errors within their attempts to discredit,74 
“further to show that the petition ‘ariseth not from the petitioners, but they were 
tempted to it with the hope of gain’ (Vale, 1956, p. 117). Coventry considered the charges 
against him, and delivered a response, he used examples to form a defence and was able 
to turn the debate against his accusers by highlighting their own faults and errors.  
Vale details the Board’s response;  
“though it be very distant from our duties to undertake a regulation of such as relate to 
your royal highness” … “Yet they are of the opinion ‘that the (secretary’s) business is 
great, calling for a constant attendance, and for the most port of such a natutr as doth 
yield not fees but only upon the disposal of places’, and they suggest a scale of 
payments which would in some measure answer the secretary’s pains without being a 
burden to those seeking places, ‘and will (as we are credibly informed) be much more 
moderate than hath formely been practised by some of his predeccessors’. That these 
fees were not so high as to drive officers of embezzlement (as Clarendon alleged), 
Coventry satisfied himself by a computation of a marginal case, the wages and 
perquisites of the Purser of a fourth rate” (Vale, 1956, p. 120).  
Here, it must be noted that assessment should not be made using modern standards, by 
which his behaviour seems comparable to corruption. Instead, it is worth remembering 
that this was a contemporary norm. As afore mentioned, it wasn’t the taking of fees that 
was a problem to Clarendon, instead his argument was only with what he considered an 
unreasonable bonus for Coventry’s position. Pool also discusses how the acceptance of 
 
74 Officers did not have the same procedure for collecting their wages. They instead had to wait until they 
had accounted for their stores (Vale, 1956, p. 117). 
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fees was commonplace at this time, stating that it was customary for people to exchange 
warrants for fees or favours (Pool, 1974, p.107).  
An extract taken from Clarendon’s work demonstrates the extent of his anger regarding 
Coventry’s influence over the sale of offices; 
“all the offices which belonged to the ships, to the navy, to the yards, to the whole 
Admiralty (except the three supervior officers, which are not in the disposal of the 
admiral) were now void and to be supplied by the duke, that is, by Mr Coventry…[he 
was advised by Penn] conferred upon those (without observing any other rule) who 
would give most money, not considering any honest seamen…” (Clarendon, as cited in 
the life of Edward, Earl of Clarendon, 1827, Vol II, pp. 328-9) 
There is substantial primary source evidence that shows that William Coventry was not 
simply an administrator or clerk in the offices, but also functioned as an Ambassador. 
Shelley describes his role in the division of the fleet in 1666, the incident from which we 
may observe the origins of the feud between Clarendon and Coventry. Shelley states that 
alongside George Cartarett, Coventry “[was] commanded to proceed to the fleet with 
such orders as would be necessary if the Admirals had no other news or thought that the 
suggested division was liable to fewer objections than had been in view”. The following 
day Coventry and Cartarett returned with a report regarding the state of the fleet, stating 
that the fleet was in the state that the King assumed it was. As such they had mutually 
decided to divide the fleet. Prince Rupert took 20 ships and sailed directly to intercept the 
French fleet returning from the Mediterranean, whilst Albemarle sailed with the 
remaining ships to engage the Dutch, which unbeknownst to the Duke had Anchored only 
25 miles from the English coast. Firstly, this demonstrates the degree of responsibility 
that was being placed upon Coventry and indeed Cartarett. For Coventry, as secretary to 
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the Lord High Admiral and Cartarett as Treasurer of the Navy Board, it would not initially 
be assumed that Coventry and Cartarett would be charged with this level of responsibility 
as it lay well outside of the remit of their offices.  
Coventry and Clarendon both gave full accounts of the event. Shelley argues that 
Coventry’s was more reliable because, unlike Clarendon, Coventry and Cartarett had 
attended the original Privy Council meeting and the subsequent meeting with the two 
admirals in question. Coventry stated in his account, that they would not reach a decision 
regarding the division of the fleet, until they had heard the advice of Prince Rupert and 
the Duke of Albemarle75. Both Cartarett and Coventry returned to London with the 
Admiral’s approbations and a list of which ships of the fleet would be taken by whom.  
On the 17th May, Coventry detailed an account of his and Cartarett’s interactions with the 
fleet, to Rupert and Albermarle, stating that their meeting had been satisfactory. 
However, Coventry was criticised for his role in this affair, as it was claimed that he did 
not respond promptly to the latest information regarding the status of the Dutch fleet, 
which lead to the four days battle when Albermarle set sail without the correct 
information regarding the whereabouts of the Dutch ships. According to Pepys’ Diary76, 
Coventry complained that “he had heard he was under the lash of people’s discourse 
about the Princes not having notice of the Dutch being out” (Pepys, 1666, as cited in 
Latham and Matthews, 1971).  
Shelley explains that this is an unfair appraisal of the situation as Coventry had been given 
delayed correspondence explaining that the Dutch had left their ports. He was sent a 
 
75 As per his professional style, Coventry recorded these events and the description of which is available in 
his files at Longleat.  
76 Dated, 24th June 1666. 
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letter from the Admiral at 8pm on the 30th May, which did not reach him until 4pm of the 
31st May. However, the previous evening the King had received matching intelligence, so 
had already gained the opportunity to host a Privy Council meeting, which had decided 
that Prince Rupert should be recalled at once. The Duke of York proceeded to sign the 
letters of recall at midnight on the 31st May and Coventry sent them to the principal 
secretary of state (Lord Arlington), who, according to Shelley, Coventry believed had the 
duty of to dispatch to the ports, with the aim of stopping Prince Rupert diving the fleet.  
However, since Arlington had already retired for the evening and his servants did not 
want to rouse him in the night, Coventry, who had not yet himself retired, took the duty 
upon himself to ensure the letters were delivered immediately. Although, he was unable 
to locate special couriers at this time, the letters were underway by post express by 1am 
and reached Portsmouth before 5pm, whereupon they were promptly forwarded to 
Rupert. Shelley asserts that considering the efficiency of the system of correspondence of 
the day “little, if any, time was lost in transit” (Shelley, 1939, p. 188).  
In a report to the commons after the war, Albemarle stressed that the failures were 
brought about by the division of the fleet, which he insisted were based upon the 
assertion professedly made by Cartarett and Coventry which indicated that the Dutch 
would not be ready to sail for at least six weeks. According the diary of Pepys, dated 1 
Nov 1667, Coventry states that this claim is “as false as it is possible” (Pepys, 1667, as 
cited in Latham and Matthews, 1971).  
However, even though this version has derived from two different sources, both sources 
stem from a statement of Coventry, not a third party that had heard the lack of this 
intelligence. To be balanced, this duality in sources does need conceding. However, as 
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detailed by Shelley, the Duke of Albermarle stated that he had never heard that the Dutch 
were out of their harbours, a claim that was patently contradicted by a letter written by 
him to Coventry on the 31st May (Shelley, 1939, p. 191). According to Shelley, Coventry 
presented this document to Pepys, but both he and the King were willing to ignore it77. 
Nevertheless, the letter provides clear indication of an attempt on the part of the 
Admirals; Prince Rupert and the Duke of Albemarle to scapegoat Coventry for the 
incident, ignoring the great effort and efficiency in which he had engaged during the 
affair.  
Although Coventry was able to avoid harsher scrutiny over the division of the fleet, his 
downfall came following the ‘personal ascendancy’ of the Duke of Buckingham to the 
position previously occupied by Clarendon. A “duelling challenge was made the occasion 
for the King to dispense with Coventry’s services” (Vale, 1956, p.108). As mentioned in 
Coventry’s introduction he was imprisoned in the Tower of London as well as removed 
from his offices. “Though he appears to have observed the form of reconciliation with his 
sovereign, Coventry refused to ever hold office under Charles again” (Vale, 1956, p.108).  
Overall, we can see from this analysis of the debate over the character of William 
Coventry and the Clarendon versus Coventry incident that Coventry was a divisive 
character that divides opinion over three hundred and fifty years after his life. Shelley, 
Pool, Burnett, Vale and Temple are generally complimentary towards Coventry. Carlyle 
and Cruickshanks are frequently severe and negative in their perspectives, but, it must be 
noted that although some seem reticent to compliment him, most historians seem to 
 
77 It is interesting that Coventry presented his work to the King and Pepys. As discussed previously, the 
hierarchy within the navy is not always clear and static. At times there have been references to Coventry 
being Pepys’ mentor, which insinuates that he is senior, however this source indicates that Pepys is 
scrutinising Coventry’s conduct.  
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agree that his work ethic and talent was beyond dispute, and unfavourable comments 
relate mostly to his personality. As such, one finds clear justification for the inclusion of 
Coventry as a case study within this research. He was clearly a capable and talented 
administrator, who exhibited substantial influence upon navy matters of the time but has 
been subsequently overshadowed by his contemporaries and is, therefore, largely under-
researched.  
Next, this research will analyse the primary evidence to assess what Coventry contributed 
towards professionalising the navy during his time in office 
The following sections of this chapter provides an assessment of the contribution of 
William Coventry toward the professionalisation of the navy during his time in office, 
based upon an analysis of novel primary evidence, including a number of documents such 
as… that have been unearthed for this purpose during the course of this research.  
 
6.5 Thematic understanding of primary evidence 
 
In a similar structure to the Duke of York case study, this chapter will also use the same 
themes to understand the available primary evidence relating to William Coventry, and 
how this supports the understanding of his role within the naval administration. The 
themes that will be analysed within this section include: the implementation of 





6.5.1 Accounting procedures 
 
The first theme of this case study on William Coventry will be an analysis of his influence 
upon the implementation of accounting procedures. In a diary extract, dated 5th August 
1666, Pepys describes a scene in which Coventry was teaching “the Duke of York how the 
world doth discourse of the ill method of our books, and that we would consider how to 
answer any enquiry which shall be made after our practice therein - which will I think, 
concern the controller most” (Pepys, 1666, as cited in Latham and Matthews, 1971). This 
is a clear demonstration of Coventry approaching the Lord High Admiral with alternative 
accounting practise to ensure the efficient and smooth running of the navy.  
The following statement from Pepys’ diary helps this research begin to ascertain 
Coventry’s responsibilities; 
“I find sir. W. Coventry and he was desirous to have spoke with me. It was to read over 
a draft of a letter which he hath made of his brother commissioners and him to sign to 
us, demanding the account of the whole business of the navy accounts [similar letters 
were to be sent to all the principal spending departments, asking for an account of 
what they had spent and what they still owed for the whole period from the restoration 
to 25th May 67. Print d in further corr. Pp 173-4] ... so we went to the Duke’s closet, 
where little to do but complaint for want of money and a motion of Sir W. Coventrys 
that we should all now bethink our self’s of lessening charge to the King, which he said 
was the only way he saw likely to put the King out of debt...” (Pepys, 1666, as cited in 
Latham and Matthews, 1971). 
This source shows that Coventry wrote the letter on behalf of his other commissioners, 
and then proceeded to ask them to be signatories to the letter. Therefore, we can see the 
first example of a duty undertaken by Coventry. This source shows that he is pursuing 
senior officers within the navy, who held budgetary responsibility, for an account 
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encompassing all of their spending and debt accrued from the introduction of the 
restoration administration to their present date seven years later. This was not a 
requirement of the senior officers set out within the Duke of York’s instructions, 
indicating that Coventry was initiating additional accounting procedures to those 
instituted by the Duke of York.  
William Coventry also takes on the responsibility for auditing the navy Commissioner’s 
orders and sourcing the appropriate revenue for their purchases. In a letter dated May 
2nd 1667, Coventry postulates that the Navy Commissioner’s order to Plymouth Dockyard 
to victual the Victory for only one hundred men is mistaken (CSP CCII.20), explaining that 
the ship is a prize taken from the French Navy and not the smaller British ship which uses 
the same name the HMS Victory. Additionally, this letter clarifies that the bills owing in 
the navy shall be paid out of the eleven months' tax, assigned by the Treasury 
Commissioners. This demonstrates not only his technical knowledge of the Royal Navy’s 
fleet, including the size and rating of the ships, as well as their supply requirements, but 
also informs us that Coventry was responsible for auditing the requests made by the Navy 
Commissioners and ensuring payments were made from the correct source of revenue. 
This source does not clarify if Coventry has been asked to undertake this duty or if it is his 
own interpretation of the requirements of his office that have led him to audit these 
orders. Regardless, this source reveals a previously unknown facet of the role Coventry 
undertook in his office, and as such is useful in aiding the understanding of Coventry’s 
overall job profile.  
Another example of Coventry auditing expenditure can be seen in a letter sent 
from Coventry to Pepys discussing potential debt owed to the Guinea Company (CSP 
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CXCIX.10)78. In the scenario outlined within the letter, The Guinea Company believe they 
are owed money from the treasury as Charles II had not ‘paid in his share as an 
adventurer’, whilst the King argues against this, insisting that ‘how much he has paid for 
them in the navy’ would be more than sufficient to cover the contested sum. Essentially, 
Charles claims that their use of the English navy as a tangible resource represents 
adequate payment and that he has therefore paid his debt via an alternative method. In 
order to formalise this claim, Coventry requests that a calculation of expenditure be 
undertaken, including any supplies used, as well as the cost of wear and tear of the fleet. 
This debt analysis is particularly insightful, as it represents a clear demonstration of the 
limitation of the King’s power. Instead of simply allowing the King to exercise supreme 
judgement in the matter and write off the debt with limited explanation, Coventry has 
decided to use procedural accounting methods to prove who owes whom what. It could 
be argued that this instruction, issued by William Coventry, exemplifies a clear criterion 
for professionalisation. Clearly, Coventry is utilising accounting practice to ensure that 
Charles conforms to the ‘morally correct’ notion of the repayment of debts. He is insisting 
that these are calculated accurately and that the crown is not avoiding their fiscal 
responsibilities, as such it could be argued that this demonstrates that there was an 
understanding of a requirement for public trust and confidence. 
Another duty that Coventry is made responsible for is extraordinary expenses79. This is 
demonstrated in a letter, in which Coventry forwards a request from the Duke of York to 
 
78 Dated, May 1st 1667. 
79 The difference between ordinary and extraordinary expenses is as follows. Ordinary expenditure is the 
expenditure required for the company’s ‘day-to-day’ operations. Extraordinary expenditure are seen as 
uncommon and unusual (https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/042413/financial-statement-
extraordinary-vs-nonrecurring-items.asp) Accessed on the 13th October 2018.  
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Pepys in relation to utilizing ships from the fleet to collect foreign ambassadors as well as 
the financial system to pay for this (CSP CXCVII.62)80.  Coventry specifies that the HMS 
Anne, the HMS Kent and the HMS Amity should be used for this purpose, but they should 
not be paid until the ships that have come from the West Indies are paid first. Therefore, 
we can see that Coventry is once again responsible for planning for the source and 
location of payments for expenditure, but further reveals that his duties also encompass 
the overseeing of extraordinary expenses.  
As Coventry explicitly states that the Duke of York requested this information, it raises the 
question of the frequency with which such instructions or memorandums issued by 
Coventry were in fact the intellectual effort of the Duke of York and whether Coventry is 
simply following orders from above or is making decisions himself. This is impossible to 
clarify for certain, however, considering these are official state papers and within all of 
the relevant instructions that this case study references pertaining to this, the Duke of 
York’s name has only been specifically given author credit twice. Additionally, we know 
from the source analysis of the previous chapter that the Duke of York would regularly 
sign his own letters and send them from his own office. Therefore, it would not 
necessarily be a fair assumption to say that Coventry’s requests, were actually the Duke 
of York’s, but sent out by Coventry. Instead, the evidence would suggest they come 
directly from Coventry. 
Additionally, it could be argued that any request being made directly from the Duke of 
York himself would likely benefit from being simply dictated for transcription with the 
 
80 Dated, April 13 1667. 
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Duke’s name attached, giving the requests additional authority and weight from the 
gravitas of his position as Lord high Admiral. As such, the absence of his name in the 
majority of these sources, would indicate that we can accredit Coventry with these 
developments in the majority of these cases. Regardless of ultimate origin of the initial 
instruction, this source provides definitive primary evidence that overseeing 
extraordinary expenses was part of Coventry’s job role, something which has not before 
been recognised. 
 
6.5.2 Increased efficiency 
 
The second theme that will be analysed within this case study is examples of the duties 
undertaken by William Coventry that pertain to increasing the efficiency of the 
administration of the navy. 
Coventry improved efficiency by implementing the follow procedure;  
“In order to make the utmost use of assignments for satisfaction of merchants selling 
to the Navy, orders of the Exchequer on any other branch of the revenue, as well as 
those on the monthly tax being assignable by a special Act lately passed, an 
assignment now given to a merchant becomes absolutely his, and need never come 
into the Navy Treasury, but the assignment be given on delivery of the commodity. To 
improve this, moneys assigned on the Customs or other branch of the revenue should 
be made in many small orders, applicable to the uses which Lord Anglesey may have 
accommodated to his own mind upon asking” (CSP 29/242.f.205)81 
 
81 Dated, 9th July 1665 and written by William Coventry to Samuel Pepys. 
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This instruction states that merchants are no longer required to go through the navy 
treasury to receive their assignments but instead assignments will be thereafter given 
upon delivery of the commodity, which makes for a more efficient system. This 
demonstrates the ever-evolving methods of stock control and acquisition. Coventry’s role 
included appraising the current working methods to ensure that they are efficient and he 
is clearly entrusted with the ability to implement changes for improvement.  
Additionally, Coventry can be seen to take on the responsibility for procuring victuals (CSP 
CXLIX.35)82. A letter from Coventry to Pepys explains that through the commissioner for 
prizes at Plymouth he has been made aware that one hundred tons of tar have been 
brought into port. He explains to Pepys that if the navy needs tar, then they should stop 
the vessel from leaving. This advice between the two administrative patriarchs of the 
navy enables cost cutting methods via requisitioning. Although it might not just be for 
cost cutting, it might be that there is not currently enough tar available for the navy to 
purchase, and to requisition it at a price to ensure the smooth running of the royal navy. 
It is not made clear in this source if any money will be paid for the tar. However, it does 
demonstrate Coventry’s responsibilities within his work, in addition to his attention to 
detail 
 
Coventry was not only responsible for implementing change, but he also took 
responsibility for enforcing administrative procedures to ensure that the increased 
efficiency is observed. An example of this is seen in a letter, in which he reproaches the 
 
82 Dated, 2nd February 1666. 
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Navy Commissioners for tardy requests for victuals on the 25th June 1667 (CSP CCVII.19). 
In this document, he states that if he had received prompter requests for victuals for the 
merchant fleet, then he could have put these requests in front of the King and the Lord 
High Admiral and, in turn, would have had a speedier response informing him of their 
instructions. This source shows that Coventry is willing to rebuke his colleagues, albeit 
politely, to ensure that they work more efficiently for the benefit of speedier victualling of 
the fleet. Although there is no specific evidence with which to make certain claims, since 
Coventry is seen to be reprimanding the Navy Commissioners, it seems likely that he 
occupied a role that was recognised as senior to them.  
At times, Coventry’s remit includes not only ensuring the efficient procurement of 
required victual, but also appears to extend to supervising their receipt. On the 15th April 
1665, Coventry writes to the Navy Commissioners from the HMS Royal Charles, 
expressing his disapproval for the inadequate victuals that had been supplied (CSP CXVIII). 
He explains to the commissioners that, although the quality of the victuals is perfect, the 
quantity is lacking. He states that they have not received any tobacco stalks or shoe 
makers shavings and other victuals are too few to supply the volume of men that require 
them. He asserts that due to the imminent departure of the fleet, these victuals needed 
to be supplied as soon as possible. Additionally, he advises the board that it would be 
prudent to ensure that salary for Mr Deane (The victualler at Harwich) is paid up to date 
justifying this requested by stating that, in the upcoming war, Mr Deane is going to be 
needed and such “every encouragement should be given him for his good husbandry”. 
This source is illuminating in aiding our understanding of the job role of William Coventry. 
We know that Coventry was not based on the HMS Royal Charles permanently and, as 
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such, it may be deduced that whilst temporarily visiting the ship, Coventry has taken it 
upon himself to execute the role of inspector for the received victuals. Furthermore, upon 
witnessing the inadequate supplies, he issued instructions for the Navy Commissioners 
moving forward, in an attempt to ensure that the fleet receive their victuals as efficiently 
as possible in the future.  
A very similar account can be seen on March 30th 1665, also written on board the HMS 
Royal Charles. Within this letter, Coventry explains to the Navy Commissioners that the 
Lord High Admiral has consented to writing monthly bills for slop sellers. 
“To ensure a better supply of clothes, which are greatly wanted, even to endangering 
the health of the men. If there be not sufficient persons to supply the fleet, others must 
be procured” (CSP CXVI).  
However, this source comes a year after Coventry and Penn wrote a letter to 
the Navy Commissioners, again from the HMS Royal Charles (CSP CVI.6)83, in which they 
had previously detailed their dissatisfaction at the lack of available supplies for the men. 
This letter also refers to the lack of Sailor’s clothing on board, and suggests that others 
within the fleet are in an even worse condition. Coventry ‘Request[s] the immediate 
dispatch of the coarser and useful sort of clothing, according to the regulation of Dec. 12, 
1663, which has been much abused by the slop sellers. These two sources are 
enlightening, because although the first source is given under the authority of the Duke of 
York, the fact that Coventry has been petitioning for a year, demonstrates that Coventry 
was working hard to find a more efficient and effective method of supply adequate slops 
to the navy. 
 
83 Dated December 2nd 1664 
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However, a letter sent a month after the Lord High Admiral has consented to monthly 
bills for slop sellers demonstrates that this was not an entirely effective fix (CSP CXVIII)84. 
Coventry and Penn again write to the Navy Commissioners stating that the clothes 
received from the slop sellers are not nearly sufficient. He requests further supplies with 
a ‘convenient’ range of items and colours. This letter shows that this was not a cause that 
Coventry had given up on, as he had evidently attempted throughout this time period to 
ensure that the men working for the service are adequately provided for and, throughout 
the Second Dutch War era, to incorporate the adequate and efficient supply of victuals 
and slops into his job role.  
Finally, a further example of Coventry attempting to ensure the efficient running of the 
navy is seen in a letter to Lord Arlington (CSP CXXXIX.58)85. Coventry instructs Arlington to 
distribute copies of the last Act of Assessment across the country because ‘none will 
advance money on it till they know what it is, and if known before the tax is set, much of 
the stink will be lost. The Navy Officers have bought two ship loads of Norway goods on 
the credit of the Act’. This source highlights not only the importance of creating 
procedures and regulation, but also the need for clear and adequate distribution to 
ensure that the procedures are widely known and adhered to. Through this source we can 
see that Coventry is ensuring that everyone is educated on new regulation effecting navy 
finances.  
Although he does not explicitly state the full name of the Parliamentary act to which he is 
referring to, it is reasonable to postulate that it was the 1665 Parliamentary act entitled 
 
84 Dated, April 16th 1665. 
85 Dated, December 18th 1665. 
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an ‘Act for granting the summe of Twelve hundred and fiftie thousand pounds to the 
King’s Majestie for His present further supply’ (Raithby, 1819, p. 570-4). This act awards 
£52,083: 6s: 8d to Charles II for use in fighting in the Second Dutch War, ‘for the safety 
and welfare of the people’ and explains that the required funds will be raised by levying a 
tax. 
“from the five and twentyeth day of December One thousand six hundred sixtie five 
shall be assessed taxed collected levyed and paid by eight quarterly payments in the 
severall Countyes Cittyes Burroughes Townes and Places within England and Wales and 
the Towne of Berwicke upon Tweede over and above the summe of Threescore and 
eight thousand eight hundred and nineteene pounds and nine shillings by the moneth 
which is to remaine and continue payable dureing the said twenty fower monethes by 
vertue of the said former Act and as an Addition to, and increase of the said monethly 
Assessment according to these further Rates Rules and Proportions in such manner as 
herein after is expressed that is to say for every of the said Twenty fower monethes” 
(Raithby, 1819, pp. 570-4).  
Coventry’s decision to ensure that this act is well circulated is forward thinking and 
insightful. It enables the public and merchants to be aware that the navy is now more 
financially buoyant and able to pay for the increased demands that the Second Dutch War 
requires and represents a step toward professionalising the navy. As this thesis 
conceptualised; a criterion for professionalisation is enhancing public trust and 
confidence. Coventry distributing this act is an attempt to increase the public confidence 
in the credit of the navy. 
Additionally, it demonstrates that Coventry is trying to work more efficiently, as it 
prevents his officers from having to explain the situation to each merchant and risk a 
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delay in the navy receiving their victuals. By pre-circulating the act, the merchant should 
be happier to release victuals without delay.  
 
6.5.3 State of the Navy 
 
Another theme that will subsequently be the focus of this case study, in the context of 
William Coventry, is the requirement to undertake ‘states of the navy’. There are multiple 
examples within the primary evidence that demonstrate, that alike the Duke of York, 
Coventry also focused on the necessity to undertake these surveys for a better 
understanding of the navy’s requirements. One of the most illuminating sources is a letter 
found within the Coventry Papers (CO 96, pp. 6-9)86. Written collaboratively between 
William Coventry and the Navy Board, this letter provides a lengthy answer to a request 
from Lop,87Including various responses regarding naval financial details, as well as a survey 
of the State of the Navy in addition to recommendations for the improvement of the navy. 
This will be discussed in depth in the following paragraph.  
However, a notable discussion point for this source is the signatories at the bottom of the 
letter. It is signed G.C, J.M, W.B, W.C and S.P stating that it is from the Navy Office. 
Naturally, looking at who was in post at this point, we can correspond the initials of four of 
the men to members of the Navy Board; George Cartarett, Sir John Mennes, William 
Batten, and Samuel Pepys. Naturally, the fifth initial may be reasonably assumed to be 
 
86 The Coventry Papers are a set of files and correspondence that William Coventry collected over his 
career. They are currently housed within the archives at Longleat house, However, this research accessed 
them on Microfiche at the Institute of Historical research.  
87 It does not explicitly state from this letter to what this abbreviation Lop stands for, however upon 
consultation with the archivist at Longleat house who hold the manuscripts for the Coventry papers; Kate 
Harris, we hypothesise that this is an abbreviation for his ‘Lordship’ at which point given context we can 
assume this is in reply to the Duke of York in post as Lord High Admiral. 
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William Coventry considering his proximity to the Navy Board and that this letter was found 
in his collection of papers. However, considering that these ‘states of the navy’ were 
typically submitted to the Lord High Admiral with the signatures from the main members 
of the Navy Board only, as evidenced elsewhere, including the Duke of York’s instructions, 
it is not immediately clear why W.C would be present as a signatory.  
Within the instructions, as previously mentioned, there are no explicit directives for the 
duties of the Secretary and, therefore, the presence of Coventry’s initials on this letter 
enable assumptions about his job description/duties to be made. Firstly, he was clearly 
heavily involved in the Navy Board, and as such was also answerable as to the State of the 
Navy. However, it could also be argued that enabling an individual with no apparent 
formalised job description to be influential in the affairs of the navy, potentially without 
proper recourse for his actions, may represent an example of the limited professionalism 
within the navy at this time. 
At the beginning of the letter, the signatories explain the delays in sending their reply, 
predominantly citing a lack of time due to the undertaking of surveys “and other necessary 
parts of our duty, our number till of late have been routinely divided” and as such as they 
could not organise themselves together to coordinate and had been prevented from 
replying. However, they have through ‘joint endeavours’ perfected their reply and hoped 
that his lordship will be happy.  
Firstly, they provide a known state of His Majesty’s stores, citing a recent survey for their 
work. Additionally, this demonstrates that the surveys being requested in the regulatory 
instructions discussed in the previous chapter of this research were actually taking place. 
They also explain that the ships and storehouses have “not received greater or lesser 
 
203 
repairs, since he entered upon the charge of the navy”. They then also include a reply to a 
specific request for information regarding the issuing of privy seals “for moneys appointed 
for each distinct service”, in which the crown asked for data relating to military 
expenditure. The Navy Board and Coventry explain that this method is tried and tested and 
“Undoubtedly the best method of proceeding”. The letter does not contain any further 
elaboration upon the method itself, instead simply re-iterating that they agree conclusively 
that it is the most effective approach to conduct a survey of naval expenditure. So, although 
not useful for this research in relation to specific procedure, it does demonstrate that new 
and methodical ‘States of the Navy’ were taking place. 
They then provide a summary of their current financial ‘wants’. They explain that they have 
not insisted upon the distinction between privy seals but assure that for all of the most 
urgent services the money have been made payable by the Treasurer. The Duke of York 
had clearly asked in reference to two specific privy seals, and as such they break down the 
payment of these. They explain that this financial output is purely for the replenishing of 
the stores, of which was “so necessarily supplied”. Hinting at a sense of urgency in their 
replenishment of provisions.  
The Duke of York’s last request is for a breakdown of what money is needed upon the ships 
returning home. This response reads like a survey of the navy outlining the output of naval 
expenditure. The Treasurer requests the reimbursement for the output of the privy seals 
and the payment of ships, breaking this down into two separate requests for payment – 
one relating to the payments made prior to sending his letter and the second for any 
payments that a have been made after the preceding letter was issued. He explains that 
this cost also comes from Portugal and other stations. However, he explains further still 
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that even with this, ships returned home and “the monthly charge of continuing the ships 
in pay being manned with or about 5170 men will be £12063: 06s :08d”. They discuss how 
they understand that the naval expense is not just a matter for the Duke of York’s enquiry 
but also necessary because of it is a matter of public ‘discourse and censure’. Therefore, 
for his enquiry they break down the costing of the navy into smaller subsections as follows; 
Bills for stores; Wages for the yards paid six quarters; Wages to the ordinary paid a quarter 
and Ships paid and now payable.  
It is argued that although the amount may seem large, it should be remembered where 
these costs are going, such as Bombay in East India, for men and horses to be sent to Lisbon, 
for the garrisons at Dunkirk and Tangier etc. They appear to be spoon-feeding the Duke of 
York with valid riposte to any subsequent Parliamentary or public enquiry and to ensure 
that he is knowledgeable on all naval spending. They also argue that no further 
retrenchment of the navy is possible with all of their ongoing foreign affairs and further 
insist that the spending of the preceding two years is consistent with pre- restoration naval 
expenditure.  
Finally, they offer some advice to the Lord High Admiral. They re-iterate the need for the 
timely supply of men, and speedier fulfilment of the requests for provisions. They state that 
due to frequent last-minute requests for the procurement of stores from the yards, they 
are not getting the best prices for goods, with great disparity in the prices appearing for 
different victuals. They provide an example of opportunities where money could be saved, 
whereupon the discharge of two thousand to three thousand men and additionally the 
“150 who being contented to be cleared from His Majesty’s works upon promise of speedy 
payment”. This is stating that, the delay in the payment of men means that the men cannot 
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be discharged. As such, these men need further payment, as well as to be supplied with 
victuals. The Navy Office make it clear that both His Majesty’s profits and honour are at 
stake due to the lack of timely payments.  
This is interesting because to an extent it demonstrates that the Duke of York’s instructions 
are not entirely effective because men are not being paid in the timely manner that they 
are requested to, but it also shows that the Navy Board and Coventry are partaking in 
additional work that is not explicitly require of them. It is clear from the request laid out 
within this document exactly the information that Duke of York requires and is expecting. 
However, it appears that they have decided, that for the advancement and advantage of 
the navy, to provide much more detailed and thorough answers, and have perceived the 
opportunity to include, along with them, further requests and appeals that they feel would 
benefit the output of the Royal Navy.  
The idea of performing a ‘State of the Navy’ is not always a forward-thinking accounting 
device. Sometimes they are performed proactively, as is observed in the previous account, 
but more often they are undertaken in reaction to ‘dire straits’ as means of conveying the 
situation to their superiors. William Coventry undertook ‘states of the navy’ to highlight the 
accumulating levels of naval debt and the negative impact that this was having on the 
current service. In the same collection of Coventry Papers there is a letter from the same 
signatories as above imploring the Lord High Admiral for more money (CO 96 pp. 11-12). 
They state that they are answering the request for a ‘charge of the navy’ up to the 25th 
March 1663 and a report on intended retrenchment. However, the signatories make clear 
that their biggest expenditure is reducing the debts of the navy. They state firstly that 
£1109952: 10s would cover the costs of bills for victuals and other charges which have 
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already been signed for- stating that the Treasurer is happy to state what has and hasn’t 
already been paid for. However, they reiterate that they dare not devalue the importance 
of this, due to the many inconveniences that arise as a consequence of the lack of money. 
They report that they are fifteen months behind in payments, which in turn leads to men 
partaking in fraudulent activity and embezzlement from the stores in order that they may 
recoup their wages, but that the Navy Board are “neither at liberty by a supply of money 
to discharge them as the service abates”. Essentially, this means that the navy is accruing 
more debt in the form of wages for the men and the costs of feeding them but are unable 
to discharge them because they lack the funds to do so. 
 
Figure 4- A breakdown of the costs of the navy from the 24th June 1660 to the 25th March 1663. Compiled in 
a single-entry book keeping system, taken from (CO 96, P.13). 
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The above letter contains an additional accounting log that demonstrates that this debt 
was accumulated over a nearly three-year period, a point which isn’t clarified in the main 
text of the letter. It also does not state which of the men was responsible for compiling the 
account, but it highlights the detrimental impact that the lack of finances is having upon 
their ability to perform their duties, suggesting that all of the signatories were involved in 
compiling the information for the ‘State of the Navy’. It is worth noting here that both 
sources analysed within this thematic subsection state that the work is being performed in 
response to a request from the Duke of York. Therefore, the intuition to bring the 
accumulating naval debt to the attention of the Duke of York by compiling these cannot 
necessarily be attributed to William Coventry, though given the skillsets of the signatories 
and knowledge of their previous endeavours, it seems reasonable to assume that both 
Coventry and Pepys would have been especially eager to undertake this review. However, 
regardless of who was responsible for initiating and completing the review, it certainly 
demonstrates what William Coventry undertook such duties as part of his job role, a point 
that is corroborated by Pepys, who states that “Mr. Coventry came before the time of 
setting to confer about preparing an account of the extraordinary charge of the navy since 




The final and perhaps most important theme within this case study is the retrenchment 
and economizing of the navy. When discussing Coventry’s role within the treasury, Vale 
 
88 Latham and Matthew describe extraordinary charges as being charges payable to merchants which the 
Navy Board accounted for, but which were not strictly naval expenses (Latham & Matthews, 1971, 4, p. 36). 
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argues that the experience he gained here gave him the perfect experience for 
retrenchment of the restoration navy. “His discharge of these various duties earned 
Coventry nothing but praise from his contemporaries” (Vale, 1956, p. 109).  
There are numerous examples of William Coventry incorporating retrenchment into his job 
role throughout his tenure and this thematic subsection will explore these in more depth 
to complete a job ‘profile’ for William Coventry. 
In a letter written to Samuel Pepys, Coventry created a table that dictates the present state 
of the victualler’s stores in London (CO 91, p. 12). It shows that William Coventry was 
responsible for highlighting overspending, a vital component in economising the navy. 
 
Table 10- A table created by William Coventry to highlight the present state of the victualler's store and 
draw attention to overspending (CO 97 p 12). 
 
Within the personal collections of Coventry, a document detailing the state of navy debts 
up until 6th December 1660 was uncovered (CO 98, p. 166). This document summarises the 
quantity of the accumulated debt and from where the debts have originated. The 
document states that £128030: 00s: 00d is owed to the wages of the officers serving on 
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board His Majesty’s seventeen ships. It then explains that £258459: 00s: 00d is owed to 
officers and mariners for unpaid wages and £42263: 10s: 00d is owed in wages to officers 
and workmen within the yards at Deptford, Woolwich, Chatham, Portsmouth and Harwich 
as well as the ship keepers of the ships in their harbours.  
The breakdown of debt is very exact, including a total calculated at £597696: 03s: 4d. The 
author and origin of this document is unknown, only that it resides within Coventry’s 
collection of papers.  It should be noted that Coventry also held documents relating to the 
supply of victuals in 1645 during the English Civil War, which show he was acquainting 
himself with historic spending, as well as current lists of ships in the pay of His Majesty (CO 
98, p. 158), a list of the compliment of men on board each ship (CO 98, p. 146), the list of 
captains and lieutenants serving on board these ships (CO 98, p. 160) and a list of officers 
bound to each ship (CO 98, p. 165). With this in consideration, whether Coventry was 
personally responsible for creating the state of naval debts or he was simply educating 
himself, we can see that he was clearly man focused upon obtaining a broad understanding 
of the size and needs of the navy and as such the necessary spending of the navy. Whether 
this was by choice as a diligent staff member, or whether this was expected of him within 
his role, we cannot be certain. However, we can see through his collection of documents 
that a main focus of his job role was fiscal administration with an eye for retrenchment. 
This point is emphasised by the lack of the documents relating to other genres of military 
information, such as information pertaining to the locations of specific ships, the training 
of men or tactical guidance - his collection of papers seems to be primarily focused upon 
financial matters.  
Pepys confirms this idea, by documenting in his diary the following 
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“[I] find sir W. Coventry alone and fell to discourse of retrenchment; and thereon he 
tells how he hath already propounded to the lords committee of the council how he 
would have the treasurer of the navy a less man, that might not sit at the board but be 
subject to the board. He would have two controllers to do his work, and two Surveyors, 
whereof one of each to take it by turns to reside at Portsmouth and Chatham, by a King 
of rotation. He would have but only one Clerk of the Acts. He doth tell me he hath 
propounded how the charge of the navy in peace shall come within 200000l, by keeping 
out 24 ships in summer and 10 in winter” (Pepys, 1667, as cited in Latham and 
Matthews, 1971). 
Latham and Matthews explain that Coventry’s idea to re-organise the Navy Board were 
put on hold but, his new sum for the annual charge was approved by council order on the 
16th March 1669. Within their work it is suggested that “It was the figure proposed before 
the war, and was half of what Pepys was to suggest as a reasonable minimum in 1685-6” 
(Latham and Matthews, 1971, Vol 8, p. 391). But, again, this source demonstrates that 
Coventry’s contemporaries were also aware Coventry was responsible for retrenching the 
navy.  
Numerous smaller references also compound this theory. There are examples of Coventry 
requesting updated information on the state of the naval debt from Pepys, including the 
victualler's estimates and totals for the last three years (CSP CCXII.50)89, as well as 
requests to the Navy Commissioners to act faster in weighing and selling ships in the 
Medway so that the profit can be used to reduce the charge of the navy (CSP CCXV 43)90. 
Coventry can also be seen to take an active role in seeking methods to economize the 
navy. On April 9th 1665, he writes to the Navy Commissioners explaining that he has been 
 
89 Dated, August 3rd 1667. 
90 Dated, August 28th 1667. 
 
211 
made aware that his design for more hulks at Harwich has been approved pending their 
acquisition (CSP CXVII.81). After consultation with the Surveyor; Sir William Batten, 
Coventry proposes the utilisation of condemned prize ships or a large ship ‘whose upper 
works are decayed be fitted up’. Another example of this can be seen when Coventry and 
the Navy Board instruct Sir William Warren to buy three-hundred tonnes of hemp from 
‘Hamburg’ at the cheapest rate they can get for the better supply of stores with cordage 
(CO 96, p. 52)91. It is alike the preceding source because William Coventry is not simply 
making broad requests to his colleagues to minimise naval expenditure, he is actively 
pursuing routes to economise. Within the Coventry papers, in particular volume 96, there 
are numerous letters of correspondence with William Warren relating to the acquisition 
of hemp for cordage. This demonstrates that although there were three signatories to the 
original letter, it is clearly a responsibility that was primarily under the remit of Coventry.  
Finally, examples of Coventry incorporating retrenchment into his responsibilities can be 
seen within two sources relating to fire ships used during the Dutch raid on Medway. In 
the first source, dated June 9th 1667 at seven o’clock in the evening, Coventry writes to 
the Navy Commissioners explaining that His Majesty has decided that the best way to 
combat the Dutch is with fire ships (SP 46/136/6) and as such, requests that the 
commissioners inquire as to what can be used from the King’s own fleet, or what can be 
bought appropriate for the purpose. However, he also questions if it is worth 
investigating if any ships can be ‘hired’ for this purpose, so long as a value is agreed upon 
in case the ship is lost, but primarily highlighting that speedy acquisition is important.  
 
91 This instruction is dated 1st November 1664 signed by G.C, W.C AND W.B thus presumably George 
Cartarett, William Coventry and William Batten 
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The second source was sent on the same day and has similar content (CSP, Vol 136, p 
485), so much so that it seems likely that the duplication of this source indicates that they 
were being received separately by different commissioners. The fact that Coventry writes 
these letters primarily within the context of analysing spending and place emphasis upon 
the need for others’ expertise in ensuring that the most financially viable route is found, 
provides further indication of Coventry’s involvement in retrenchment of the navy. 
Additionally, his focus is upon speed and efficiency are still a very clear and necessary 
factor. Therefore, we can see yet another responsibility within Coventry’s wide and varied 
role that focuses on finding the most economically viable option for the benefit of the 
navy. 
 
6.5.5 Clarendon’s View  
 
An interesting source that can be used to ascertain William Coventry’s job role is that of 
his contemporary adversary; Clarendon. In his work he states the following regarding 
Coventry; 
“Mr Coventry proposed to the Duke, “that in regard to the multiplicity of business in the 
navy, much more than in former times, and the setting out greater fleets than had 
been accustomed in that age when those officers and that model for the government of 
the navy had been established, his royal highness would propose to the King to make 
an addition, by commissioners, of some other persons always to sit with the other 
officers with equal authority, and to sign all bills with them,” which was a thing never 
heard of before, and is in truth a lessening of the power of the admiral” ( Clarendon, 
Life of Clarendon. Vol II.331) This is followed by a statement from Clarendon explaining 
that, then the “Duke liked the proposition well, and without conferring with anybody 
else upon it, proposed it to the King at the council board, where nobody though fit to 
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examine of debate what the duke proposed; and the King approved it” (Clarendon, as 
cited in the life of Edward, Earl of Clarendon, 1827, Vol II, p. 332) 
Clarendon goes on to detail that Coventry felt the Treasurer had previously held too much 
power. This source is important, because it shows that Coventry was actively involved in 
the development of novel practice, and provides evidence of his power and influence 
within the organisation, especially with the Duke of York and, in particular, since this 
appraisal comes from his adversary, ho presumably seek to belittle Coventry rather than 
promote his ideas. It also provides a clear demonstration that from the earliest stages of 




There is a clear lack of secondary literature and research relating to William Coventry, as 
is evident through this case study by the lack of diversity amongst the secondary 
references. This is due in part to the wide acclaim of Samuel Pepys who has been 
attracting the attention and focus of naval scholars for centuries. However, even amongst 
the existing literature on Coventry there is a clear focus upon his social history, most 
notably the controversy of his character, his imprisonment and his famous fall out with 
Clarendon.  
There had been no historic attempt to understand Coventry’s job specification or his 
contributions to naval accounting and administrative practice during his tenure as 
secretary to the Duke of York.  
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This case study has found numerous examples detailing the tasks Coventry undertook in 
his role as Secretary to the Duke of York and as Navy Commissioner. These can be broken 
down into four themes; Accounting procedures, Increased efficiency, ‘states of the navy’ 
and retrenchment. Within accounting procedures, we see examples of him partaking in 
auditing of accounts, using accounting procedure to settle queries relating to debt and 
the payment of extraordinary expenses. Numerous references of Coventry pursuing 
increased efficiency within the navy are observed, which include examples of him 
campaigning for the more efficient supply of victuals and slops, the requisitioning of 
victuals and the distribution of acts of Parliament to enhance public confidence in the 
navy’s ability to purchase are a clear demonstration of his role in increasing the efficiency.  
Coventry can also be observed to cooperate with the Navy Board in the creation of up to 
date reviews of the state of current financial requirements and to ensure that the Duke of 
York is prepared to answer potential queries relating to expenditure in any public 
enquiries.   
This chapter has asserted that the primary focus of William Coventry’s professional 
responsibilities was retrenchment of the navy. Numerous sources detail the state of the 
naval debt and the frequent innovative ideas by Coventry to reduce naval expenditure. 
Overall, for the first time, we can see what Coventry was responsible for and begin to see 
a picture of how he, alongside the Duke of York and Samuel Pepys, was responsible for 
implementing administrative reforms and accounting procedures. These procedures 
demonstrate examples of the metrics for management control; therefore, we can see his 
contribution towards the implementation of management control systems, which led to 
the navy working towards organisational professionalism.  This responds to the research 
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objective in which individual case studies are created, ‘focusing on the reforms that they 
put in place and how these established standard operating procedures, managerialism, 
control mechanisms and rewards systems. 
This will be built upon in the subsequent Samuel Pepys chapter, which constitutes the 
final case study used to ascertain the extent to which attempts were made to instigate 








Samuel Pepys is the final of the three biographical case studies that this thesis will 
investigate in order to establish the extent to which attempts made by three senior 
individuals to instigate management controls were responsible for the organisational 
professionalisation of the Royal Navy in the late 17th century. The previous chapters have 
set the scene for the developments and reforms made by the Duke of York, William 
Coventry and Samuel Pepys, by demonstrating what we mean by professionalisation and 
management control as well as supplying us the historical context necessary to 
understand the implications of the Duke of York’s reforms.  This will focus on the reforms 
that he put in place and how these established standardised operating procedures, 
managerialism, control mechanisms and rewards systems. 
The case study will firstly conduct an exploration into the character and life of Samuel 
Pepys. Section 7.2 and 7.3 will give an overview of Pepys’ humble background and rise to 
fame as one of the most notable administrators in British history.  Historians working in 
the 20th century have credited him as being “an unrivalled commentator on his own 
times” (Knighton, 2004, 142), a “treasure … hardworking…and astute” (Trease, 1972, p. 
31) and a “great naval organizer and reformer” (Tanner, 1920, p. 10). Davies describes 
how audiences “are won over immediately by the likeable, ever so slightly pompous, 
lascivious, eternally curious, achingly, (but not entirely) self-aware author” (Davies, 2017, 
p. 18).   
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The exploration into his character will also depict his controversial financial outgoings, 
criticisms of corruptions as well as his accusations of treason. This chapter will endeavour 
to place this into an appropriate historic context. Conducted in a similar method to the 
accusations facing William Coventry in chapter 6, this case study will place the 
accusations within a historical context as well as analysing the appropriate social norms of 
that era.  
Subsequently, this chapter will then discuss Pepys’ entry into political office, detailing 
how it bridged the gulf in communication between Crown and Parliament and set the 
precedent for future naval administrators holding joint political careers. 
Section 7.4 then focuses upon the financial crisis that has befallen the navy for the entire 
time period covered by this thesis (1660-1688). This includes a detailed analysis the 
untrusting relationship between crown and parliament and how this resulted in funds 
being withheld from the navy and the impact this had on the organisation, notably their 
declining credit and inflated costs of victuals. This is essential because it places the need 
for reform and the developments implemented by Samuel Pepys as well as the Duke of 
York and William Coventry into context. This supports the research objective in 
concluding that these findings establish the extent to which the management controls put 
in place are significant in the organisational professionalisation of the Royal Navy in the 
later 17th century. 
This case study undertakes a similar framework to the previous case studies; the Duke of 
York and William Coventry. It uses archival evidence to ascertain the contributions made 
by the Pepys in implementing management control in order to work towards 
organisational professionalism. This is achieved by exploring what accounting procedures 
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Pepys implemented and then assessing which of these can be seen as displaying the 
metrics for this thesis’ framework for professionalisation or management control. This 
will help to contribute towards the overall research aim of assessing how one of the three 
senior individuals who instigated management controls was responsible for the 
organisational professionalisation of the Royal Navy in the late 17th century. 
Pepys’ professional responsibilities focus more heavily of the reduction of abuses than his 
case study counterparts. Where the Duke of York demonstrates the implementation of 
management control systems through the application of standard operating procedures 
and William Coventry focuses on retrenchment, we can see that although Pepys 
demonstrates these professional qualities also, his focus is primarily on control 
mechanisms. 
Section 7.5 focuses upon the reduction of abuses through Pepys enquiries into pursers 
and victualling and the resulting reforms that followed these enquiries.  Subsequently, 7.7 
explores the notion of the introduction of a financial year. This section gives a brief 
overview as to the history behind the financial year with Pepys’ rationale for instigating 
different dates in order to align bookkeeping across the organisation. This also 
demonstrates the standardisation of operating procedures. 
Finally, this chapter discusses Pepys’ role in the introduction of the lieutenant’s 




This will help to contribute towards the overall research aim of assessing how one of the 
three senior individuals who instigated management controls was responsible for the 
organisational professionalisation of the Royal Navy in the late 17th century. 
 
7.2 Accusations of treason 
 
Pepys was fortunate to have been given the support and influence of the powerful Lord 
Montagu at the beginning of his naval career. Montagu was his cousin and was influential 
in his decision to join the navy.  
Montagu employed Pepys in his first post as his personal secretary at sea (Trease, 1972, 
p. 28). During the Interregnum years, Montagu had been corresponding secretly with 
Charles Stuart (the future King Charles II), whilst he was in exile and aided his return upon 
the restoration of the monarchy. Consequently, Montagu was given a prominent role 
under Charles’ new court. As a kinsman to Samuel Pepys, Montagu proved to be a 
powerful ally, and secured for Pepys the post of Clerk of the Acts (Trease, 1972, p. 42). 
Thereafter, many modern scholars, such as Gerald Aylmer and Knighton, credit Pepys’ 
meteoric rise to senior office as an example of patronage (Aylmer, 1973, p. 68 & 
Knighton, 2004, p. 142). 
Geoffrey Trease argues that in a Navy Board filled with accomplished men, Pepys was 
inexperienced, and could have been treated as an ‘office boy’. However, this was not the 
case. 
“His love of method, his grasp of detail, his capacity for working long hours, his 
inquiring mind that drove him always to find out for himself- these qualities, together 
 
220 
with an ambitious trait which offset any undue deference to his superiors, enabled him 
to hold his own with his eminent associates” (Trease, 1972, p. 45). 
Trease clearly believed that despite gaining his position through patronage, Pepys was 
nevertheless an extraordinarily talented man, with a good work ethic, that proved himself 
capable of the challenge.  
After his role as Clerk of the Acts, he was made secretary under the Admiralty 
Commission in 1673 (Truesdale Heath, 1956, p. xi-xii) and Secretary for the affairs of the 
Admiralty in 1684. Kate Loveman suggests that “this effectively made him the most 
powerful official within the navy” (Loveman, 2010, pp. 215-6). Davies describes this 
position as being equal to the ‘existing secretaries of state’. However, he also suggests 
that this post was an imitation of the French Secretaire d’Etat de la Marine office (Davies, 
2017, p. 122). It is not surprising that the Duke of York borrowed from French protocol, 
considering the time he spent there whilst in exile. 
Loveman provides a detailed description of Pepys’ loyalty to the Duke of York, particularly 
during the periods of the Duke of York’s resignation as Lord High Admiral due to the 
introduction of the Test Act.  
This was demonstrated in 1685 when, even as a non-Catholic, Pepys steadfastly 
supported James’ attempt to remove the penal laws92. Furthering this, after the Glorious 
revolution in 1688, Pepys would not commit to taking an oath of allegiance to King James 
II’s deposers; William and Mary (Loveman, 2010, p. 52).  
 
92 The Penal Laws, were the acts enforced by Parliament against the Roman Catholics. These included the 
test and corporation acts, as well as acts excluding Catholics from both the House of Lords and House of 
Commons in Parliament. Ursula Henriques describes these acts as effectively excluding Catholics “from 
public life” (Henriques, 1962, p.137). 
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This unswerving loyalty to the Duke of York did not come without its dangers and Pepys 
was the focus of a number of plots that aimed to have him removed from office or 
prosecuted. As part of a larger ruse against James, Pepys was accused of treason and 
between October 1678 and June 1680 was under investigation and even spent some of 
this period imprisoned in the tower of London (Trusedale Heath, 1956, p. xii).  
As part of the plot against him, Pepys was implicated in the murder of a magistrate; Sir 
Edmund Berry Godfrey. Heath believes that it had always been a part of the plan in this 
plot to implicate Pepys. Fortunately for Pepys, he happened to be in Newmarket and had 
a clear alibi. As an alternative, the plotters turned their attention turned to Pepys’ clerk; 
Sam Atkins. Helen Trusedale Heath describes the evidence collected against Atkins to 
have been “later proved so palpably false that the young man was acquitted” (Trusedale 
Heath, 1956, p. xiii)93.  
However, whilst attention was focused upon this fabricated murder trial, further trumped 
up charges consisting of “piracy, popery and treachery” were brought against Pepys and 
his friend, the ship builder; Sir Anthony Dean, with fictitious evidence being created in 
order to prosecute and imprison them both (Trusedale Heath, 1956, p. xiv)94. Colonel 
John Scott was intended to give evidence to the effect that Pepys was selling images of 
English coastline maps to the French with the aid of Deane. It was not until a death bed 
confession from Pepys’ butler in 1680, who had been bribed into fabricating testimony, 
did the truth finally emerge and Pepys’ name was cleared.  
 
93 Tanner describes Atkins’ release; “when Atkins himself was brought to trial as an accessory to the murder 
he proved an alibi and was acquitted by the jury without leaving the box” (Tanner, 1982, p. 288) 
94 Scott accused Dean and Pepys of hiring a privateer “to prey on English Ships in the last Dutch War” as well 
as selling naval secrets to the French, namely maps of English coast lines (Wilson, 1972, p. 114).  
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In the same year as his accusation for treason in 1679 (Hooper, 1888, p. 343), Pepys 
resigned his post. However, he regained public office in 1683 and was sent to Tangier by 
the Duke of York, who still retained substantial influence over the navy at this time. 
Margarette Lincoln and Tanner describe his employment at Tangier as being very 
lucrative for Pepys (Lincoln, 2014, p. 420 &Tanner, 1920, p. 29).  
Lincoln makes an interesting statement regarding Pepys and Tangier by stating the 
following 
“He [Pepys] took steps to secure the King’s economic interest in Tangier could also be 
construed as precautionary measures on his own account. For example, a letter to his 
friend Henry Sheeres, the engineer partly responsible for building the mole, shows him 
trying to ensure the cost and period of construction were accurately calculated so that 
no one could find fault then or afterward. He sought to provide a defence against any 
future accusation of malpractice. He later advised Sheeres in tangier to present his 
work in a favourable light so that the reputation of the colony might justify the King’s 
expenditure” (Lincoln, 2014, p. 421). 
 
7.3 Political career 
 
Amongst Pepys’ accomplishments outside of his naval career was his determination to 
become an influential Member of Parliament. The rationale behind Pepys’ quest for 
elected office, was to be able to effectively defend the Navy Board from allegations, 
Interrogations and lacking finances.  
The navy was repeatedly affected by financial crises during Pepys’ career, and the ability 
to exercise direct influence over parliament in favour of the navy was attractive, 
particularly as a potential remedy for these financial issues. At this time, state 
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departments were largely isolated from parliament and it was often a goal to get a 
representative within the House of Commons to bridge the political gulf that had formed.  
Davies explains that during the early period of the restoration, prior to the third Anglo-
Dutch War and Pepys’ involvement in politics, “Parliamentary involvement in naval 
matters had been intermittent”. Few navy men held seats in Parliament during this era 
and those that did were generally politically inactive (Davies, 1993, p. 272).  
Pepys discusses his own motivations for seeking political office within his ‘sea manuscript’ 
collection, in which he states the following; 
“our Parliament so little understood, or at least considered, the importance and charge 
of the navy as even in the midst of their earnestness for a war with France and their 
preparations of a fleet for it, they would not so much as advance credit, or admit of the 
sum of twenty or thirty odd thousand pounds demanded as a sum to be presently had 
towards its. Though it was expressly told them that the King had it not” (Pepys, 1673, 
as cited in Samuel Pepys’ Naval Minutes, 1980, pp. 19-25). 
Pepys’ view that naval expertise needed to be added to Parliamentary debates 
demonstrates a motivation for Pepys to stand for public office. An additional rationale 
can be seen within his diaries when Pepys explains that, at the end of July, he had taken 
part in a meeting with the Navy Board and the Duke of York. All parties lamented the 
condition of naval finances. All of whom agreed that this money could only be raised 
through Parliament (Trease, 1972, p. 46).  
Ranft argues that Pepys’ “chief motive in seeking election to Parliament was to facilitate 
the administration of the navy” (Ranft, 1952, p. 368). This was demonstrated during an 
examination of the Navy Board for their conduct following the 1667 Dutch raid on the 
Medway. Further, in a subsequent enquiry pertaining to the questionable use of the 
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ticketing system for the payment of sailors, Pepys was also shown to effectively exercise 
his parliamentary influence in favour of the navy. 
Ranft asserts that “on both these occasions Pepys most successfully defended his 
department at the bar of the house” (Ranft, 1952, p. 368). This demonstrated that to 
advocate for the navy as an insider rather than an external ‘defendant’ was a far more 
effective and beneficial ideal. Additionally, when discussing financial grants for the navy, 
he is credited with being solely responsible for achieving the allocation of money required 
to build thirty new ships for the fleet (Ranft, 1952, p. 373).  
This is again demonstrated in Pepys’ records in which he discusses the navy board making 
an estimate to Parliament for expenditure in March 1682-3 and receiving censure. 
“observe that our Parliaments have ever been (in my time at least) very forward in their 
complaints of the bad payments of the navy, and particularly to the seamen; and I have 
in particular made it my business to improve any occasion given of opening the same to 
them, to the end they might make some effectual provision for remedying the same. 
Whereas when they have seen it and found they could place no blame upon N[avy] 
O[fficers] for it, they have never proceeded further for it, nor provided any relief for the 
seamen, the ministers of the government and officers of the treasury always finding 
some ways, either by diversion or prorogation to prevent the charge’s being brought 
and fastened upon them, who alone ought to bear it” (Pepys, 1673, as cited in Samuel 
Pepys’ Naval Minutes, 1980, pp. 19-25). 
In addition to declaring what he had achieved, Ranft also gives a shining commendation 
of Pepys’ ability overall by stating that none of his successors managed to achieve what 
Pepys did during his tenure, and subsequent holders of his office relied upon the Lord 
High Admiral, instead of the Clerk of the Acts to defend the navy in Parliament (Ranft, 
1952, pp. 374-5). 
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Ranft also concludes by saying that both King Charles II and the Duke of York were both 
aware of the necessity to “have a spokesman of the Admiralty in the House of Commons, 
who, by his technical knowledge and by his ability to expound it, should be able to 
convince an ignorant and suspicious house of the necessity of providing enough money 
for the navy” (Ranft, 1952, p. 375). However, it is worth considering the potentially biased 
nature of Ranft’s opinion. At no point in his research paper, does he empathise with the 
parliamentary distrust of the restoration navy.  
The quest for Parliamentary election was not an easy feat for Pepys, but it helped 
establish a transitional relationship between Parliament and the crown on navy affairs. 
Whilst seeking out a prospective seat to contend for, Pepys decided to focus on coastal 
towns, because he could claim to be able to do a lot more for them with his influence 
within the Navy Board. However, even with the support of the Duke of York and 
influential local individuals such as; Captain Thomas Elliott and Lord Henry Howard, he 
lost his election in 1669 for the available seat for Aldborough (Ranft, 1952, p. 369). 
After trying to follow various avenues for a potential seat it was not until November 1673 
that Pepys was finally elected into Parliament for Castle Rising (Knights, 2014, p. 28). 
Davies argues that Pepys’ joint administrative and political careers set a precedent for the 
inheritors of his office until 1830, when it became the norm to hold political office in a 
coastal town utilizing Admiralty sway (Davies, 2017, p. 369). 




“None of his successors at the Admiralty was of the calibre to claim successfully the 
position of secretary of state, and it was to be the first lord rather than the secretary 
who was to become the Admiralty's spokesman” (Ranft, 1952, p. 374). 
Hooper, writing in 1888, details the arduous task Pepys faced in his quest for political 
office. He describes how in 1673 Pepys’ political opponent in Castle Rising was a lawyer; 
Robert Offley. In an attempt to dissuade the local electorate from voting for Pepys, Offley 
tried to proclaim that Pepys was a papist. “Pepys found himself hooted a papist where 
ever he went”. To attempt to counter this, Pepys was necessitated to obtain a certificate 
from local clergy decreeing him a protestant (Hooper, 1888, p. 340).  
However, Pepys’ motivation of enabling the navy to access more funds became fruitful. 
He became capable of persuading the government to bequest sums as large as £600,000, 
an extraordinary and unique grant from Parliament, especially considering it was 
allocated for a “peace time building program” (Rodger, 2006, p. 108). In addition to this, 
over the next decade, Pepys was involved in assisting the successful quest for political 
office of 4 other royalist supporters.  
Pepys’ novel re-imagining of the House of Commons-Navy Board relationship, was 
something that had not been achieved by his predecessors. However, these successes 
should not be over-stated. Even with unprecedented parliamentary influence, Pepys was 
not capable of fully solving the fiscal concerns of the navy, and finances remained a 





7.4 State of finances 
 
As discussed in the previous case studies of this work, the restoration administration 
faced many problems in managing the Royal Navy, when they succeeded the protectorate 
government. King Charles II inherited an indebted navy from the Interregnum 
administration, whilst simultaneously facing a constitutional crisis fomented by the 
continuing power struggle between Parliament and the Crown. As highlighted by Ranft, a 
bureaucratic problem existed at this time whereby the Crown held executive powers for 
the navy, whilst Parliament held the financial reigns and legislative abilities (Ranft, 1952, 
p. 368).  
As Davies discusses, this led to bureaucratic issues, such as the withholding of funds from 
the crown for the navy. These issues were spurred by parliamentary distrust in the 
monarchy, and the fear that King Charles II and the Duke of York would use the navy as a 
“Trojan horse of arbitrary power” that could empower the crown to forever banish 
Parliament (Davies, 1993, p. 274). Although this rationalises some of the parliamentary 
choices during the restoration, this growing fear led to some of the biggest issues facing 
the navy during this time period; including a crippling lack of financial support, corruption 
and abuses as well as ill-discipline within the fleet.  
Lambert also considers this situation, stating that “Charles possessed a potent battlefield, 
but parliament did not trust him with the money to use it”, and that Charles and James 
had a unique vision for the navy, but this was supressed because they did not have the 
financial support to execute this (Lambert, 2018, p. 272).  
This issue is also addressed by Wheeler, who explains that “Navy short term debt grew 
from about £50,000 in 1661, to at least £229,000 in June 1667. Most of this debt was 
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carried in the form of tallies as bills imprested on tax receipts due into the exchequer, 
which had been allocated to the navy’s financial support” (Wheeler, 1999, p. 56). 
The timely acquisition of money for the navy was an ongoing problem that plagued the 
restoration administration. Naturally, this effected the payment of ships and men, which 
would have had a detrimental impact on the practicalities of managing the navy.  
A lack of adequate resourcing of the navy is a theme that reoccurs in the biographies of 
all three men whom are the focus of this research, indicating the pervasive nature of this 
issue throughout the restoration period. However, the financial problems of the navy are 
of particular significance when discussing Pepys, due to his continued efforts to improve 
and streamline the administration of naval finances through endeavours such as his 
political career. As such, the financial State of the Navy will be discussed in full detail in 
this section. This will be achieved principally through analysis of primary evidence, which 
enables us to observe both the financial struggles of the navy and its growing attempts to 
rectify the situation. 
Pepys frequently laments the grim State of the Navy finances and the impact this had on 
the management of the navy. One such example is the desertion of workers at 
Portsmouth, documented in a letter authored by Pepys for the attention of William 
Coventry95 (Pepys, 1665, as cited in Further correspondence of Samuel Pepys, 1929). 
Interestingly, the usually severe Pepys is understanding of the plight of the workmen, 
asserting that “their provocation [was] never so great as this at Portsmouth I doubt is”. 
Pepys explains that their desertion is due to “the Treasurer’s instruments here leaving us 
utterly unsatisfied therein till the Treasurer return to town”.  
 
95 Dated, 1st July 1665. 
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Pepys explains that lacking access to funds prevented the navy from accessing the 
required victuals. In a letter written by Pepys to William Coventry, Pepys asks for a timely 
resolution for the “victualler’s case as to money”, highlighting that it has been six weeks 
since payment was due and that the following year’s victuals will be impossible to access 
if they lose many more weeks in finding payment (Pepys, 1665, as cited in Further 
correspondence of Samuel Pepys, 1929)96. Further, it is written that the victuallers 
themselves are warning “of the danger the King’s work is in for the next year through the 
want of money”.  
The Navy Board sums up the state of naval finances in a letter expressing their discomfort 
at the frequency with which they must write to the Duke of York regarding “our want of 
money” (Pepys, 1665, as cited in Further correspondence of Samuel Pepys, 1929)97. This 
theme of discontent is prevalent within numerous sources cited within this research, 
complaining of the tardiness of payments. In this letter, the Navy Board explain that the 
situation is so dire that they cannot let “our tenderness of your royal highness’ trouble 
give way to our general duty to His Majesty”. They explain that over half of their time is 
wasted in discourse relating to payments. This not only wastes His Majesty’s treasure but 
also exacerbates the issue due to the excessive rates they must pay for supplies due to 
the merchants “uncertainty of his payment”. It also clearly demonstrates the 
inefficiencies and waste within the department, which Pepys and the board are 
attempting to address. It is explained that the damages to His Majesty financially are too 
 
96 Dated, 5th December 1665. 
97 Dated, 12th Mary 1666. 
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numerous to document in their entirety so instead a single example of the problem was 
given as follows:  
A hemp merchant tried to ask for 60l /ton, of which the Navy Board bartered him down to 
57l /ton. However, they found out he is charging other private persons 49l10s for the 
exact same goods. Upon reproach the merchant explained that he would readily change 
the price from 57l to 49l upon receipt of ready money, indicating that the navy were 
taking a sixteen percent premium on these goods for bad credit.  
Pepys again shares his despondency with Coventry describing how he “loathes to guess” 
“what we shall shortly do without better payments”. He explains that the credit of the 
navy is in decline in direct relation to their lack of financing. Within this letter he explains 
that contractors are telling Pepys to “pay me what you have had, and I’le trust you 
further”, demonstrating that the navy’s credit and trust that contractors that supplied it 
was lacking as a direct result of poor finances (Pepys, 1665, as cited in Further 
correspondence of Samuel Pepys, 1929)98.  
It appears that the payment of men is one of the most damaging bi-products of lacking 
finances for the navy. In correspondence between Richard Haddock to the ‘Principal 
Officers’99, Haddock implores the Navy Board to remunerate him for his former services, 
stating that he has already written a few lines to Pepys regarding his pay but has not 
heard back from him as yet (ADM 106/292 94B)100. Haddock goes on to explain his 
location for the next week in the hopes of a member of the Navy Board seeking him out 
 
98 Dated, May 25th 1665. 
99 Richard Haddock was a commissioner at Deal in Kent. 
100 Dated, December 12th 1673. 
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to the give him his due wages. Additionally, he encloses a petition on the behalf of 
carpenters at Portsmouth Dockyard requesting two quarters pay. This source is 
particularly interesting because it demonstrates that arrears in pay is a problem shared 
across the various echelons of naval superiority and not just a phenomenon attributed to 
the lower ranking servicemen.  
An additional letter from Captain Coleman to the Principal Officers also demonstrates the 
lack of financial availability for the payment of wages (ADM 106/332/319)101. This letter is 
hard to read due to the partially illegible handwriting, but from what can be transcribed, 
the letter states that he had received an order from Pepys to reduce his compliment of 
men to the number allowed in times of peace. However, he points out that he needs the 
money to discharge the men and as such he asks if he “may have 40 or 50 tickets sent 
down, not having sufficient” himself already. This source demonstrates that Pepys and 
the Navy Board were consistently ensuring that the service is not overburdened 
financially by paying for unnecessary men outside of war. However, it also demonstrates 
that the lacking finances available created a ‘domino effect’, because the inability to 
discharge unnecessary men led to further financial wastage. 
Within his diary, Pepys again describes the problem of the unpaid wages of men 
employed within the King’s service102. This excerpt states that the sailors of the HMS 
Guernsey remained unpaid since the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, causing the 
sailors to borrow money and “had very little to receive at the table- which grieved me to 
see it”. Pepys does not just describe this from an administrative or statistical perspective- 
 
101 Dated, 21st September 1679. 
102 Dated, 27th March 1662.  
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he emphasises with the men and emotively describes the presence of seamen in the 
street, all loudly distressed due to the starvation and poverty encountered for “lack of 
money- which doth trouble and perplex me to the heart” (Pepys, 1665, as cited in Latham 
and Matthews, 1971)103.  
Despite the abundance of primary evidence demonstrating financial hardship, there is in 
turn a wealth of evidence demonstrating slow progressions rectifying the issues. Pepys 
writes to Coventry, in response to “his royal highness’s order”104 and “Coventry’s 
advertisement” regarding the paying off of ships, with precedent and importance placed 
upon the “merchantmen in the river” in preference to the sailors at Portsmouth (Pepys, 
1665, as cited in Further correspondence of Samuel Pepys, 1929)105. Pepys states that the 
rationale for this decision focuses upon the idea that if those at sea “hear of the plaints of 
their fellows on shore for non-payment” they will not believe that they themselves will be 
paid, and merchantmen move around the country more and as such the bad reputation 
would spread in the speediest and most damaging manner. Additionally, Pepys argues 
that priority for payment must be given to those in arrears. In this letter, he also 
commands that they should swap able men at the end of their deployment onto 
alternative ships to replace the “worst men” to be discharged, and that there must be 
money readily available to pay them off. This source demonstrates Pepys’ acumen in 
 
103 Diary extract dated, 7th November 1665. 
104 As is a common occurrence when analysing primary evidence for this research we cannot be 100 percent 
sure to whom Pepys is referring when he notes “his royal highness’s order”. This could be King Charles II or 
James Duke of York. Due to the fact that they are both royal highnesses as well as both having the authority 
and inclination to give orders to the navy. But, it is only logical to assume that this is referencing the Duke of 
York. Pepys regularly refers to James as his royal highness, and as Lord High Admiral, it is James that is most 
frequently distributing orders to the Navy Board. 
105 A letter dated, 17th October 1665. 
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times of financial woe, as well as establishing his understanding of the sensitivity of 
morale to avoid mutiny.  
Pepys’ efforts towards reducing, and further preventing public knowledge of the navy’s 
poor credit is in order to increase the trust and confidence in the organisation. In 
accordance with this thesis’ framework for the definition of professionalisation, this 
clearly demonstrates the criterion; ‘the understanding of a public perception or ‘status’ 
relating to an occupation. 
Once again, a letter from Pepys to Coventry explains the dire need for financial input into 
the navy. In the letter that he states that he has met with the lord general and the 
victualler with the focus of “informing them with our states as to money”. Pepys explains 
that they fully owe for wages and stores in their entirety for months’ worth of supplies. 
He references Gauden, stating that he needs 150,000l by the end of January, with a 
residue of arrears accounting for 350,000l which he suggests should be made in weekly 
payments over nine or ten months. Without which, Gauden implores that he would not 
able to “go through to the next years’ service”. Pepys does not believe that they would be 
able to obtain more than 30,000l (Pepys, 1665, as cited in Further correspondence of 
Samuel Pepys, 1929)106.  
Evidently, this is an entirely unlikely and implausible amount to be requesting at this stage 
considering the finances that have been made available up to this point. However, this 
could be a device used to highlight the urgency and danger associated with their current 
allocation, hoping to encourage them to part with more money. Pepys also explains, 
 
106 Dated, 9th December 1665. 
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through private discourse with Sir G. Downing, that they believe the new act will reap 
several real advantages, though it is unlikely that these will “come timely enough and in 
proportion to succour the King in his present difficulties”.  
A final source demonstrating the inability to pay off employees of the navy is a letter 
written from Rich Beach to Haddock and the commissioners referencing this quarter’s pay 
owed to Chatham Dockyard107. This source states that he knows  
“his ma[jesty] hath ordered a quarter pay for Chatham yards which was due in your 
time and which is already paid them. I am informed by the workmen of this yard to 
move you on their behalf that you would be pleased to speak to Master Secretary 
Pepys to beg His Majesty’s favour, Favour to order them an old quarter pay as 
Chatham hath (?) and his joyner which are discharged from the works (the contract 
works being finished) that humbly begs your favour that they may be paid their arrears, 
they living in severall of the Kingdoms. U have put a stop to y workmen petitioning y 
King (?) because I would not give too much trouble to His Majesty” (ADM 106/383/87).  
This source demonstrates extraordinary administrative inefficiencies, in which the 
workmen, whom are owed money, must pass their requests for remuneration through 
several layers of bureaucracy, in order to ask for the arrears in wages to be paid (I.e. they 
ask Beach to ask the commissioners to ask Pepys to ask the King). One might assume that 
the workmen are incapable, either through illiteracy or means, to contact Haddock or the 
commissioners directly. However, it seems inefficient that Beach would not be able to 
contact Pepys himself, rather than communicating through the commissioners. The 
source also shows that problems at this point are frequent enough to suggest that the 
timely payment of wages are certainly not the norm.  
 
107 Dated, 12th June 1688. 
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Another collection of Navy Board in-letters once again documents the lack of money 
made available (ADM 106/384/421)108. The first letter explains that currently the Royal 
Navy has thirteen thousand men employed in the service and the Victualling Board 
implore the Navy Board to negotiate with the King on their behalf, in order to obtain 
funds. Within the letter they calculate that they have only received from the board £1000 
towards carrying on the victualling. But they estimate that even if they paid only eight 
thousand men for four months under the estimation of eight shillings per man per day 
this would cost £29866: 13s :4d. As such they beg for a weekly payment to enable them 
to carry out their service.  
 It is highlighted by the Victualling Board that this request for financial aid comes as a 
response to an instruction from His Majesty via Pepys on the 19th October.  
“not to slack our hands in making provisions both dry &wett. Which his Ma[jesty’s] 
fleet doth or may call for”. Finally, they call for timely notice to be given. Imploring for 
the Navy Board to ask His Majesty what further needs he will require of them for that 
year “insuring the proper season for providing the same w[i]ch wee are doing with all 
possible expedition” (ADM 106/384/421).  
Naturally, this source demonstrates how serious the financial conditions of the navy are, 
to the point that it appears unlikely that they will be able to keep the fleet afloat for the 
following year. Although this leads the reader to believe that the administration during 
this era was suffering awfully, the historical context must be considered. These letters 
were written the midst of the Glorious Revolution aimed to depose James. During this 
stage of the revolution, the King’s grasp on parliament and the state finances had been 
 
108 Written from the Victualling office 29th October 1688. 
 
236 
severely weakened. Naturally, his ability to ensure that the navy was adequately financed 
was severely impinged.   
Within the same source, they create an account of what has been received and what is 
needed. It is concluded that the weekly sum of 24,979l should be provided to contribute 
towards debts already accrued and finance current naval expenses. It is explained within 
the letter that, through appealing to their books, it had been determined that in the 
previous nineteen weeks “beside what hath been paid in sea wages and to the victualler” 
have not exceeded 5,300l.  
Therefore, this source reiterates that the debt of the navy was at this time growing and 
ask Pepys to intervene with the King on their behalf to request the sum of 120,000l to 
enable them to pay the bills that remain unsatisfied as well as a further 47,000l to 
discharge the debt due to the workmen in the yards. Therefore, a total of 167,000l was 
requested. The Board further requested a weekly supply of 20,000l for the current service 
as the previous volumes were for arrears only. It is stated that: “If this can be obtained we 
might hope in some time to recover the lost credit of this office, and carry on the service 
thereof with husbandry and dispatch”. The authors obviously feel that this is a far too 
ambitious a sum to be requesting and as such state that if these full sums cannot be 






7.4.1 The effect of declining credit on dockyard employment  
 
One method that may be used to effectively demonstrate the impact that the declining 
credit of naval finances had on public trust for the navy, is to analyse employment within 
dockyards. Historically, due to the constancy of employment, dockyard work was, at this 
time, competitive and a matter of petition to receive employment. By the restoration 
period it had been reduced to a punishment. The workers were “frequently found to 
neglect and loiter” just with the hope of being dismissed from the service to be able to 
find alternative reliable work (Pepys, 1665, as cited in Further correspondence of Samuel 
Pepys, 1929)109. 
Before the seventeenth Century, the dockyards were not all permanent and very few men 
were kept in continuous employment outside of war time. This changed by 1660, when 
employment became more stable and structured within the dockyards, which resulted in 
the erection of homes and larger towns surrounding the dockyards which became the 
permanent place of residence for the workers. This clearly demonstrates a criterion for 
professionalisation, exemplifying the necessity for an ‘occupation having permanent and 
full-time employment’. 
In 1953, D. C Coleman undertook an in-depth study of naval dockyards. Within this 
research she ascertains the employment implications of the expanding Stuart dockyards 
(Coleman, 1953, p. 139). She describes how during the time period of 1654 to the turn of 
the century, employment “had risen over fivefold”. During the Second Dutch War, “238 
 
109 Davies 2017 “dockyards were, by a considerable distance, the largest industrial establishments in the 
country; and when fully mobilised its population made it the third largest ‘city’ in the British Isles’ (Davies: 
2017, p. 13) 
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were at work at Deptford in 1663, 302 at Woolwich in the following year; 1665 saw 800 
busy at Chatham”. Coleman then suggests that with this increasing volume of dockyard 
workers and increasing population on dockyard towns, it is reasonable to suggest that 
they “were dependent upon direct dockyard labour” (Coleman,153, p.139). Davies also 
comments on the increase in dockyard populations, stating that if all of the dockyards 
together were to be considered a standalone town, when manned to full capacity they 
would be ranked as the ‘third largest city in the British Isles’ (Davies, 2017, p.13).  
As part of her research, Coleman calculates the comparative average pay between 
dockyard workers and civilians, ascertaining that in 1669 carpenters were paid 1 s 8d per 
day and plumbers 2 s. 6d per day (Coleman, 1953, pp. 143-4). She determines that there 
is a 1s. 8d difference between dockyard and civilian carpenters and plumbers. Labourers 
and shipwrights varied by much slighter margins. With both of these facts in 
consideration, it becomes a far more significant notion that dockyard work was 
undesirable and considered a punishment; demonstrating the far-reaching implications of 
lacking public trust and confidence in the navy.  
Additional evidence of the severity of declining confidence of dockyard employment can 
also be seen in sources from William Coventry. He writes to the Navy Commissioners to 
explain that they have access to 10,000l for paying the tickets of ships to be discharged, 
expecting further sums to be received for the same usage (CSP CCXIX.40)110. Coventry 
theorises that if a large amount of men were to be discharged from the navy, then it 
 
110 Dated, 3rd October 1667. 
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would make employment within the service desirous again and as such restore order and 
obedience.  
 
7.4.2 Improving finances 
 
Before the accession of the Duke of York to the throne as King James II in 1685, we start 
to see examples of the state of naval finances improving. Coventry explains in a letter to 
Pepys the severity of the lack of payment for men (CSP CCCCI)111. But, he also states that 
‘since Michaelmas there has always been money in the Exchequer, applicable to that use. 
[But, Coventry is] fearful how long the stock will last, but whilst they can get money, shall 
apply all to the use of the navy’. Again, the lack of money available to the navy is evident. 
However, Coventry is clearly aware of this situation and attempting to ensure that men 
are paid when they can be, and not to miss an opportunity of there being money 
available to them.  
However, we see more clearly the slow trend in improving finances after the Duke of York 
ascended to the throne. A letter to the commissioners of the navy from Pepys, explains 
that the HMS Bonaventure has recently come into the Downes and is ready to be laid up 
and the men discharged (ADM 106/381/114)112. Therefore, the treasurer needs an 
estimate of wages due up the 25th March so that the men can be paid immediately before 
discharging. This is interesting, because this document is written roughly six weeks after 
the 25th March, suggesting that the navy are more effectively organising their finances 
and finding a capacity to more swiftly pay the wages of serving seamen. Additionally, the 
 
111 Dated, 29th October 1667. 
112 Dated, 3rd November 1686. 
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expedience and efficiency to which they are treating the Bonaventure, since they cannot 
discharge until the men have been paid, shows increased prudence in financial matters.  
Two additional sources can be found within the national archives that demonstrate in 
September of 1686 Pepys was finally able to effectively organise the navy’s finances.113 
The first is a letter dated 4th September 1686 to the commissioners of the navy; Tippetts, 
Haddock and Sotherne from Pepys which is a request from Pepys to the aforementioned 
names requesting that they prepare an estimate of the wages due to the HMS 
Greyhound, of which payment shall be given by the King on the following Monday(ADM 
106/381/105).  
The second letter enclosed and dated the 6th July 1686 from the ticket office, is a detailed 
estimate of the cost due the HMS Greyhound from the 25th March last114. “Estimate of y 
greyhound wages from 16th July to y 24th march 5/6. Compliment being 75 men w[ich] 
cast at 28 a man medium amounts to £3686: 5s :0d. Tickets paid about £4916: 19s :0d 
with a total due £3129: 6s :0d”. This indicates clearly that the commissioners had enacted 
Pepys’ instructions in a prompt and timely fashion. 
The second source is, similarly, a request from Pepys, asking the commissioners to collate 
an estimate for the wages due to Portsmouth up to the 25th march for the satisfaction of 
the Lord Treasurer “who has soon pleased to determine to have her paid out of y revenues 
of Ireland” (ADM 106.381/112)115. These sources are interesting because they were both 
issued in the month of September and both state imminent payment, which demonstrate 
 
113 An argument for this could be because the Duke of York is on the throne now and now has more ability 
to control and prioritise naval expenditure. 
114 It is worth noting here that this response appears to have been sent before Pepys’ original letter. 
However, in the pre-Gregorian calendar, the 7th month is September. 
115 Dated, 15th September 1686. 
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that the navy was beginning to be financed in a more orderly fashion. However, it is also 
interesting that both letters ask for estimates dating up to the end of 25th March, which 
will be discussed further within this case study, in reference to the introduction of a 
financial year. 
Another letter, from Pepys to the Navy Commissioners, once again demonstrates that 
arrears are being paid off (ADM 106/382/43)116. It states that His Majesty was pleased to 
direct “that one of y old quarters due to Chatham yard should be paid in sometime either 
during his being there at y beginning or within y other part of y next week”.  
Another source that sheds light on the improving financial situation are the parliamentary 
accounts relating to public debt. These accounts show a significant decrease of naval debt 
by the end of James II’s reign. This document was written in the Victorian era for the 
House of Commons Parliamentary Papers and ascertains that;  
“At the period of the revolution in 1688, the whole amount, outstanding on tallies 
of loan, excluding the bankers’ debt, did not exceed 84,888/. 6 A'. 9 d., issued in 
anticipation of the duties on French linens, &c., under the 1st James 2, c. 5. This 
amount constituted the whole of the public debt at that time, but there were also some 
arrears due to the army and navy, amounting to 300,000 /. The amount of ordinary 
revenue was 1,580,000 /. Per annum” (HCP XXXIII.165. 443) 
 
Numerous sources discussed here indicate that the navy experienced a substantial 
decline in credit and public trust throughout the Interregnum and restoration periods, but 
several sources indicate that this situation had been improving sporadically under the 
tenure of Pepys and the Duke of York.  
 
116 Dated, 29th April 1687. 
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7.4.3 Salary sacrifice 
 
There are some sources that indicate that Pepys and the Navy Board were on occasion 
willing to sacrifice their personal salaries in the interest of improving the credit of the 
navy. Whilst discussing ways to prevent the credit of the navy to decline further, Pepys 
states the following; 
“we will endeavour (if by any means its may bee) go avoid the hazard of so great 
an evil; and in order there to have resolved to w[ith]hold the receipt of our own 
salaries, which were assigned upon these monys for the quarter so long since due 
as Christmas last. Rather than expose the credit of the office to this interrupting 
while there remainds anything in our power to due towards the preventing it. By 
which means, we hope not only to dispatch away these victualling vessels by 
(together with the tyme w[ich[ we shall endeavour in our freatings to save in the 
payment for the shipps, barges horsemeat and rhe rescputt you tell us you will 
please to use in y payments of all bills) to give on to the preparing of all so as that 
if mony does arise to us within the tyme mentioned, we shall hope to carry on the 
service in such a manner as that noe observation shall be taken of any delay or 
disorder to our payments; an evil too great in it selfe to be long either concealed or 
born with and would be much more so, when added to what w[ich] have for a 
good while lay underof being unable to assign for payment, bills on w[ich] 
payment hath been long claimable to above 50,000. 
Which last circumstances we mentioned not so much for y magnifying any of the 
difficulties we are driven to contend w[ith] (and w[ich] are by other waies enough 
made nowne to you) but to satisfie you in the moment it is of to his ma[hesty] that 
by all possible means our course & method of payment should be kept unshaken, 
or atleast from being discovered to be otherwise” (IOHR, Vol 97, p. 15). 
 This source shows many important things. Firstly, it suggests that Pepys and the board 
are self-sacrificing, willing to put aside their own salaries in the interest of promoting the 
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navy. It could also be argued that this demonstrates Pepys regarded his position not 
simply as a job for which to obtain a living and status, but that he is personally invested in 
revolutionising the administration of the Royal Navy.  
Secondly, for Pepys to sacrifice his money for this purpose, it clearly highlights the 
prominence that declining credit and trust should be placed. With his idealistic dream in 
the first paragraph stating his future hopes for no delay or disorder in the payment of 
long overdue bills. It could also be argued that in his final few sentences he could be 
admonishing the treasurer for his own conduct. Clearly, he is telling the treasurer that 
focus needs to be placed upon making all payments clearly, or at least for the public’s 
perception that all payments are being processed. Something which is clearly not 
happening properly at this stage.  
Other sources indicate that this is not the only time Pepys has forgone his own financial 
gain for the benefit of the navy. Pepys gives permission to “compute what my profits 
upon renewing all the commissions and warrants in the navy would have amounted to, for 
they were all void upon the Duke’s laying down his admiralship; which profits I voluntarily 
proposed my being prevented of (for the ease of the poor navy officers) by a 
proclamation” (Pepys, 1673, as cited in Samuel Pepys’ Naval Minutes, 1980, pp. 19-25). 
Furthermore, within the footnotes for this sourcebook, it suggests that for further 
reference of Pepys sacrificing his salary look for the proclamation of June 18, 1673, 
entitled ‘The Secretary of the Admiralty sacrificed fees to which he was entitled on the 
renewal of commissions (R. Steele. ‘Tudor and Stuart Proclamations, 3583). However, 
upon this research’s further analysis of this source (Steele, 1910, p. 433), it is evident that 
the afore mentioned proclamation does not infact provide any clear demonstration of 
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Pepys forgoing financial profit but it instead merely stipulates that following the 
resignation of James II for the Test Act, all office holders from previous will continue to 
hold their office. Although, this might bring into question the validity of Robert Steele’s 
reference, one could logically assume that he has simply made a referencing mistake 
whilst undertaking his research. 
.  
Figure 5- An image of proclamation 3583 (Steele, 1910, p. 433). 
 
7.5 Reduction of abuses 
 
As has been discussed throughout the case studies of this research, it is clear from the 
many sources cited that a major aim of the restoration administration was to reduce the 
systemic abuses that were widespread within naval administration. Samuel Pepys is 
known for being an avid adversary of corruption and this next section of this case study 
will focus on an analysis of his contribution to the reduction of such abuses. Excerpts from 
Pepys’ writing indicate that he had considered that the cause of corruption in the navy 
could generally be attributed to negligence on the part of senior naval employees for the 
inconvenience that pursuing punishment would cause (Pepys, 1673, as cited in Samuel 
Pepys Naval Minutes, 1980, pp. 19-25). Knowing that this was a concern of Pepys’, it is of 
no surprise that Pepys himself took such an active role in reducing corruption and abuses.  
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Within an entry of his diary, Pepys describes in detail the events of a full Navy Board 
meeting, which had been undertaken in order to examine disputed accounts pertaining to 
victuals supplied in Lisbon ‘‘where Robert Cooke was the navy victualling agent’’, and to 
ascertain whether any potential abuses of this position occurred (Pepys, 1663, as cited in 
Latham and Matthews, 1971)117. 
These accounts were under dispute, following examination conducted by Mennes, which 
revealed that several vouchers were missing. In return, the Navy Board saw “reason to 
strike off several of his demands and to bring down his 5 percent commission to 3 per 
cent- so that we shall save the King some money which both the Comptroller and his clerk 
has absolutely given away”. This excerpt is interesting for a few key reasons. It 
demonstrates the commitment of Pepys and the Navy Board in the pursuit of reducing 
the navy budget and saving the King’s treasure. This gesture from the Navy Board set the 
precedent for the use of clear accounting procedures and documentation practices. 
Furthermore, it demonstrated that neglecting to apply these practices will be met with 
sanctions in the form of a loss in revenue for the victualling agents. It is unclear whether 
the intent behind the introduction of these measures was primarily for the purpose of 
improving accounting procedure, curtailing abuses of position, or simply as a money 
saving exercise, but it is evident that all of these were achieved.  
A similar investigation into abuses, which took place in 1676, is detailed in a letter from 
Tippets and Pepys to the Navy Board, dated June 8th 1676 (ADM 106/319/320). The letter 
stated that at Chatham they had made enquiries with regard to the complaints of the 
officers in harbour concerning victuals provisions, for which numerous examples of 
 
117 Dated, 6th October 1663. 
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malpractice are given. Two examples of such complaints can be seen. Firstly, the beef and 
pork are “small and wanting”. The Agent Victualler offers to measure it by weight or 
piece. If by piece they are undersold, if by weight they are given bad cuts. E.g. “hocks, 
necks, shanks and bones” this source then goes on to give examples with first hand stores 
from different ships, of which the victuallers deny doing these practises. The second 
example is that officers state that there have been multiple times that they have had to 
go to shore to find drink for the men.  
The source details, not only a description of the complaints themselves, as exampled 
above, but also provides accounts of subsequent investigations conducted. This indicates 
that, at this time, such allegations and reports of abusive conduct were being taken 
seriously by the Navy Board and were being dealt with appropriately.  
There are a number of examples, within the personal correspondence and diary entries of 
Samuel Pepys, which demonstrate his resolve to bring to the attention of his superiors, 
the abuses that were prevalent within his office, and to implore them to exercise their 
powers to address these issues. In a diary entry found on the 24th July 1668, Pepys 
recounts his discourse with the Duke of York regarding abuses in which he recalls that he 
had clearly outlined to James “the weakness of our office” and strongly advised him as to 
how to counter it (Pepys, 1668, as cited in Latham and Matthews, 1971). It further 
explains that the Duke of York had advised him to forward his issues and proposal to him 
in writing.  
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The resulting correspondence from Pepys was later designated by Latham and Matthews 
as ‘The Dukes great letter’118, and described as “one of Pepys’ most mastery 
compositions, and proved to be the starting point of several reforms (Latham and 
Matthews, 1971, Vol 9, p. 267). It traced the roots of maladministration to the failure of 
the principal officers to observe the Duke’s instructions of 1662 and blamed particularly 
the Comptroller (first and foremost), the Treasurer and the Surveyor” (Latham and 
Matthews, 1971, Vol 9, p. 289). Pepys himself recounts that the Duke of York had 
received his letter and “did take mighty well…and seemed much to rely on what I said”. 
He discusses the letter again on the 27th august 1668, “And there with Mr Wren did 
correct his copy of my letter; which the Duke of York hath signed in my very words, 
without alteration of a syllable” (Pepys, 1668, as cited in Latham and Matthews, 1971).  
On the 13th September 1668, Pepys met with the Duke of York to receive replies from 
Brounker, Penn and Mennes to this letter. It states that the Duke of York was too busy to 
answer these replies straight away, so entrusted the task to Pepys. Pepys gleefully writes 
of his relief of this news in this diary extract, because it enabled him to prepare a defence 
in order to safeguard the Duke of York in case his peers were to have accused him of any 
wrong doing. Pepys states that Mennes “would lead the Duke of York to question the 
exactness of my keeping my records- but all to no purpose” (Pepys, 1668, as cited in 
Latham and Matthews, 1971).  
An additional enquiry into alleged abuses can be seen in a letter addressed to Edward 
Gregory, Clerk of the Cheque at Chatham Dockyard, which charges him with undergoing 
 
118 The Duke of York to the Navy Board, dated 26th August. 
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‘ancient’ and unnecessary practises. Both Coventry and Pett sign this letter alongside 
Pepys and therefore it is hard to ascertain to whom it should be accredited119. 
 “when the smallness of salaries was supply’d in part by a liberty of employing one or 
more able servants extraordinary on His Majesty’s works/occasion hath been taken by 
some of the officers of his majsety’s yards to bu[rden] them by an unallowable number 
of unable servants & particularly the Master Attendant at Chatham each of whom 
were find to have (?) eight to the great abuse of that ancient indulgence. We do pray 
and require you from henceforth to forbear allowing on your books more than 4 to 
each of them & those to be above 16 years of ages & kept to the same duty w[ith] 
others & not otherwise for doing which, (tile??) upon the further deliberation we shall 
come to some more general establishment in this particular” (ADM 106/462/38).  
This source highlights that even from the earlier years of restoration administration the 
reduction of abuses was the focus of the new administration. Additionally, it provides 
another example of the introduction of novel procedure, in this case to ensures that 
qualified men, not underage or ‘unable’ men are undertaking their positions. This 
represents another example of improvement in the professional nature of the 
organisation. 
 
7.5.1 Reduction of abuses through enquiries into Pursers 
 
The role of Purser during the seventeenth century was controversial and often 
lampooned by its contemporaries. There are multiple surviving sources that indicate that 
one of the notable achievements of Samuel Pepys during his tenure on the Navy Board 
was his extensive enquiries into the role of Purser.  
 
119 Dated, 10th October 1662. 
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Historically, Pursers were generally from a genteel back ground, as highlighted by Lewis 
who suggests the following; 
 “It is by no means accidental that their surnames in the navy lists are quite often the 
same as the captain’s. For a Purser could be made into a very profitable line of 
business, and –in selected ships- was obtainable by interest which was worked along 
lines very similar to those at the commissioned officer’s disposal” (Lewis, 1960, p. 249).  
The role can be dated back as early as the fourteenth century, when the Purser’s income 
was dependent on his abuse of emoluments rather than through official renumeration by 
a government bestowed salary. A famous Pepysian quote is often used in regards to the 
study of the Purser, which says that “a Purser without professed cheating is a professed 
loser” (Leyland, 1912, p. 322) 120. Due to frequency with which the status of the role 
attracted ridicule, there have historically been many attempts to reinvent the role by 
experimenting with different descriptions and role specifications to attempt to make it 
more respectable successful. At the beginning of 1653 the role was shared between two 
separate offices. These roles were, firstly the ‘Ship’s Steward’, who was tasked with the 
duty of Victualling for the ship’s company and the second office was the ‘Clerk of the 
Cheque’ who was responsible for mustering the crew. Prior to this, both of these jobs 
were encompassed by a single office of the Purser, but this was divided with the intention 
of creating a dual office which regulated one another. We can assume that this divisional 
experiment was unsuccessful due to the revival of the Purser just over two years later 
(Rodger, 2006, p. 52).  
 
120 The well referenced diary extract dated, 22nd November 1665. 
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Latham and Matthews describe the necessary cheating of a Purser in their footnotes of 
the above quotation, taken from Pepys Diary on the 22nd November 1666 (Latham and 
Matthews, 1971, Vol 6, p. 306). Firstly, they cite a letter in which Pepys questions “is it 
not manifest, that a Purser (with the utmost of his present allowed profits) must be a 
knave or be undon?” (Pepys, 1666, as cited in Latham and Matthews, 1971). Latham and 
Matthews also reference a Purser’s petition in which they quote “we are poor men, bred 
fit for service of consequence, but so poorly paid that we cannot exist without the 
continuance of what has ever been tolerated’. They then describe from their own words 
“Purser’s pay was small and they had to enter into bond for the performance of their 
duties, the amount varying (like their pay) with the rate of their ship. The worst of the 
tricks of the trade included the cashing of pay-tickets for non-existent seamen. But 
Pursers were allowed to make a profit from the sale of victuals and slops, sharing the 
proceeds, more often than not, with their captains and the contractors”.  
Before Pepys’ enquiries into the role of Purser, the office was paid an allocation for the 
purpose of obtaining the necessary divisions, dependent on the number of men serving 
on his ship. This system provided ample opportunity for abuse and Pursers would 
commonly attempt to inflate the numbers of their ships compliment in order that they 
may receive financial renumeration and inflate their profits. This was often a method that 
was typically undertaken in collaboration with their residing captains, who also benefited 
from this ‘false mustering’ as they would be able to receive the corresponding salaries by 
cashing tickets for seamen that did not exist. J. Leyland provides a concise summary of 
this system of abuse, in which he describes as follows; 
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“The Purser kept a muster-book of the ship’s company, from which the pay tickets were 
made out, and were signed by the Purser himself and the Captain, Master and 
Boatswain. The system of payment by ticket led to shameful wrongs inflicted upon the 
men. Holland considered it a great abuse that the Purser and Clerk of the Check should 
themselves have power of means to receive seamen’s wages when paid by ticket” 
(Leyland, 1912, pp. 322-3).  
This did not change until the nineteenth century, before which the pay was granted at the 
end of deployment. At this point men could cash portions of their salary as they needed it 
up to four shillings a month per man and two shillings for a boy.  
Due to their inadequate income, Pursers relied upon alternative, and typically 
unscrupulous means of renumeration, in order to supplement their income and make a 
full time living from their office. Some official routes of supplementing their income were 
available, such as the Purser’s commission of twelve and a half percent on the issuing of 
victuals. Furthermore, he was also able to gain through commission, five percent from 
clothing, ten percent through tobacco products and a “half penny per man for every day 
the ship was in commission” for coals, candles, firewood etc (Lewis, 1960, p. 247).  
The later element, also relied upon the management of his money and resources as the 
Purser would receive a bonus on proviso of the Victualling Board approving his yearly 
accounts, which provided an incentive for Pursers to work more honestly. The system did 
not change until 1840 when Pursers were granted salaries. 
However, in addition to the task of finding sufficient sources of income to attain a living 
salary, the Purser was also required to ensure profits, in order to safeguard the 
substantial bond that he was required to lay down upon entering his office. Known as 
‘caution money’, this bond acted as an indemnity against the large sums of money for 
 
252 
which he was responsible. Such burdens often encouraged Pursers to pursue more 
unscrupulous tactics.  
Pepys’ plan to curtail such abuses was to revive an earlier system, which afford the Purser 
the full monetary value of the ship’s complement regardless of whether the ship was at 
capacity. This then meant, that for the Purser to make an increased profit, he would need 
to economise, instead of deceive and exploit the muster books. This also stopped any 
benefit from a pseudo-alliance between the captain and the Purser, they now had no 
reason not to be truthful in regards to one another’s exploits and thus they worked as a 
control mechanism upon one another.  
This was indisputably, a markedly superior and more efficient method of victualling for 
the fleet. Rodger provides a convenient summary of this system in a comparison with 
those in place within the navies of other nations. His description is highly complementary 
of Pepys’ system and concisely shows how the system in the Royal Navy was superior; 
 “In the Dutch Navy the captains and even admirals-or rather, in practise, their wives 
and daughters- were responsible for victualling their own ships, and were expected to 
make a substantial part of their earnings thereby. The only check on their honesty was 
that they also recruited their own men, and stood to suffer from a bad reputation. 
French captains had no such check, and also victualed their own ships, ruthlessly 
cheating their men, until in 1667 an English style victualling contractor, the 
Munitionnaire- Général was installed to prevent them” (Rodger, 2006, p. 106). 
Endeavouring to counter the fraud exercised routinely the Navy Board set up a new office 
for the organisation and procurement of ships victuals, run by the ‘Agent-victualler’, in 
order to dissuade and prevent captains and Pursers from victualling their own ships. 
These were based on shore, however, for the duration of the Seven Years War, one was 
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based in Gibraltar. The rest of the victuals were gained from suppliers local to the fleet’s 
location. This was effective, because it meant they could benefit from cheaper local 
supplies (Lewis, 1960, p. 100).  
Lewis highlights that with regard to the abuse exercised by the Purser, the issue was not 
just with the quantity of victuals that the men were receiving, but that the quality of the 
goods they were receiving was the more pressing issue. Although improvements were 
made with this over time, it remained a prominent issue into the eighteenth century, with 
the men being effectively ‘short changed’ with their victuals. Lewis states that the sailors 
were defenceless to the abuses surrounding them and their victuals, and were prey to 
methods such as ‘Pusser’s tricks’, including the Purser’s Eights (or ’14 or 16’). This was an 
abuse whereby victuals were issued “at the rate of 14 ounces to the pound, steering the 
value of the odd two into his own pocket” (Lewis, 1960, p. 100).  
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Isobel Powell engaged in research investigating 
“Profiteering” (Powell, 1921, p. 243). He gives examples of how the Purser and other 
officers profiteered from their positions. In one example, he discusses how sailors who 
had been pressed into service, would arrive with only the clothes on their backs and 
were, unsurprisingly inadequately supplied for their voyages. Considering that sailors 
typically remained unpaid until the end of their service, this caused extreme hardship for 
many of the ships men and led to a higher mortality rate. In the aftermath of a 
Parliamentary enquiry, a new system known as “provant clothes” was introduced, which 
enabled the sailors to purchase clothes by providing credit, which would be subsequently 
deducted from their final salary. However, Powell argues that “both contractor and 
Purser looked to reap a handsome profit, while the Admiralty officials were more than 
 
254 
ready to share in the spoils; and naturally the pocket and temper of the sailor suffered 
considerably. He was quite helpless against this formidable official combination, unless he 
preferred to go without the clothes and take the consequences- and he very often did” 
(Powell, 1921, p. 243). 
Powell describes this as being a result of an “age notorious for the laxity of official 
morals”, a stigma that the Admiralty themselves were guilty of and could not shy away 
from (Powell, 1921, p. 6). Suggesting that the logical answer would have been to supply 
the men with clothing as a staple, free of charge, however “this solution seems not to 
have occurred to the Stuart official.” This was such a contentious issue at this point, that 
it became responsible for mutinies, namely that of the crew of the Red Lion. However, 
Janet Macdonald highlights that whilst looking at the previous effectiveness of 
administration, we should try to detach ourselves from hindsight, because “it is 
comparatively easy to assess this competence using twenty-first century hindsight; 
however, this risks an anachronistic judgement” (Macdonald, 2010, p. 3).  
Pepys understood the problems caused by the Purser, but was equally aware of their 
plight. As such, before making any changes, he endeavoured to undertake an enquiry into 
the Purser’s role. Numerous sources detail the build up to this enquiry as well as the 
document itself. 
This endeavour is documented by Pepys himself in a letter, written to William Coventry, 
in which he describes the pains he took into “his enquiries into the Purser’s trade” and 
collected a volume of observations (Pepys, 1665, as cited in Further correspondence of 
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Samuel Pepys, 1929)121. Pepys does not yet know what to advise as he hasn’t had the 
time to digest all of the data, in order to decide on how to proceed. However, he does 
state that in the interim “he has no expectations that will ever be found, in so many 
persons as we shall need, all the qualifications necessary to make the project of cheques 
and stewards advisable”. This source demonstrates that in Pepys’ personal opinion, no 
matter what comes of his investigation into the role of the Purser, it will never be a 
problem that can be completely addressed due to insufficient capable manpower. 
However, this source does also demonstrate that Pepys is looking for suitably ‘qualified’ 
men. 
Following on from the above letter to William Coventry, Pepys finalises a document 
entitled “The Purser’s employ anatomised, and both advantages and disadvantages 
therein discovered and also a proposal of committing the victualling accompt to the care 
and management of each commander” (Pepys, 1665, as cited in Further correspondence 
of Samuel Pepys, 1929). This document was addressed to Coventry on the 1st January 
1665-6, nearly three weeks after the previous letter, suggesting that Pepys wrote his 
opinion peace regarding this matter with great care and attention. 
In Pepys’ diary extract for this day, he recalls his summoning of Mr Tooker to him at five 
am to write whilst Pepys dictated, after which they worked continuously without a break 
until three pm. Within this document Pepys describes his purpose as being to analyse the 
methods currently employed for securing victuals for His Majesty’s navy and to ascertain 
whether the cost of supplying the required provisions “Which by His Majesty’s 
declaration of 35,000 men will for the ensuing year amount to 425,833l” will be realistic 
 
121 Dated, 12th December 1665.  
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and proposed remedies if it is not (Pepys, 1666, as cited in Latham and Matthews, 1971). 
Within this investigation Pepys consulted the “best qualified” men within the navy; 
commanders, Pursers, ancient cheques, stewards, “clerks bred to the accountant part 
thereof” and Mr Gauden.  
It is noteworthy how Pepys described those who he consulted, which appears to be alike 
to our modern notion of a focus group, with special emphasis on consulting those with 
particular qualifications and experience. It is possible that such consultation could have 
been achieved merely through informal conversation with men in the yards, instead he 
focused primarily on those undertaking financial roles and with a wide range and breadth 
of participants. Pepys commented on their contributions, noting that they did not 
overshare on their own flawed practises but were “open in stories of their neighbour’s 
practises” (Pepys, 1666, as cited in Latham and Matthews, 1971).  
One of the main concerns highlighted by Pepys, in his investigation, is the lack of timely 
payments for the requisition of goods for a voyage. In an example pertaining to frigates of 
the fleet, Pepys indicates that all manner of goods, including casks for goods storage122, 
turnery ware, and candles must be obtained all before men even arrive upon the ship123. 
He explains that this must be achieved without money as these goods must be obtained 
in advance of receiving the payments required to attain them, because the victualler does 
not see fit to pay the Purser until indenting, and many times not till a good while after. 
Furthermore, it is noted that other factors outside of the Purser’s control, such as 
 
122 Pepys is not entirely clear about what is meant by his statement “other than among the cask”. For 
example, he could be stating that there is always enough alcohol for the voyage. However, this researcher 
argues that he is stating that the literal acquisition of casks was the priority. Because, without the casks, 
further victuals cannot be stored properly, therefore they need prioritising before further supplies are 
purchased. 
123 Turnery ware are goods fashioned on a lathe. In this instance, likely to be food serving ware.  
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digressions “to Kent or Essex” made by the Hoyman in order to obtain receipts, 
exacerbate these issues and delay the Purser even further in receiving payment for the 
required goods (Pepys, 1666, as cited in Latham and Matthews, 1971).  
Pepys indicates that it many such cases, the only remedy available to the Purser “is to find 
such persons as will furnish him with goods upon the credit of his necessary money and 
his undertaking to satisfy them before the departure of his ship”. However, it is said that 
if the Purser can find a man to trust him, the receipt of such credit is reflected in the 
escalated price of his goods. This led to alternative practices arising, in which the 
victualler agreed to provide the required sums in advance so that the Purser could avoid 
the increased costs of goods, but at the price of one eight of the provisions required, 
which would be left behind with the victualler.  
This practice is tantamount to a bribe imposed by the victualler upon the Purser to enable 
him to effectively supply his ship and clearly represents and unacceptable use of the 
King’s treasure. In addition, the Purser was also required to remain ashore after his ship 
had sailed until the bill of credit was settled in full. This is not only problematic for the 
Purser, but it is also damaging to the King’s treasure due to the Purser’s unnecessary and 
prolonged absence from his ship. This in turn added unnecessary charges to the Purser 
and his provisions are left under the watchful eye of his steward and cooper, who was not 
as prudent with the distribution of supplies as the Purser would be, due to them not 
having invested interest in the correct distribution of stores. 
Previously, the general notion amongst Pepys’ contemporaries had been that the practice 
of leaving 1/8th of a ship’s provisions in the hands of a victualler was undertaken 
voluntarily by the ship’s Purser.  
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But with the above considerations, Pepys tried to amend the popular view, by stating that 
nothing but the most extreme state of poverty would induce the Purser to make such 
short-sighted financial decisions. Pepys justifies this statement to Coventry, by giving 
clear examples. 
Pepys describes how bread gains weight whilst it is being stored, therefore, the longer it 
is stored, the more its value would increase. For example, the purser is only paid 10 s 5d 
per cwt of bread where as the market value was 14s 7d per cwt of bread124. Therefore, it 
would benefit the Purser to receive the victuals in advance, so that he can have them sit 
and thus increase in value. Therefore, when the Purser is criticised for the tardy 
distribution of victuals it should be remember that if he doesn’t supply in the appropriate 
timely manner, is really a necessity that he is required to undertake and “is really to his 
[personal] damage” and then Pepys explains why there was a shortness of provisions in 
the fleet. This description of the Purser’s plight is empathetic, forgiving and a well-
reasoned appraisal. But, it does not shy away from addressing the wider problems facing 
the navy. Even though it would have been much easier to conform to the popular view 
and lay these wrong doings at the feet of the Purser.  
Pepys draws attention to another problem, associated with the under gauge of casks 
which should hold one hundred and eight gallons of beer, but generally do not hold above 
ninety-eight gallons. Pepys purposes that this is due to the under measurement 
performed by the victualler “to which the Purser is in no manner accessory”. The profit is 
the victuallers. The Purser is allowed thirty shillings per ton for beer, but with what is left 
 
124 Trease explains that CWT is the abbreviation for the historic unit of weights and mass; a hundred weight. 




behind with the victualler, as discussed above, he only receives twenty shillings (Pepys, 
1666, as cited in Latham and Matthews, 1971). 
Pepys makes an evocative statement regarding the Purser’s shortages, stating that “it is 
not the Purser’s corruption but necessity must be thought able to tempt him to such 
unthrifty ways of profit”.  Pepys explains that the Purser was spending his sea provisions 
in harbour, which were roughly one third more valuable than port provisions, thereby to 
spare his petty warrant125. The profit of this deal between the victualler and the Purser 
was five pence ‘ready money’. Thereby ensuring that the Purser can buy his provisions. 
Essentially, this means that the purser is forfeiting funds allocated to later in the voyage, 
in order to be able to adequately supply the ship whilst in port. However, the advantage 
of this ready money is negated by the fact that the Purser should have received six pence 
money, and thus, in order to ensure he received his money on time, he had to take a 
twenty percent loss (Pepys, 1666, as cited in Latham and Matthews, 1971). 
Sometimes the victualler even refuses him the allowance of a man’s daily victuals unless it 
was reduced to as low as four and a half pence. This situation would become so dire, that 
the King would be required to fix this by entering the ship into sea victuals “some days 
sooner”, therefore meaning the elevated rate per head for victuals by a third and as such 
raising the charge to His Majesty from 6p to 8p”. This is clearly problematic, not only is 
the Purser making a financial loss, but this system was also affecting the King’s treasure. 
Therefore, we can clearly see why there is debt, bad credit and arrears.  
 
125 A petty warrant is “the scale of victualling allowed in the British Navy during the 16th–18th centuries to 
ships' companies when in port, generally at about two-thirds the scale allowed at sea”. 
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780199205684.001.0001/acref-9780199205684-
e-1801 (Accessed on 20th September 2019) 
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Pepys also discusses the evidence for the over burdening of the Purser with additional 
tasks. For example, when making the requests of commanders to provide the necessary 
documentation for the processing of runaways, deaths or discharges, he was given the 
following response by many of them; “I can’t do it myself, but I’ll make my Purser do it”. 
This is clearly increasing the workload and burdening the Purser.  
When the Purser comes to pass his accounts, he would often find himself a debtor due to; 
his cask being cut up to be utilised by the carpenters, his being condemned for using 
greater quantities when his ship is unexpectedly sent to sea as well as his want of receipts 
from the victualler’s agents. This meant that the Purser increasingly had to waste time 
getting his accounts ready as well as collecting certificates and receipts. The Purser is 
continually treated in a tardy manner, with no consideration to the tasks he needs to 
complete in order to be remunerated.  
Additionally, victuals in a greater proportion were being found defective, when “the 
victualler either denies the owing, or delays it till better informed (as he pretends) of the 
reason of the defect”. Once again, we can see these clear examples of the Purser’s over 
burdening work load, as well increasing opportunities of him being personally made a 
debtor, due to the actions of others. 
Once again with all of this in consideration, Pepys empathetically attempts to make his 
colleagues understand the plight faced by the Purser. He states that they need to 




As stated earlier, this is an empathetic and novel view on the Purser. Historically, the 
Purser had been blamed or lampooned by the men of the fleet. One could argue that 
prior to proper investigation the failures in the system, such as the insufficient quantity 
and inadequate quality of victuals received by the men appear to be to the blame of the 
Purser. However, following Pepys’ thorough and extensive investigation we can see that 
that it would appear from the majority of the above examples that it is, in fact, the 
victuallers that are at fault. However, it is worth recognising that these are private 
companies, who have frequently been induced to extreme arrears by the debts accrued 
by the navy. Therefore, it is necessary for these contractors to ensure better terms to 
increase their profit and make such business worthwhile (Pepys, 1666, as cited in Latham 
and Matthews, 1971).  
Lastly, a letter dated 26th February 1667 written by Pepys to Coventry, indicates that his 
aforementioned enquiries relating to perquisites were relevant only to officers of the 
yard and not those aboard ships, for example Boatswains, Gunners and carpenters 
(Pepys, 1667, as cited in Further correspondence of Samuel Pepys, 1929). He makes the 
argument that Purser’s salaries are inadequate and lower that his colleagues, but with 
their potential for perquisites, their money was ample. He states that firstly, they have a 
servant, secondly, they can make profit on the Purser’s eight, they had a 12d per pound 
allocation from the slop seller as well as their private gain of selling tobacco and brandy 
“which in a moderate manner is indulged them”. When combined, he asserts that this is 
equitable to a healthy salary. Obviously, we can see from this source that although the 
perquisites were not completely eradicated, there was a compromise with the 
introduction of a partial salary. When comparing this source with the previous source, we 
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can see that a lot has changed in only a year, not least, Pepys’ attitude. It could be argued 
that the living standards of the Purser are significantly higher. 
Pepys then goes on to give another unforgiving statement regarding the fortunes of 
poorer Pursers.  
“The poverty, debauchery or ignorance of the man, the tyranny and charge able-ness of 
the captain and his table, or the loss arising by the charge of his necessaries (which 
hath been eased this war by the doubling of his necessary money) have not hindered, 
they may and do get a very fair livelihood” (Pepys, 1667, as cited in Further 
correspondence of Samuel Pepys, 1929).  
This statement appears to suggest that the situation of the purser had improved 
considerably over the course of the previous year and suggest that the problems the 
purser now encounters are from third party effects. It is worth noting here that Pepys is 
being somewhat contradictory because there are sources clearly stating that they are still 
being overcharged in this period.  
In an extract from Pepys’ diary126, he describes an encounter with a Purser, named 
Martin, whom he provides advice with regard to being cautious in his use of certain 
methods of obtaining income: 
“With high demands for supernumeraries of other things; for now, Sir W Penn is come 
to mind that business, the passing of his accounts will not be so easy as the last” 
(Pepys, 1667, as cited in Latham and Matthews, 1971). 
This excerpt is noteworthy because it demonstrates that the Navy Board are actively 
clamping down on poor accounting and inefficiencies, and provides an insight about both 
 
126 Dated, 5th March 1667. 
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Penn’s attitude and Pepys’ inclination to warn Pursers about their accounts. The tone of 
the extract does not elucidate whether this was a friendly warning or a professional 
warning, but either way it is indicative of a changing norm within the board. 
On the 7th November 1663, Pepys describes an altercation with Sir William Penn.  
“[They] had a word or two, where by opposing him in not being willing to excuse a 
mulct put upon the Purser of the James, absent from duty, he says by his business 
and order, he was mighty angry and went out of the office like an Asse 
discontented- at which I am never a whit sorry; I would not have [him] think that I 
dare not oppose him where I see reason and cause for it” (Pepys, 1663, as cited in 
Latham and Matthews, 1971).  
This is a particularly interesting extract because it shows that Pepys is fighting for 
efficiencies and the reduction of abuses, as goes with the clear focus of reforming the 
administration of the navy upon the restoration. Secondly it shows that, regardless of his 
colleague’s attitudes, Pepys is willing to make enemies to ensure protocol is being 
adhered to, and is indicative of a personal determination to achieve reform that goes 
beyond professional responsibility. 
Pepys writes to William Coventry lamenting the state of naval finances (Pepys, 1665, as 
cited in Further correspondence of Samuel Pepys, 1929)127. It is very telling within this 
source, that even though Pepys is frustrated at the dire state of naval debt, which is 
exasperated at the hands of the vendors, he is also empathetic and understanding of 
their plight. Pepys gave the example of a slop seller who is owed in excess of 16,000l from 
the King (a mammoth sum that Pepys is sure is actually more than the business is worth). 
Considering this, he is not lacking in understanding as to the reasons for the lack of trust 
 
127 Dated, 18th November, 1665. 
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and declining credit of the navy amongst vendors. He states that “I know now how to 
blame their not trusting us onwards”. This demonstrates a lack of continuity in Pepys’ 
opinions, when analysed in conjunction with the above excerpts from his investigations 
concerning the Purser. He indemnifies the Purser by blaming the vendors overpricing, 
whilst simultaneously exonerating the vendors by lambasting the financial situation which 
led them to the afore mentioned behaviour.   
 
7.5.2 Ill-discipline with the fleet 
 
Tanner also discusses the abuses within the navy, detailing the “unlimited number of 
captains built on the King’s ships” which resulted in sickness, neglect and drunken 
disorderly behaviour (Tanner, 1920, pp. 66-7). To counter this, on 16 October, 1673, rules 
were brought in enforcing numbers for cabins on each size ship. Additionally, Tanner 
describes the abuses associated with utilizing navy ships for the transferral of merchant 
goods. An example he highlights is documented by Slyngsbie, which enabled, through 
alleged confusion, the ability to also sell navy provisions. 
Pepys addressed this issue in 1674, by petitioning the King to deal severe punishment of 
those found guilty. The introduction of such punitive measures may be seen in an 
example that Pepys highlights from 1675, in which a guilty commander was offered “trial 
by court martial, or forfeiting the whole of his pay for the voyage, and ‘making good to 
the poor of the chest’ at Chatham out of his own purse the value of the freight of the 
merchants goods brought home by him” (Tanner, 1920, pp. 66-7).  
Another example of ill-discipline within the fleet can be seen in an entry in Pepys’ diaries, 
from the 21st July 1666, where he reflects upon the dismal state of disciple in the navy. 
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Following an enlightening conversation with Pett, whom was newly returned to town, 
Pepys is told of how “infinite the disorders are among the commanders and all officers of 
the fleet- no discipline- nothing but swearing and cursing, and everybody doing what they 
please; and the generals, understanding no better, suffer it, to the reproaching of this 
board” (Pepys, 1666, as cited in Latham and Matthews, 1971). According to this 
assessment, the ill-disciple is observed at all levels of seniority within the crew, not just 
amongst the most junior servicemen as one might expect, and demonstrates the 
requirements for introducing more stringent discipline from the top down. 
Another reference to ill-discipline is found within Pepys’ diary, in an extract dated 15th 
October 1666, in which he narrates a conversation with the Duke of Albermarle, whereby 
he was told that “all the commanders of the fleet and officers that are sober men do cry 
out upon their bad discipline, and the ruine that must fallow if it continues” (Pepys, 1666, 
as cited in Latham and Matthews, 1971). Similarly, in an entry from the 20th October 
1666, in conversation with Gauden he is told of the mismanagement of the fleet, which 
once again leads sober men to complain with which the Prince would reply “damn him! 
Do you fallow your orders, and that is enough for you”? Even though Gauden “hears of 
nothing but of swearing and drinking and whoring, and all manners of profaneness quite 
through the whole fleet” (Pepys, 1666, as cited in Latham and Matthews, 1971) 128.  
A comparable interaction occurred with Captain Guy who commanded the HMS 
Assurance, Guy tells Pepys on the 28th October of the same year that “he cries out of the 
discipline of the fleet, and confesses really that the true English valour we talk of is almost 
spent and worn out- few of the commanders doing what they should do, and he much 
 
128 Latham and Matthews assert that the prince in Question here is Prince Rupert. 
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fears we shall therefore be beaten the next year” (Pepys, 1666, as cited in Latham and 
Matthews, 1971). The following day Pepys met with Sir Thomas Teddiman, a captain, who 
also attempts to draw Pepys’ attention to the gravitas of the disorder and ill-discipline 
with the fleet, highlighting blame being to the Prince and Albermarle. 
Yet another conversation occurs on the 1st November 1666 with Coventry at Whitehall 
who “complains, and sees perfectly what I with grief do, and said it first himself to me: 
that all discipline is lost in the fleet, no order nor no command” (Pepys, 1666, as cited in 
Latham and Matthews, 1971). According to Pepys, both himself and Coventry both 
mutually decided to once again relay the state of affairs to the Duke of York, both for 
potential amendment but also to indemnify themselves from potential censure. Finally, in 
an extract dated 3rd February 1667, Pepys describes a conversation he had in an evening 
walk with Sir George Cartarett. Cartarett informs him that shortly the Duke of York will go 
to sea to join and command the fleet. Pepys states the following; 
He is “sorry for in respect to his person, but yet there is no person in condition to 
command the fleet, now the captains are frown so great, but him- it being impossible 
for anybody else but him to command any order or discipline among them” (Pepys, 
1667, as cited in Latham and Matthews, 1971).  
This is an interesting extract for multiple reasons. Firstly, it is a glowing commendation for 
the abilities and effectiveness of the Duke of York as a naval leader. But also, this 
appraisal of the situation is merely the opinion of Pepys. We do not know if this is the 
Duke of York’s rationale for wanting to command the fleet. If it is, it would demonstrate 
that the Duke of York has taken heed of the advice of Pepys and Coventry regarding the 
ill-discipline of the Navy.  
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Although all of the accounts outlined are from a single source, namely Pepys 
documenting his interactions with multiple contemporaries, we do gain a breadth of 
opinions on this matter, though these should perhaps be viewed through a Pepysian lens. 
Within October of 1666, we see through Pepys’ narrative, the opinions of Albermarle, 
Gauden, Captain Guy and William Coventry, whom all appear to be in unanimous 
agreement with Pepys’ assessment of the current situation with regard to discipline 
within the navy. However, it is worth questioning if these conversations merely arose 
because that is the issue that Pepys is currently focusing upon and as such if he is 
responsible for engaging each of the individuals in this specific topic, potentially through 
use of a leading line of conversation.  
When using the Latham and Matthews’ index companion to the Pepysian diaries, there 
are seven references to alleged lack of discipline within the fleet. The first is dated 21st 
July 1666 and the last is dated 3rd of February 1667 (Pepys, 1667, as cited in Latham and 
Matthews, 1971). Although this is a broad speculation based on one contemporary 
source, we can make a rough assumption that this eight-month period was potentially 
worse than the surrounding time period that comes under the remit of this research the 
lack of discipline. It could also be an argument that this would demonstrate why an 
updated set of instructions was published in 1667, as discussed in the Duke of York case 
study of this work. Obviously, there are references to problematic behaviours outside of 
this eight-month time period, however these are generally associated with abuses and 
negligence, whilst the lack of discipline described here specifically references people 
“doing what they please” as seen in the previous paragraph. However, it would be 
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prudent to consider that Pepys may have just been disproportionately engrossed in this 
topic at that time. 
It should be worth noting at this stage, exactly what Pepys considered ‘ill-disciplined’ and 
if this is in line with contemporary norms. Davies discusses Pepys attitudes towards ill-
discipline, especially in the context of drunkenness within the navy. Davies suggests that 
Pepys is somewhat hypocritical in his condemnation of this, because he ignores his own 
overindulgent drinking sessions. Additionally, because drunkenness was commonplace 
“prominent figures in the navy were inclined to tolerate it, provided an intoxicated sea-
officers did his duty in battle” (Davies, 1991, p. 49).129 
Finally, it is clear that Pepys’ mission to eradicate ill-discipline, as stated above, it is an 
example of the Duke of York ‘guiding [the] behaviour and establishing of standards within 
each role’, according to this research’s criteria for professionalisation.  
 
7.6 Changes to the victualling system 
 
The restoration government attempted to tackle the problem associated with bad 
victualling, in particular the poor quality of food supplied, through the appointment of 
Gauden (Wilcox, 1966, p. 119).  
Gauden held the post from 1660, and although he was deemed to be an effective 
administrator, a deficit of £425,933: 6s :8d of government allocated funds remained 
 
129 It is interesting that Davies is not the only historian to argue that Pepys is somewhat hypocritical in his 
condemnation of his contemporaries. Knights asserts that “Pepys’s simultaneous condemnation of corrupt 
behaviour in others and his justification or legitimisation of his own corrupt behaviour sheds interesting light 
on how corruption was defined and, in particular, on the uncertain boundaries between presents or gifts and 
bribery, and the similarly blurred boundaries of public and private interests.” (Knights, 2014, p.21) 
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unsecured by the end of his tenure (Wilcox, 1966, p. 119). This led to discontent amongst 
many within the fleet, who blamed Gauden as an individual instead of assessing 
Parliamentary grants and allowance. Pepys had a novel innovation to counter these 
issues, with the introduction of another new office, entitled ‘Surveyor-General of 
Victualling’. Wilcox suggests that being well researched in the administration of the navy, 
Pepys was inspired to introduce this new office in response to historic abuses, particularly 
during the reign of James I (Wilcox, 1966, p. 123).  
Pepys wrote to Coventry to initiate an investigation into the Surveyor General, five years 
after Gauden had taken up the post (IOHR, Vol 97, p. 13).130 Within this letter, Pepys 
states that it is his belief that this is the ‘proper juncture’ to present His Royal Highness 
with the present state of Mr Gauden’s affairs and asks Coventry to show this to the Duke 
of York along with Gauden’s objections and ‘take answer from him’. This source clearly 
demonstrates an active attempt at the reduction of abuses, and that Pepys monitored 
this position after installing it. However, Wilcox argues that Gauden tried his best within 
this position, but he did not receive payment from the government and as such, was 
unable to purchase the provisions he needed to supply the men (Wilcox, 1966, p. 119).  
Another change to the administration of the restoration navy, for which credit is 
attributed to Samuel Pepys, is the alterations to the victualling system. As can be seen in 
the above analysis of victualling and Pursers, there were many systematic errors that had 
been recognised and addressed by Coventry and Pepys. Therefore, in 1665 Pepys 
undertook a restructuring of the victualling system. He introduced a ‘Surveyor of 
 
130 Dated, January 27th 1665. 
 
270 
Victualling’, who was to hold office in each of the ports and held the authority to 
scrutinize the victualler’s accounts.  
Additionally, these ‘Surveyors of Victualling’ were to report each week to a centralised 
senior officer called the ‘Surveyor-General of Victualling’, for which Pepys himself 
volunteered (with the addition of a three-hundred-pound salary per annum) (Tanner, 
1920, p. 59). 131 Pepys describes his role in the following way; 
[Pepys] “Was the first that took the pains to bring the victualling contract to what it 
now is, and provided instructions to be added to the patent of the controller of the 
victualling, and the like to the controller of the stores and Treasurer of the navy and 
other commissioners. And observe how easily the same have been destroyed, and 
particularly by the order of council for by the Treasurer for the vacating of all of part of 
his” (Pepys, 1665, as cited in Samuel Pepys Naval Minutes, 1980, pp. 19-25).  
 This shows that the financial amendments to the instructions for the Navy Board, as 
discussed in the Duke of York case study, can potentially be attributed to Pepys. 
Obviously, Pepys can be somewhat self-aggrandising so it is unclear whether he was given 
assistance in this or not. As the editor of this compilation of ‘Sea Manuscripts’, Tanner has 
given additional information, in his footnote for this extract, where he asserts that there 
was an appointment of ‘Comptroller of the Stores’ until 1671 and suggests that “Pepys is 
probably referring to the improved contract of December 31 1677, for the drafting of 
which he was largely responsible, and not to his tenure of the office of Surveyor General 
of Victualling in 1665-67” (Pepys, 1667, as cited in Samuel Pepys Naval Minutes, 1980, pp. 
19-25).  
 
131 Tanner states that this was not a permanent post, and was meant to be held during war time only 




The primary evidence provides with an account of the diligence to which Pepys undertook 
his new role, though this evidence does, admittedly come principally from the account of 
Pepys himself (IOHR, VOL 97, 9)132. He states in a letter to Coventry that he has “from 
time to time been collecting, by different instruments (?) his r highnesses (?) lately 
established in the chief victualling postes”. He also notes that he has done this in 
corroboration with the late discourses on the victualling as they have discussed, 
indicating that the decision to introduce the new post was as a result of discourse with 
Coventry. This demonstrates that his enquiry actually bore the fruit of administrative 
reform and it wasn’t just a ‘box-ticking exercise’. After assessing the situation, Pepys 
found ways to actively counter the difficulties. He asks for advice and includes a 
comprehensive review of the ‘present state of the victualler’s stores”. As seen in figure 6 
below. 
 
Figure 6- A table which demonstrates the state of the victualler's stores (IOHR, Vol 97, p. 10). 
 
 
132 Dated, 26th January 1665. 
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Pepys provides comprehensive analysis of the data presented in figure 6, which is an 
excerpt from the Coventry Papers. He explains that all of the parts are critically under 
supplied, with the ports of London, Dover and Portsmouth having on 1/44th, 1/46th and 
1/70th, respectively of the amount of bread required to sustain the subsequent 4 months 
of service. Ipswich appeared to be the best supplied with bread, still having only half of 
the required amount. He further summaries the supply of Beer, pork, Pease, fish butter 
and corke, which yield similar unnerving results.  
A similarly comprehensive de-construction of the state of the victualling stores is seen 
elsewhere amongst Pepys’ correspondence, found in the Coventry Papers (IOHR, Volume 
97, 27)133. These sources demonstrate a number of important points. Firstly, it indicates 
that Pepys is diligently under taking his new role, suggesting his volunteering for the role 
was not simply an attempt to purloin an increased salary.  
Secondly, by examining the state of the victualler’s accounts he is actively contributing to 
the reduction of abuses within the Victualling Office. Finally, he is creating an accurate 
account of the present ‘State of the Navy’, in terms of what assets are held and what is 
required for the necessity of the service.  
The new system of victualling involved the allocation of “6d a man a day for ships in ‘petty 
warrant’ victuals in harbour, 8d for those at sea, and 8 3/4d for ships voyaging south of 
27°N” (Rodger, 2006, p.105). However, predictably, with the general lack of funds made 
available to the navy at this point, the office was not receiving its allocated funding in full.  
 
 
133 Dated, August 29th 1666. 
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7.7 Accounting procedures 
 
During the period of 1660 through to 1688, novel accounting procedures were introduced 
by Pepys. These changes can be observed through contemporary sources pertaining to 
the payment of men. One of the most prominent developments during the restoration 
administration was the application of numbering bills. Pepys explains to Coventry that 
before the previous June, when the vice chamberlain left town he suggested to the Navy 
Board regarding the introduction of the novel billing system and that he had received 
approval and begun to number passed bills (Pepys, 1665, as cited in Further 
correspondence of Samuel Pepys, 1929)134. As a result of this suggestion, Pepys began 
numbering passed bills. The problem was that the bills amounted to 20,000l per week, 
where as they were only allocated 2,500 l per week. Therefore, even with this novel 
system, which should aid in countering fraud and increasing efficiency. The Navy Board 
are yet again hindered by their lack of funds. 
“We have been very far from an ability to answer life and death payment, much less to 
offer at paying bills in course, which implies an income in some near proportion to the 
expense” (Pepys, 1665, as cited in Further correspondence of Samuel Pepys, 1929).  
Although this source does demonstrate the negative financial State of the Navy, it also 
highlights the introduction of the procedure to number all bills. This accounting method 
adds efficiency, but also reduces abuses by adding traceability to all transactions.  
In the same day, Pepys also wrote a letter for the attention of Cartarett, in which he 
explains that more time would be required to cost up what is due to the fleet. He goes on 
to state that he had enclosed a copy of payment of bills in course, from which they had 
 
134 Dated, 9th November 1665. 
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continued to number every bill that they sign. He does however, reiterate that despite 
the helpfulness of numbered billing, money is short and that despite asking the Lord 
Treasurer for 23,000l they had not received more than 11,500l in the preceding eleven 
weeks (Pepys, 1665, as cited in Further correspondence of Samuel Pepys, 1929)135.  
Pepys implores that it is impossible to pay what is owed with the amounts they are being 
given, when they owe five times what they are granted. 
“However, by the enclosed it appears plain enough that you had done your part in 
declaring your consent and a (?) That this method should be observed in payments, 
though my Lord Treasurer hath not enabled us to observe it” (Pepys, 1665, as cited in 
Further correspondence of Samuel Pepys, 1929). 
Pepys signs off the letter by asking for any alterations or additions Cartarett has on his 
instructions to victualling ports “and your opinion freely” on whether they will answer 
their problems”. This represents another source which clearly demonstrates the financial 
difficulty befallen the navy at this point, but also overall it shows a willingness to adapt 
and change, according to others’ expertise.  
Great detail can be found relating to the payment of bills in course through numbering, in 
a document accessed through the Pepysian Library, Cambridge (L/71/PLB/83)136. This 
vellum bound journal contains two separate documents on pages 118-22 and 122-5 which 
detail the procedure of payment of bills. The first is the Lord High Admiral’s instructions 
 
135 Dated, 9th November 1665. 
136 This document was acquired by the Pepysian Library in 1998. It is important to state this because Pepys 
donated his collection to the University of Cambridge under the strict codicil that his collection is to remain 
untouched, neither taken from or added to from the original 3,000 volumes. Knighton describes this as “the 
proper size for a private gentlemen’s library”. Therefore, the University of Cambridge has acquired a small 
collection of additional documents pertaining to Pepys, which it keeps alongside, but separate to the 
Pepysian collection. (Knighton, 2000, p. 148) 
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for the payment of Bills and Tickets, countersigned by William Coventry137. The second 
document is further instructions issued by the Lord High Admiral for the signing and 
paying of bills and tickets, again countersigned by William Coventry.138 Both of these 
documents demonstrate the painstaking efforts that were taken to implement a more 
efficient and proper accounting system for the paying of bills. 
As seen previously, this formalising of accounting procedures relating to the issuing and 
payment of bills could easily appear in any of the case studies in this thesis. However, this 
researcher has chosen to analyse it within the Samuel Pepys case study because of Pepys’ 
earlier work on the numbering of bills.  
The Duke of York explains that the issuing of the above instructions was stimulated by the 
ongoing war with the Dutch, which necessitated the speedy supply of provisions to the 
fleet. He addresses, as discussed earlier within this chapter, the detriment caused to the 
navy by declining credit; merchants set “exclusive rates to the King’s exceeding damage”. 
To answer this, the Lord High Admiral sets out fourteen rules. These include; temporal 
restrictions for delivering bills to merchants upon delivery of goods (four days), the dates 
when the clerks should present bills to the board (specifically stipulating that this is to 
ensure that “the merchant is not abused, or his payment postponed by [the] delay”), the 
correct order for payment of bills (“that the bills signed one day be entered before the 
next day’s bills”), that the bills should be signed each day and those exceeding twenty 
pounds should be numbered in the margin in words at length including the date of signing 
(with the same entered into the Comptroller’s book), foreign bills should be paid in 
 
137 Dated, 8th December, 1665. 
138 Dated, 26th December 1665. 
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priority over domestic bills, that seamen’s tickets, bills of pilotage should be paid without 
observation of time or order of payments and “their payments not be interpreted a 
breach of order” with the same applying for the bills of impressed men, procedures for 
the Treasurer dealing with his accounts for bills totalling more than twenty pounds 
(including a yearly schedule to be issued by the Treasurer to the Principal Officers), each 
Saturday a Breviate should be sent to the Treasurer by the Comptroller of all bills signed 
the week before139, with the breviate to contain the name of the person, to whom the bill 
is payable, the sum and the date with the number in the margin, with the Treasurer 
completing the same breviate for the Principal Officers, that the Comptroller receives an 
account from the auditors of the exchequer of what assignments or tallies have been 
assigned to the treasurer of the navy and finally, that all of His Majesty’s treasure should 
be paid into the treasury office to curtail any potential abuses. 
However, these instructions also stipulate that if a merchant is postponed in his journey 
or neglects to tender his bill, then his money should be reserved within the treasury and 
that “subsequent bills, to be paid in their course, as fast as [the] state of His Majesty’s 
treasury shall permit”. This system is in place to ensure that the payment of bills does not 
subsequently become disordered. 
This letter is then followed eighteen days later by a second letter from the Duke of York, 
in which he explains that he had only given basic advice in his preceding letter because 
the “introduction of too many new rules might obstruct other services until [the] practice 
of those then given being by use becomes easy”. However, the Principal Officers have 
 
139 A breviate is a short account or summary (according to Collins dictionary), although it does not appear to 
be a term commonly used in accounting today. 
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shown clear willingness to embrace these new regulations, as such the Lord High Admiral 
has seen fit to listen to their proposed amendments as well as his own additions to the 
previous instructions. 
This is a clear example of the dynamic and effective working pattern of the restoration 
administration. The Navy Board are seen to be embracing new challenges and responding 
with innovative ideas for improvement, of which is clearly being embraced by the 
leadership. 
Within his follow-up letter, the Lord High Admiral stipulates six amendments to the 
aforementioned set of rules. These include; his clarification over the confusion of whether 
it is twenty pounds and above or above twenty pounds, in which he states “I do declare 
my intention that they be paid with the smaller bills”. He responds that he does not 
expect tickets to be tendered every day because this is inefficient for the service and they 
should stipulate specific days each week for the tickets to be paid. 
James also explains within these instructions that the method of numbering bills was 
primarily implemented for the prevention of counterfeiting, as such they can make the 
choice of whether to use words at length or numeral letters. This statement is particularly 
enlightening, because it demonstrates that the reduction of abuses was the catalyst for 
the introduction of more formalised accounting procedures. 
 James also displays discretion within these instructions by declaring his acceptance that 
emergencies of poverty might require some variation of payment in course “being 
confident that you will put such a due value upon [the] observation of rules in matters of 
money, as not to depart from them but upon very good grounds”. Finally, James explicitly 
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stipulates that the last article from his previous letter “is not to be understood to prohibit 
the paying any merchants (who shall be willing to receive the same) by the assigning or 
transforming of any order of payment, upon the act of parliament, passed in the] last 
session of parliament according to the intent of those acts”. It could be argued that this 
final statement is demonstrating an attempt from the Lord High Admiral to thaw 
Parliamentary/Royalist relations by ensuring that he is not seen to be undermining 
Parliamentary authority by contradicting parliamentary legislation. 
Another accounting procedure was implemented to prevent fraudulent abuses. 
Historically, the Navy had been able to issue tickets without having the money to pay for 
them, which Tanner describes as having ‘disastrous results’ (Tanner, 1920, p. 54). During 
the Interregnum, counterfoils for tickets had been introduced, in order to prevent the 
fraudulent cashing of tickets. However, in 1667 the restoration administration took this 
further by issuing a set of intricate directives “for the examining and signing of tickets and 
comparing those with the counterfoils that were issued by the Navy Board to protect the 
office against fraud” (Tanner, 1920, p. 54). With both the introduction of these directives 
and the implementation of a numbering system for bills, we can see the active steps 
taken to reduce the opportunities for abuses, through the implantation of accounting 
procedures.  
7.7.1 The notion of a financial year  
  
It is noteworthy that within the primary sources cited in this case study, there are 
numerous instances in which the 25th March is mentioned as a notable date to use as the 
end of an accounting period. This is specifically seen in the following sources; ADM 
106/382/3, CO 96 p 13, ADM/106/381/114, CO 96 pp11-12 and ADM/106/382/43. 
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Specifically, it is observed that on several occasions, accounts detailing the breakdown of 
costs and arrears accumulated within an annual period be recorded and submitted from 
this date.  
  
There are discrepancies and inconsistencies with calendars throughout this period, due to 
overlap in the usage of the Gregorian and Julian calendars. At this time in England, the 
date of the 25th March was still commonly perceived to be the end of the year, in 
accordance with the Julian Calendar. This calendar, introduced by Julius Caesar, had been 
in use since 45 BC until it was largely superseded by the Gregorian calendar, which was 
introduced in 1582, again by its namesake; Pope Gregory XIII (Cheney & Jones, 2014, p. 
1).  
Theologically speaking, Lady Day (25th March) was viewed as the correct starting point for 
the beginning of the year. C. R Cheney & Michael Jones describe it in the following way 
“[the] correct starting point from a theological point of view of years reckoned from the 
incarnation. This was first used in the ninth and tenth centuries, but in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries it replaced reckoning from the nativity” (Cheney & Jones, 2004, p. 
12)  
They then state that countries across the continent eventually moved to view the 1st 
January as the beginning of their year. 
“from about the middle of the seventeenth century the practice of those continental 
countries, which had gone over to a year beginning with 1 January must have inevitably 
had had an effect on England. This influence was probably strengthened by English 
exiles abroad in the period of the commonwealth. 
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For official purposes, Englishmen continued till 1751 to use the old reckoning from 25 
March, but they were wavering in their allegiance and found it convenient to give a 
double indication for the period between 1st January and 24th March, we commonly 
meet this in the form 29 February 1675/6” (Cheney & Jones, 2004, p. 13) 
Cheney and Jones also highlight that Pepys reckoned his diary from 25th March, but 
always mentioned New Year’s Day on the 1st January (Cheney & Jones, 2004, p. 14). This 
demonstrates the internal public official conflict. 
One rationale for the two calendars being used simultaneously might be due to the 
polarising religious views of the time. According to Dutka; “The Gregorian revisions soon 
aroused vigorous opposition in protestant countries at the time, and even disquiet among 
many Catholics. But eventually (in some cases after several centuries), it came to be 
accepted by virtually all Christian churches” (Dutka, 1988, p. 56). As such, it seems likely 
that the Julian Calendar remained in common usage throughout protestant England due 
to opposition to the Papal reforms. Due to the use of the Julian calendar in this time 
period, the end of the year was seen as the 25th March ‘Old New Year’s Day’140.  
It has proven hard to ascertain when the notion of a ‘financial year’ was first used, 
especially in England. A Victorian Parliamentary research paper states that 
“comparatively little was known of the financial and other records of the United 
Kingdom”. It was not until parliamentary reports written in 1800 that rudimentary 
information was gained between William the conqueror and Henry VIII (HCP 366 XXXV.1, 
483, p. 332). Though this provides some limited enlightenment of the practices in use 
over that period, this still leaves knowledge of procedure in place during the reigns of the 
 
140 https://www.ebs.ltd.uk/news/why-does-the-uk-tax-year-end-on-5th-april/ accessed on 29.4.2018 
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later Tudor monarchs and the Stuarts in relative ‘darkness’. The afore mentioned report 
begins only in 1688, thus leaving the period between 1547 and 1688 under-researched, 
demonstrating a clear rationale for undertaking research into financial proceedings in this 
time period. The author of this source, was a financial officer of the exchequer, writing in 
the late Victorian era and created these reports based on accounts of net public income 
and expenditure between 1688 and 1800 from the yearly revenue books of the treasury 
(HCP 366 XXXV.1, 483, p. 3260). 
Within the Victorian accounts of public expenditure, we see casual references to the 
exchequer’s accounts for years ending 1668, 1687 and 1688. In each of these accounts, 
the author explains that it is worked out for year end, Lady Day of that year ((HCP 366 
XXXV.1, 483, p. 444). 
So, although this research has not enabled us to ascertain the first time a yearly cut off 
was given to accounts, but it maybe stated that Pepys and the Stuart naval administration 
were using it within procedures pertaining to naval accounting from 1660. This shows a 
significantly lacking area of accounting academia, with specifics being sorely neglected.  
The National Archives states that the Medieval financial records: in the form of pipe rolls 
from 1130-c1300, were recording with “The financial year ran from Michaelmas (29 
September) to the next Michaelmas. In the very early years the Exchequer’s terms were 
usually quite short, but by about 1220 the audit process usually began on the day 
following the closure of one financial year, and lasted between eight and ten months”141 
 
141 http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/help-with-your-research/research-guides/medieval-




“one particular class of record introduces a complication into the reckoning of English 
regnal years. The exchequer period of account, which closed at Michaelmas, cut across 
the regnal year.  
Therefore, to date their annual account-roll, the great roll of the pipe, the exchequer 
clerks reckoned according to the regnal year in which the accounts were either opened 
or closed” (Cheney &Jones, 2004, p. 22). 
The National Maritime Museum also has a folio of sources which potentially represent 
sources of evidence for a financial year (ADL/B/3). This folio includes 4 documents, all 
dating between 1672 and 1673 and signed by Pepys and other members of the Navy 
Board; which include three letters and one estimate for the building of a second-rate ship 
marked for the attention of Sir. T. Osbourne, the Treasurer of the navy.  
The first letter is sent from the Navy Office to Osbourne, signed by Pepys and with three 
illegible signatures. With regard to Osbourne, the letter states; 
“have sometyms mentioned, aswell at the board, as at our attendences on his 
roy[al] highness, severall proposals you had to make tending to the improvement 
of the methods hithero provided (whether those of the elder date by the Lord High 
Admiral, or them more lately established by His Majesty in council) for the orderly 
issuing of his treasure in the navy; and considering not only of how much moment 
and such improvement would be to his ma[jesty] and the credit of his service under 
the present difficulties we are contending with from the want of money but also 
that the old yeare being now newly closed it would be most seasonable, that the 
effects of y sais proposals may begin to (?) in the books we are providing for y 
yeare coming; we make it our earnest desire that you will at your first convenience 
bee pleased to let us see the result of any such, your observations and what shall 
there from think fit to propose to us by way of advise either in this particular or 
ought else wherein you conceive any part of the present methods of practise the 




This source provides a clear demonstration that the notion of providing a summary of the 
books for the financial year was in place by this time. In addition, it provides further 
evidence of the presence of established accounting procedure as well as the development 
and continuous improvement of administration by drawing upon the expertise of others. 
The second source contains another letter to Osbourne from Pepys, Tippetts and two 
other signatories and documents an estimate for the payment of tickets on board the 
HMS Antelope, HMS Resolution, HMS Castle (?) as well as others in port at Portsmouth. 
This letter estimates that the cost will amount to £2,500 and urges that this payment be 
made promptly because some of the ships in question are ready to leave port and sail 
again swiftly.  
The third letter is an estimate for the charge of building a ship which does not contain any 
relevant information pertaining to the implementation of accounting procedure. 
However, the final letter from this folio is of utmost importance, as it provides substantial 
clarification as to the status of naval credit at this time, as well as information pertaining 
to the personal characteristics of Pepys. This letter is dated the 19th May 1673 and begins 
by outlining the financial problems facing the navy. It provides an example of the water 
ships dispatching victuals for the fleet; “so much prest for by his highness and who 
(though fully loaden) does utterly refuse to sail, till they bee satisfied their first month’s 
freight by contract to be advanced them”. It also states that they need to hire and fit out 
ships and barges to load with hay, oats and other necessities for their upcoming 
expedition, explaining that the only way to achieve this is to gain the money for “the 
customer so long since assigned for payment for their stores taken up for setting forth the 
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present fleet” (ADL/B/3). Pepys explains that they need to have consideration for “the 
consequences w[hich] and such violation of the credit of their office would inevitably be 
attended with”. However, Pepys does highlight that Osbourne did previously promise to 
pay this within 8 to 10 days. This excerpt demonstrates the severe lack of credit and trust 
vendors are having with the navy, evidenced by the threats and actions to which they 
hold the navy accountable, which could severely hinder the navy’s current service.  
In contrast to this, a letter from Pepys addressed to Coventry details a visit made to 
Cartarett in which his financial transactions between January 1st 1664 and December 31st 
1665 were assessed (IOHR, Vol 97, p. 15). This is interesting since this financial 
assessment does not take place at the end of the financial year as is evidenced above, 
instead ending in December. Therefore, as this letter was written in February 19th 1665, it 
appears that Pepys was acting promptly in pursuit of receiving account books.  
In contrast, in a source documenting the Lord High Admiral’s instructions for the payment 
of Bills and Tickets, dated the 8th December 1665, this document states the following; 
“The Treasurer of the navy is hereby required to give to the principal officers and 
commissioners before the 1st day of January a list of schedule of all such bills exceeding 
the sum of twenty pounds, as he hath paid since his last accompt passed in that office 
which shall forthwith be marked paid in the margin of the comptroller’s books which 
being done the rest of the bills exceeding twenty pounds in the comptroller present or 
any of this former books” (L/71/PLB/83). 
This account indicates that although it appears that the 25th March was being 
predominantly used as the date to which accounts should be reckoned, this procedure 
may not have been uniformly used at this time, since this source suggests that in some 




The current literature and academic sources contain sparse references that specifically 
provide evidence or details as to when the concept of a ‘financial year’ was first 
introduced and in common usage. It appears to be something that is largely presumed to 
have been introduced at an earlier date and in common usage. Certainly, the evidence 
from a number of sources, that is well summarised by writers including Jones & Cheney 
amongst others, appears to indicate that the notion of a financial year was not new in the 
Stuart era. However, it is noteworthy that the navy, as an organisation, appears to be 
striving to attain conformity with standard practices of the time and to standardise 
procedures. Some evidence appears to indicate that, on occasion, the navy was ahead of 
the curve. 
 
7.8 State of the Navy 
 
The final theme running through the case studies conducted within this research is the 
notion of a ‘State of the Navy’. Which will now be discussed in the context of and from 
the perspective of Samuel Pepys. 
In a letter written from Pepys to the commissioners of the navy; Tippetts, Sotherne and 
Haddock, Pepys requests a “thorough state to be laid before them of y present condicion 
of the navy (through all y parts of it) in reference to mony w[ith] regard to y arrears 
contracted before y 25th March last” (ADM 106/382/3)142. This letter also includes Pepys 
documenting his recent promotion to the treasury.  
 
142 Dated, 14th January 1666/7. 
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Pepys explains that under the Duke of York’s command they are required to draw up a 
“clear and succinct” state of the general debt of the navy, once again reiterating that this 
is in the period running up to the 25th March last. Within the letter, it is emphasised that 
the rationale for conducting this thorough investigation is due to the growing size of the 
service. Further, he stipulates the urgency required for this task, as follows; 
 “this I am to pray you to cause immediately to be gone in hand w[ith] praying you also 
to allow me an opportunity of waiting on you at your office tomorrow morning for 
giving you any light you may have occasion of demanding from me in relation to this 
matter” (ADM 106/382/3).  
Pepys once again shows his administrative acumen by taking a personal vested interest in 
this task and not only sending a letter allocating it to the commissioners, but furthering 
this by giving up his own time to ensure that this task is undertaken effectively and 
properly.  
In another letter written to Coventry, Pepys writes providing him with an in-depth 
analysis of the differencing prices of commodities in peace and war time (shown in figure 
7), demonstrating his commitment to ensuring that he is acquainted with the current 
market price of commodities, as requested in the Duke of York’s instructions to the 
principal officers (IOHR, VOL 97, pp. 29-32)143. 
 












Figure 7- A table demonstrating Pepys taking an account of the 'states of the Navy' (IOHR, Volume 97, p. 30) 
 
This summary includes, amongst others, the prices for hemp, corkage, timber and plank. 
Pepys further breaks down the associated costs for each ship and fire ship, using 
Gauden’s accounts for further analysis. These sources demonstrate the effectiveness of 
active control mechanisms and shows how the strong implementation of accounting 
procedures helped in producing a ‘State of the Navy’ to assist in the reduction of abuses 
and increased efficiency in financial matters. 
Pepys’ research also creates a protocol for enlisting contractors to ensure that he and his 
colleagues remain well informed regarding the differing market prices of provisions to 
ensure that they are adequately educated as to what is a ‘fair price’ when seeking to 






7.9 Lieutenant’s exams 
 
Another change made by Pepys that is a potent example of reform that led to increased 
professionalisation in the navy, is the introduction of lieutenant’s exams. This is an area 
that is sparsely researched in the literature, but is highlighted by Mclean, in his PhD thesis 
associated with naval administration in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Mclean argues that the introduction of these exams is “the most significant professional 
development between the Restoration and the Glorious Revolution was the development 
of professional qualifications” (Mclean, 2017, p. 144). This research agrees with this 
notion, because it exemplifies clearly the third criterion for professionalisation, according 
to this research’s framework; ‘the necessity to undertake formal training or have 
achieved specific qualifications. 
Mclean states that these examinations were created in response to feedback from Vice-
Admiral John Narbrough regarding the inferiority of lieutenants serving in the fleet in 
1675. Pepys makes it clear that the introduction of these assessments was not just to 
increase competence, but also as an aid in the reduction of nepotism (Davies, 2017, 
p.144). 
Pepys submitted his proposals to the Admiralty board for an examination, which was 
subsequently approved for all except those whom would conduct the assessment. 
Despite Pepys’ preference to have Trinity House and the Navy Board conduct the 
assessment, it was subsequently agreed that they would be undertaken instead by a 
panel of flag officers and former captains. In 1678 “Pepys was able to report that the first 
batch of examinations had taken place, with four passes and one fail”, this greatly pleased 
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His Majesty because it showed the calibre of lieutenant’s expecting to progress within the 
navy (Davies, 2017, p. 146). 
In 1677, The Duke of York also sat on the Admiralty commission which mandated that all 
future candidates for a commission were required to gain a certificate obtained through 
examination and by recommendation from their captains outlining their ability and 
experience (Rodger, 2004).  
Mclean argues that Pepys is given ‘much credit’ for the implantation of these 
examinations (Mclean, 2017, p. 342). He references a 1677 order-in-council which 
demonstrates ‘that Parliament did not have a role in creating these professional 
definitions.” Davies describes the introduction of these examinations as Pepys’ “defining 
achievement” (Davies, 2007, p. 141). 
 
7.10 Administrative failings of Pepys 
 
Perhaps a problem that may be attributed to previous examinations of Pepys was the 
largely one-sided perspective regarding his supposedly infallible administrative prowess. 
The research undertaken here has gone some way to addressing this, by highlighting a 
number of examples of Pepys’ administrative failings. A letter written by Captain Watson 
serving on the HMS Phoenix for the attention of the principal officers is in reply to a 
reprimand from Pepys, rebuking him for not informing the nature of his wants (ADM 
106/292-111)144. However, Watson states that “I have wrote to you 3 letters this week 
and this is y 4th” once again stipulating that he needs a master. This source demonstrates 
that there is still lacking administrative procedures within the navy. It is possible that 
 
144 Dated, 12th December 1673. 
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Pepys had not received all three letters from Captain Watson, got confused and is writing 
to him even though he already received three letters from Watson this week, however 
this seems in itself unlikely. Which addresses the question as to why he hasn’t received 
them or why he hasn’t replied or noted them? Could this simply be argued that their 
inbound letter system is not effective? This does not seem the most plausible answer 
considering the abundance of inbound letter volumes retained by the national archives 
from the Navy Board in the late seventeenth century. Regardless of where you could 
apportion blame in this scenario, it clearly demonstrates that not all of the administrative 




The aim of this case study was to explore the contributions of Samuel Pepys in instigating 
management controls systems in order to move towards organisational professionalism. 
This case study has followed the previous chapters, detailing the contributions of the 
Duke of York and William Coventry. It has utilized the same methodology and framework 
for the archival data collection and subsequent analysis.  
This chapter has highlighted how Pepys introduced enquires into pursers and the 
victualling system, after these enquiries he instituted reforms to respond to the 
established abuses and corruption. 
Pepys was an innovative thinker, who managed to master the skills necessary for his post- 
even with limited experience upon his entry into office. His loyalty to the James, Duke of 
York and the navy shines through in his work. His task was not easy, considering the 
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turbulent political climate of restoration England, marked by a power struggle caused by 
fractured parliamentary-crown relations. Despite this, he managed to achieve great 
reform during his tenure. He entered into Parliament, enabling him to act as a ‘middle-
man’ between Parliament and the navy- a precedent that remained in place until 1830. 
He underwent enquiries into retrenchment, the Purser and victualling. Additionally, a 
clear theme throughout this thesis that promotes itself strongly through this case study is 
the reduction of abuses. Pepys made as concerted an effort as Coventry and the Duke of 
York to eradicate abuses and corruption. However, not only was he willing to identify 
these and inefficiencies, he was also sympathetic to the plight of the perpetrators and 
understanding of the circumstances that lead to these abuses rising, perhaps most 
notably observed in his examination of the pursers.  
Additionally, alike Coventry and the Duke of York, Pepys focused on the accurate 
implementation of accounting procedures into the protocol of the Navy Board. This 
included the notion of a financial year, and the system of numbering bills for enabling 
efficient and accurate payments. This is arguably a clear demonstration of his motivation 
during this time period to professionalise the navy. Numerous other examples also 
demonstrate this, notably his mission to professionalise the staffing on board the ships, as 
seen in his introduction of Lieutenant’s examinations. This was also seen with his dogged 
determination to address ill-discipline within the fleet. This is clearly displaying the 
metrics for implementing management control systems, which supports the research 
aims of this thesis, demonstrating that one of the three senior individuals explored as part 
of the biographical case studies, instigated management controls to support the Royal 
Navy in working towards organisational professionalisation in the late 17th century 
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However, Pepys was by no means a paradigm of virtue and there is ample evidence to 
indicate that he made dubious private financial gains from his endeavours and examples 
of administrative errors on his part. However, we can see through his own 
correspondence that he was an active champion of the navy, at times willing to sacrifice 
his own salary and profit to enable other payments and safeguard navy reputation. With 
the overall aim being to reduce the negative impact of declining credit on the public trust 
and confidence of the navy. He understood the necessity for this, due to his own 
examinations into contracts for victuals, which became widely inflated with the declining 
confidence in the navy.  
 
The next chapter will  
• Analyse these findings to establish the extent to which the management controls 
put in place are significant in the organisational professionalisation of the Royal 












Chapter Eight- Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to establish the extent to which attempts made by three 
senior individuals to instigate management controls were responsible for the 
organisational professionalisation of the Royal Navy in the late 17th century 
It has been suggested that Samuel Pepys was the “lynchpin of the Navy’s administration 
for almost the whole of the restoration era” (Knighton, 2004, p. 142). Focus has not been 
on the reformist efforts of just one individual, but has instead researched three key 
members of the restoration administration; it has attempted to rehabilitate the character 
of the Duke of York, it has drawn into the spotlight Samuel Pepys’ contemporary; William 
Coventry as well as, naturally, including an overview of the contributions of Samuel Pepys 
himself. 
One of the main findings of this research is the development of understanding relating to 
professionalisation. Previously, historians refer to developments in professionalisation as 
if they are singular events that occur in an ad hoc fashion. However, this thesis has 
demonstrated that instead, organisational professionalism is achieved through the 
implementation of management control systems. This is analysed further in 8.1 and 8.1.1. 
As stated in the research objectives, this was assessed through the scholarship of 3 
biographical case studies. One of the primary findings within these case studies has been 
the increase in understanding of William Coventry’s role within the naval administration. 
Previously, Coventry had been generally unacknowledged by historians, side-lined merely 
as the Duke of York’s secretary. The details of his duties had been poorly defined and 
were given no prominence. However, it swiftly became clear during the undertaking of 
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this research, that Coventry was in fact an influential and powerful figure in seventeenth 
century administration.  
 His signature is frequently found alongside those of the members of the Navy Board on 
various memoranda and correspondence (CO 96, pp. 6-9, 11-12 & 52). His inclusion 
within these letters demonstrates that he was not merely a secretary to the Duke of York, 
but also an active participant within the functions of the Navy Board itself. 
The analysis of these specific letters demonstrate clearly that his professional focus was 
financial administration. He undertook detailed dissections of naval expenditure and, in 
doing so, ascertained the contemporary needs of the service, whilst ensuring 
comparability with pre-restoration spending. We can see through the abundance of 
primary sources, in particular from his collection of papers from Longleat House, that 
Coventry educated himself thoroughly on the necessary statistics for an accurate financial 
understanding of the navy. These include the volume of ships, volume of men, and 
volume of senior officers on each ship as well as the supply requirements of each 
individual ship (CO98, pp. 146-160). There seems to be a distinct lack of paperwork 
relating to military tactics, training or any matters not pertaining to finances, within his 
personal collections. Therefore, this research reasons that retrenchment was plausibly 
the main focus of his employment. 
However, It is observed through entries within Pepys’ diaries that Coventry was also in 
charge of approving expenses for the Navy Board (Pepys, 1663, as cited in Latham and 
Matthews, 1971). Additionally, Pepys’ diaries provide examples of Coventry requesting 
updated states of the navy from each department on behalf of himself, as well as the 
Principal Officers, which he subsequently circulated for each member of the Navy Board 
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to sign. This evidence would suggest that he occupied a managerial or supervisory role 
within the department. 
This research has also managed to highlight five key themes that have arisen throughout 
each of the case studies in relation to the primary evidence; the introduction of 
accounting procedures, increased efficiency, and retrenchment, states of the navy and 
the reduction of abuses. These themes support the hypothesis that the time period of 
1660-1688 is a period of professionalisation for the Royal Navy, and each case study 
provides ample evidence that these activities were being undertaken during this period. 
The choice of themes for this investigation were selected after performing a systematic 
analysis of the reforms that were introduced in each edition of the Duke of York’s 
instructions and categorized according to the researcher’s perceived intention for 
implementing each reform, based upon a logical analysis of the potential impact of that 
reform. Subsequently, the ‘themes’ that appeared most frequently were selected as areas 
of focus for this research. Additionally, although retrenchment was not a theme that had 
proven to be a highlight in the Duke of York’s instructions, it was repeatedly 
demonstrated in William Coventry’s and Samuel Pepys’ case studies. As such, as an 
evolving research project, it was subsequently added to the thematic categories during 
the data collection process.  
The first prevalent theme that arose was the introduction of specific accounting practises. 
This is analysed in depth in the Duke of York’s case study, in which numerous instances of 
the introduction of novel accounting procedure are observed across his instructions for 
the duties of the officers of the navy. Updates to procedure are seen both within the 
generic instructions to the principal officers as well as the specific instructions for the 
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Treasurer, Comptroller, Clerk of the Acts, Comptroller of the Treasurer and the 
Storekeeper. These practises include; weekly invoices, ledgers, traceable warrants, 
returns charges, procedures for cataloguing expenses, auditing of accounts and protocol 
to follow when errors are found, accounts of impressed men - double verified by abating 
against accounts of those who have left service, historic accounts for consultation of 
precedent, daily logs, the requirement for counter signatories, accounts for conversion of 
stores and year end reports.  
What is also notable within the analysis of the Duke of York case study, is the additional 
letters sent throughout the tenure of the Duke, as Lord High Admiral, reminding the Navy 
Board to return their accounts and clarifying procedures. Thus, it can clearly be argued 
that accounting procedures were not simply implemented within his published 
instructions and then ignored but that he continued his focus on improving and updating 
practice throughout his tenure and was active in ensuring that they were effectively 
implemented. 
Analysis of sources pertaining to Coventry demonstrate that he too was using accounting 
procedures in the form of debt analysis to ensure that private companies are not 
overpaid (CSP. CXCIX). However, there is more evidence of accounting procedures within 
the Pepys case study. Pepys ensures that bills were assigned a numerical value upon 
receipt. This aided in efficiency, but it also served to act as a control mechanism to ensure 
abuses do not occur by safeguarding bills receiving duplicate payments (Pepys, 1665, as 
cited in Further correspondence of Samuel Pepys, 1929). 
We see within the collection of Coventry papers (CO 97, pp. 29-32) that Pepys utilized 
accounting procedures to reduce wastage. He achieved this by creating accounts of the 
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current state of the navy and expenditure both in peace and war time, as a control 
mechanism, he subsequently cross analysed his results with Gauden’s similar accounts. 
Within these accounts, he details the prices of all of the provisions required by the navy 
and then proceeds to utilise this data to create a list of the standard market pricing of 
provisions to ensure that overspending would be kept to a minimum.  
Perhaps the most compelling illustration of the implementation of more professional 
practice within the navy during this period are the endeavours observed, from all three of 
the studied men, to reduce the abuses that were prevalent within naval administration. 
Examples of such efforts are seen with significant frequency throughout all three case 
studies of this research. An early example is observed within the accompanying letters to 
the Duke of York’s instructions, which include evidence of his severe reprimands to the 
Principal Officers and his ordering them to seek out abuses and inform him of them. In 
these letters, he further explains that punishments should be given when employees have 
demonstrated that they have broken ‘the trust’. The use of punishments can also be seen 
in primary sources in the William Coventry case study, in which Coventry provides clear 
instruction for the punishment of embezzling Boatswains (CXCV.83).  
When analysing the Duke of York’s instructions this theme arose in each of the officer’s 
instructions, both in generic orders issued to the principal officers as a whole, as well as 
individual instructions to the Treasurer, Comptroller, Surveyor, Clerk of the Acts, 
Storekeepers and Clerk of the Cheque. The frequency of attempts to reduce abuses with 
the instructions is indicative of the gravitas placed upon the endeavour. Examples of the 
Duke of York’s attempts to reduce abuses range from the introduction of public meetings, 
control mechanism, dual counter signatures and the reduction of powers of junior 
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officers, which subsequently obligated them to undergo additional checks before certain 
tasks could be carried out, particularly where the tasks necessitated the spending of 
money. Examples of this are seen in the limitation of the power of the Clerk of the 
Cheque, who would have been required to ensure that warrants were signed by his fellow 
Principal Officers in order to allow him to recruit men. A similar method was 
implemented for the storekeeper in order to more stringently control the acquisition of 
provisions. 
Later, further examples of efforts to reduce abuses can also be deduced from the primary 
evidence. For example, there are numerous letters from Coventry that provide evidence 
that he frequently following up on orders issued for the discharging of men within 
dockyards whereupon he has previously been made aware that men have been allowed 
to linger unnecessarily in the employ of the service, and hence derive a wage from it. This 
is significant not only because it demonstrates an awareness these abuses, for which the 
original orders are being issued in an attempt to combat, but also that Coventry 
subsequently elected to follow up on these orders to ensure their fulfilment.  
Perhaps one of the more salient examples of an effort to reduce systematic abuses, 
occurs when Coventry sacrifices his personal profits in lieu of a salary to encourage, by 
example, the trend of opting for a fixed salary in preference to sinecures, of which should 
contribute to the reduction of abuses and over spending (MSS, XCVII, FOS, 119-21). 
Pepys’ diaries have been an incredible resource throughout this research in aiding the 
further understanding the reduction of abuses within this time period. Additionally, Pepys 
questions the nepotism associated with punishing abuses (Pepys, 1673, as cited in Samuel 
Pepys Naval Minutes, 1980, p. 49).  There are then various sources demonstrating his 
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attempts to use his office to reduce abuses in the future. These can be seen in his diary 
(6th October 1663), (24th July 1668), (13th September 1668), (12th February 1669), the 
Coventry papers and in records accessed from the National Archives; ADM/106/462/38, 
ADM 106/319/320. These sources explain how he examined and adjusted captains’ 
accounts, alerted the Duke of York to his fellow principal officers’ behaviour, undertook 
enquiries into behaviour with the dockyards and engaged in detailed discourse with the 
Duke of York to create new systems to highlight and curb abuses. 
Pepys’ diaries also provide insight into Coventry’s attitudes toward the reduction of 
abuses. In one example, Pepys gives an interesting description of Coventry’s diligence in a 
diary entry dated 7th-8th June. He explains that people were becoming fearful of 
submitting their expense requests for Coventry’s inspection because he “is resolved to do 
much good and to enquire into all the miscarriages of the office” (Pepys, 1662, as cited in 
Latham and Matthews, 1971). On 30th October 1662, Pepys explains that Coventry was 
displeased with Cartarett for not paying the victuallers money in the proper way, because 
he becomes frustrated when the officers are not doing “as they ought”. This 
demonstrates not only Coventry’s zeal for professional conduct and professionalism in 
ensuring the standardisation of roles, but it also highlights his personal zeal for ensuring 
professional conduct within the office. 
Though the evidence for the effective improvement of the efficiency within the navy 
during this time period appear to be somewhat sparser within the primary literature, 
these examples are none the less important. Within the main body of the Duke of York’s 
instructions, only the Treasurer is given specific instructions relating to improved 
efficiency, in which he is repeatedly warned of the necessity to undertake speedier 
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payments and to swiftly pass estimates so as not to ‘retard’ the service due to lack of 
funds. These instructions relate both to the finances needed for the current running of 
the navy as well as to injured men receiving financial support from the Chatham Chest. 
However, Coventry also demands increased efficiency for the request of victuals.  
In addition to these references within the Duke of York’s instructions, there are numerous 
examples of recommendations for increased efficiency throughout the correspondence of 
Samuel Pepys’, in particular regarding the making of payments for being benefit the 
service (CSP. XXVII.19, CO 96, pp. 6-9 & Pepys, 1665, as cited in Further correspondence 
of Samuel Pepys, 1929). Additional Letters also highlight how Pepys was focused upon 
making payments more efficient in 1686 as a form of retrenchment (ADM/106/381/114). 
This was because employed sailors could not be laid off until they had been paid and, 
therefore, though this represented a substantial burden for the navy, it was nevertheless 
financially prudent to make these payments as promptly as possible.  
Another prevalent theme that is addressed by this research is the recurrent notion of 
keeping a ‘state of the navy’. Within his own set of instructions, issued in his capacity as 
Lord High Admiral, the Duke of York is himself instructed to at all times be knowledgeable 
and able to give a perfect account of the current state of the navy, specifically in terms of 
the employees, ships, victuals and yards that constituted all of the assets and 
responsibilities of the service. 
Examples of this theme can be seen in the Principal Officer’s collective instructions as well 
as each of the individual instructions for; the Lord High Admiral, the Treasurer, the 
Comptroller, the Surveyor, the Clerk of the Cheque and the Master Shipwright. The ‘State 
of the navy’ can refer to the contents of dockyards, ships, stores, estimations of wages, 
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finances (be it ether quarterly or annually) or individual provisions such as timber and 
hemp. This data can then be turned into estimates of debt as well as estimates for the 
requirements for the following years of quantity of victuals, wages or finances which are 
required for the effective running of the navy. Coventry also requests states of the navy in 
reference to naval debt and financial expenditure (CSP, CCXII.50) (CO 96).  
The last and potentially clearest example of a theme that contributes to the 
professionalisation of the navy that arises most predominantly within the second case 
study of William Coventry is retrenchment. Numerous documents obtained from the 
Calendar of State Papers, as well as excerpts from Pepys’ diaries, provide clear evidence 
of Coventry’s attempts to retrench the navy. CSP CCXV.43, CSP CXVII.81, CSP CXLIX.35, 
CSP 136.485, CO 96.52, CO 98.166 and Pepys’ diary extracts dated; 8.8.1663, 13.7.1667 
and 9.8.1667. These sources include references to a number of novel ideas, apparently 
attributable to Coventry himself, such as the weighing of ships in the Medway to ensure 
accurate financial estimates; the repurposing of prize ships for new and economical ship 
construction;’ the requisitioning of ships by the navy; the expenditure analysis of fire 
ships to ensure they are economically viable military tactic and . Furthermore, Coventry 
implements other practical financial practices such as conducting analysis to ascertain the 
most cost-effective methods for accessing provisions, as well as the examination of debts 
and attempts to change regulation and policy, including the identification of the 




Pepys also demonstrates a keenness to undertake retrenchment. An example can be seen 
when he instructs a captain to reduce the compliment of men in peace time to ensure the 
service is not burdened financially by unnecessary expenditure (ADM 106/322/319).  
 
8.1 Professionalisation  
 
As discussed within the literature review, for the theoretical understanding of the term 
professionalisation, there are various key criteria that appear most frequently within the 
literature seeking an academic definition of the term. For the purposes of establishing the 
extent of professionalisation undertaken by the subjects of the three case studies, it was 
necessary to establish an entirely new framework of the criteria that most appropriately 
represent the term ‘professionalisation’. This is because previously established 
frameworks were typically too vague, or otherwise specifically tailored for other fields of 
research and, therefore, were not representative of the skillsets available to the 
seventeenth century naval administrators. The framework established by the methods 
employed here is summarised toward the end of the professionalisation literature review 
included in this work. 
The criteria are as follows: 
1. The occupation having permanence and full-time employment 
2. A formal pay system and salaries  
3. The necessity to undertake formal training or have achieved specific qualifications. 
(The literature does not agree on the level or type of qualification, disagreeing on 
whether it should be university level, vocational or apprenticeship) 
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4. The requirement of specific knowledge and expertise  
5. The understanding of a public perception or ‘status’ relating to an occupation and 
the need to uphold it.  
6. The guiding of behaviour and establishing of standards within each role.  
 
This research has taken examples collected in each of the case studies to demonstrate the 
activation of each professionalisation criteria. The first criterion is that the occupation 
should have permanence and full-time employment. Coleman and Davies both discuss 
the expansion of the dockyards in great depth and the permanence of this employment 
(Coleman, 1953, p.139 & Davies, 2017, p.3). Coleman asserts that employment had risen 
fivefold since the English Civil War and towns became reliant on the dockyards for 
employment. This was a reasonably novel concept for the seventeenth century. 
This can be seen within this research’s archival analysis. Inside the published instructions 
for the principal officers, we see that the Duke of York asserts that the Surveyor is 
allowed to delegate work to his ‘instruments’, which he claims to be in response to the 
rapid increase in naval business.  
However, it is also worth noting, that although the employment was permanent, it was 
not always seen as desirable work. This was due in part to the declining confidence in 
naval finances and as such the public lack of trust in payment. This demonstrates that this 
process is ongoing and the term professionalising instead of fully professionalised would 
be a fairer assessment of the given time period. 
The second criterion is that there should be a formal pay system and salaries. Specific 
examples can be seen when James introduced three new additional commissioners to the 
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Navy Board, all to be paid through salaries. Additionally, the Treasurer was moved over to 
salary payment in preference to his historic method of receiving fees and perquisites.  
James Personally involved himself with instituting a more formalised pay system, as seen 
through his official correspondence, which stipulated that impressed men should be 
awarded specific salaries (Ms Eng His. C 478/ fols. 216-7), as well as his personal 
involvement in incorporating a salary into the pay of the Judge Advocate of the fleet; John 
Fowler in 1662 (Stuart, J, 1662 as cited in Memoirs of the English Affairs, 1729). 
Lastly, we see that the pay system for the navy became more formalised during this 
period because contributions towards the payment of slops and towards the Chatham 
Chest were deducted from the men’s salaries prior to payment; a concept we are not 
unfamiliar with today. 
It would be a gross exaggeration to state that the pay system was fully formalised by 
1688. We can use the Purser as a case study alone to demonstrate this. The Purser 
remained only partially salaried and was not granted a full salary until 1840- well out of 
the timeframe of this research. However, seeing that Coventry personally offered to give 
up his potentially far more lucrative payment of profits, in exchange for a salary, 
demonstrates that it was clearly moving in the direction of more formalised payment 
(MSS X CVII, fos 119-21).  
Coventry offered this sacrifice, which was potentially less personally lucrative, to 
demonstrate that he was not partaking in fraudulent practices and to encourage his 
colleagues to do the same. In this action, we can see a movement towards 
professionalisation. It also demonstrates why Coventry was selected as a case study for 




The third criterion is that there is a necessity to undertake formal training or have 
achieved specific qualifications145. The most notable example of this is the distribution of 
the duties and regulations of the principal officers, as analysed in length within the first 
case study. This document is a detailed aid for employees, that ‘trains’ the staff, informing 
them of their duties as well as expectations, responsibilities and organisational 
procedures. Another example can be seen with the introduction of Lieutenant’s 
examinations, as introduced by Samuel Pepys.  
Finally, in a more informal approach, we can see examples of Coventry taking Pepys on 
inspections of the dockyards to look for abuses. Where applicable, this was then followed 
by instructions for re-training. This clearly demonstrates that a level of training and 
competence is both expected and routinely monitored by the principal officers. 
The fourth criterion is that there should be a requirement of specific knowledge and 
expertise. Arguably, this can be amalgamated with the previous criteria, because the 
same instructions that were issued by the Duke of York also demonstrate that there was a 
requirement within the navy, under the restoration administration, for a higher level of 
competency.  
This is demonstrated by the necessity for the principal officers to understand accounting 
procedures as well as the level of knowledge they need to hold on each department in 
order to be able to issue and ascertain the ‘states of the navy’.  
These instructions clearly detail exactly how each of the officers should conduct 
themselves and execute their offices of responsibility. It tells them what they need to 
 
145 The literature does not agree on the level or type of qualification, disagreeing on 
whether it should be university level, vocational or apprenticeship.  
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know, where to access the required information and how to utilise said information. This 
is clearly an example of requiring specific knowledge and expertise from the staff. 
Another example of this can be seen with the Duke of York’s new Navy Board that he 
created upon the restoration. The new Navy Board he created, with the exception of 
Pepys, was composed entirely of men of strong military and administrative experience, 
including previous sea captains and officials who had experience in their post. These 
offices were no longer recruited via nepotism, as was the normal practise prior to the 
restoration. This shows that there was an expectation of a level of expertise for 
recruitment which demonstrates professionalisation.  
The fifth criterion is that there is an understanding of a public perception or ‘status’ 
relating to an occupation and the need to uphold it. This can be seen when the Duke of 
York shows awareness in the issuing of his instructions for the necessity of enhancing 
public trust and confidence in the navy when he instructs the Treasurer to proceed with 
speedier payments to ensure that the respect of the trust of the office is upheld.  
Another interesting example of this criterion of professionalisation being observed in a 
source within the Coventry case study. Coventry recommends that the Navy 
Commissioners discharge a large quantity of men (CCXIX.40). This would in turn lead to 
employment within the navy once again becoming a desirable prospect and as such 
would increase order and obedience within the navy.  
Pepys also seemed to be increasingly aware of the importance of public trust and 
confidence in the navy. In a letter dated 17th October 1665, Pepys highlighted the 
necessity, when paying off the ships, to prioritise merchant men in the river. He suggests 
this because he believed that their discontent over the bad credit of the navy would 
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spread the quickest across the country by merchant men who were on the move, 
compares to stationary sailors in port. This would then affect both the credit and the 
morale of the sailors serving across the fleet (Pepys, 1665, as cited in Further 
correspondence of Samuel Pepys, 1929).  
Similarly, letters from Pepys and the Navy Board also demonstrate this. ADL/B/3 shows an 
example of Pepys describing how the naval finances were becoming stronger after such a 
long period of financial crisis. However, he states that they do not have enough to pay all 
of their upcoming commitments. To ensure that the public does not become aware of 
their return to debt, which would become detrimental to their ability to gain good credit, 
Pepys and the Navy Board decide to sacrifice their own salaries to ensure that this does 
not happen. This reveals the importance they placed upon public trust and confidence in 
the navy. This is not the only time Pepys has been willing to sacrifice his own salary, we 
also see another example of Pepys sacrificing his profits in to aid the payment of junior 
officers (Pepys, 1673, as cited in Samuel Pepys Naval Minutes, 1980, p. 41).  
Similarly, there is the notion of ‘enhancing the status of an occupation’. One finding from 
the case studies that could demonstrate this criterion can be seen with Pepys’ 
determination to enter a political career. B. MCL. Ranft and Davies both discuss in great 
depth Pepys’ entry into public office to act as a bridge between crown and Parliament 
(Ranft, 1952, p.369 & Davies, 2017, 369). A potential rationale for this, as theorised by 
Ranft is that Pepys wanted to be perceived as an ‘insider’ in Parliamentary circles instead 
of a defendant. So, when the Navy Board were brought in front of the House of Commons 
to answer for their conduct or financial expenditure, he would be perceived as an equal 
to the members of Parliament instead of a guilty party (Davies, 2017, p. 369). Therefore, 
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his ability to defend the navy in Parliament would mean that he was also defending the 
status of the occupation. 
Finally, the last criterion that is present within this thesis’ framework is ‘The guiding of 
behaviour and establishing of standards within each role’. This criterion is generally seen 
when the Duke of York published his set of instructions. As discussed in great detail within 
this thesis, these instructions detail the duties of the officers within the navy. They discuss 
the duties of the Principal Officers, with one of the most notable being, to ensure they are 
responsible for junior officers such as Clerks, Shipwrights and Gunners and that they are 
“honest, diligent and active in His Majesty’s service”. 
An additional example can be seen when the Duke of York commands the Navy Board the 
Navy Board to oversee their duties in a strict and diligent performance and expects that if 
they have found anyone to have broken this rule then they are “to expect the severest 
punishment that their offences shall deserve” (Stuart, 1662, as cited in Memoirs of the 
English Affairs, 1729). Finally, this criterion is particularly evident in Pepys’ diary in 1667, 
when Pepys strives ardently to reduce ill-discipline within the fleet (Pepys, 1667, as cited 
in Latham and Matthews, 1971). 
 
8.1.1 Management control and performance management 
 
As discussed within the professionalisation literature review in chapter three, this thesis 
has also detailed the early uses of performance management and management control 
between 1660-1688. Naturally, this terminology is not used by any of the contemporaries 
studied within the thesis, due to the terminology originating in the twentieth century. 
However, whilst analysing the archival evidence through all three case studies, there are 
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numerous examples of practices that display the metrics for performance management 
and management control. This research has taken place in response to the research 
objective; Analyse these findings to establish the extent to which the management 
controls put in place are significant in the organisational professionalisation of the Royal 
Navy in the later 17th century. 
For clarification, performance management comes under the umbrella term of 
management control. Performance management specifically details the supervision of an 
organization’s performance whereas management control is a broader term, including 
standard operating procedures, human resources and informal controls and 
organizational norms. 
This modern terminology is very rarely applied in a historical context, and has never 
previously been applied to the Royal Navy in the seventeenth century. However, this 
thesis has demonstrated numerous examples of management control and performance 
management in place during this time period. 
Firstly, we can see that the punishment of employees, in order to curb abuses, is a clear 
example of the imbedding of rewards systems. Of which,  Ferreira and Otley describe as 
not being just related to financial incentives, but also can be seen in the form of 
‘penalties’ for failures. An additional example can be seen with the self-reflective 
publication of the different discourses of the navy in 1659 and 1660 which demonstrate 
‘performance management systems change’. This displays an organization evaluating 
changes to pre-existing systems. 
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A very clear example that is seen numerous times throughout this thesis is the monitoring 
of purchase price data. It is made clear by Pepys and the Duke of York that it is important 
that measures are taken to ensure that fair market prices are paid without inflation 
caused due to tardy payments or declining credit. Additionally, we see examples of the 
naval administration monitoring the absenteeism by junior offices as well as staff within 
the dockyards via the clerk of the cheque and his muster books. The clerk is also 
responsible for overseeing wood chips in order to monitor the reduction of waste and 
excess. It is also clear that the changes to salaries and the movement towards 
standardised payment methods and away from sinecures and benefits is an example of 
monitoring salaries and benefits. 
Finally, we can see examples of the broader term; Management control through the 
overall publication of the Duke of York’s instructions. This publication which details duties 
and requirements can clearly be labelled as a ‘standard operating procedure’ as well as an 
example of information flows and organizational structure. 
This study did not rely solely upon one definition of management control or performance 
management. Instead it used Neely et Al (2005), Langsfield-Smith (1997) and Ferreira and 
Otley (2009). The above series of examples found within the data collection for this 
thesis, show examples which demonstrate differing criteria from of all the above leading 
academics. Therefore, it can be asserted for the first time, with confidence that there is 
strong evidence that the Royal Navy between 1660 and 1688 was implementing 
performance management and management control in order to move towards becoming 
a more professionalised body. 
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Additionally, as stated by Evetts, professionalisation and management control are not two 
concepts that should be treated separately (Evetts, 2009). Coventry, Pepys and the Duke 
of York all implemented managerialism, performance reviews, and standardized 
procedures, which are examples of management control, in order to work towards 
organizational professionalism. Therefore, this thesis has demonstrated that 
management control is a method of instituting professionalism within an organization.  
 
8.2 Earlier establishment of the Fiscal-Military state 
 
As described within the introduction of this thesis (section 1.4), it had previously been 
theorised by Brewer in 1989 and supported by Rodger in 2011 that the eighteenth 
century in Britain saw the beginning of what can be described as Britain becoming a 
‘fiscal-military state’. This is due to Britain becoming a ‘war making machine’ that has 
competent administrative procedures and can procure its own finances.  
Janžekovič (2020) stated that Venice was the first fiscal-military state in the seventeenth 
century for the following reasons; “Venice was a centralised state with a sophisticated 
administrative apparatus and an established standing fleet by at least the late-thirteenth 
century. Furthermore, it could rely on the Venetian Arsenal, a complex of shipyards and 
armouries” (Janžekovič, 2020, P. 184). 
Janžekovič gives a detailed historiographical overview of the concept of the fiscal-military 
state as coined by Brewer. He argues that the idea could not be described as distinctively 
British, as seen by his assertion on Venice above. Therefore, alike Janžekovič, who has 
questioned the concept of the fiscal-military state as being defined by Britain in the 18th 
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century. This thesis demonstrates clearly that there are elements of this concept earlier 
within the restoration navy between 1660-1688. 
Firstly, we have seen the improvement of administrative procedures and record keeping 
within this period evidenced within all three case studies. By using not only the Duke of 
York’s instructions for the duties of officers within the navy, but also  additional source 
material accessed showing how Pepys, Coventry and the Duke of York followed up on 
these instructions and ensured that employees within the navy were following 
administrative protocol including record keeping. The growth in record keeping in the 18th 
century was a factor in the definition of Britain being a ‘fiscal-military state’ (Brewer, 
1989, p. 14). 
Additionally, Pepys’ career also clearly demonstrates attempts at ensuring the smooth 
procurement of financing for the navy. We see numerous examples of him working hard 
to maintain good credit for the navy, including sacrificing his salary to ensure the future 
ability for the navy to receive credit for expenditure (IOHR, Vol 97, 15). 
Additionally, we see his introduction of numbered bills for payment in course, which were 
introduced to maintain the good credit of the navy to be able to secure future financing 
(Pepys, 1665, as cited in Further correspondence of Samuel Pepys, 1929). 
It could also be argued that Pepys’ political career as an MP helped support the 
procurement of financing for the navy and as such contributes to the concept of a ‘fiscal-
military state’. As discussed within section 7.3, Pepys joined parliament to be able to sway 
parliamentary opinion and maintain financing for the navy. This notion set a precedent 





The sources analysed within each of the case studies demonstrate a clear re-occurring 
and debilitating problem; the lack of financial support afforded to the navy, on top of the 
inherited debt from the commonwealth era. Pepys’ case study in particular focuses upon 
the crisis of naval finances during this period.  
Numerous sources contain letters detailing their financial situation (ADM/106/384/421, 
ADM/106/292/94B, ADM 106/332/319, ADM 106/383/87 & Pepys, 1665, as cited in 
Further correspondence of Samuel Pepys, 1929). This is compounded by the modern 
analysis undertaken in 1953 by Coleman, who ascertains that undesirable employment 
within dockyards was due to the unreliability of payment of men.  
This research also addressed the historiography relating to the characters of the Duke of 
York, William Coventry and Samuel Pepys. 
James, Duke of York is either seen as an able military commander and expert in naval 
matters or as an immoral philanderer who focused on entertaining and his private 
pursuits to a far greater degree than his professional life. This thesis disputes this notion. 
The Duke of York case study clearly demonstrates that he was hard working and capable. 
His love life is irrelevant to his professional conduct. This researcher does not deny the 
existence of scandal within his private life, but instead asserts that this does not diminish 
his capacity as a military leader 
Noted historian, Turner, declares that James’ ministers did most of his work. He theorises 
that James was merely a figurehead for authority. Tanner opposes this by stating that the 
Duke of York held great attention to naval detail. This researcher proposes that Turner’s 
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assertion is unfair, and additionally, this research demonstrated that Turner contradicts 
himself. Following his declaration that James’ minister did most of his work, he also states 
that in the context of the Second Dutch War, Turner observes that “James spent the 
whole of his days & the greater parts of his nights with that part of the fleet which were 
being equipped in the Thames” as well as spending time at Portsmouth and Chatham 
Dockyards (Turner, 1950, p.77).  
There is also debate regarding the character of William Coventry. The overwhelming 
consensus amongst historians is that William Coventry had superior administrative skills 
and was the mentor that guided Pepys through his early years in office. Shelley, Kohlman, 
Vale, Pool, Clarke and Pepys are all very complimentary of Coventry’s professional 
attributes (Shelley, 1939, p. 179, Kohlman, 2010, p.565, Vale, 2010, p.107, Pool, 1974 & 
Clarke, 1816, p. 433). In reality, only a few sources are overtly negative towards Coventry. 
One negative source is his contemporary peer Clarendon; of whom Vale has managed to 
debunk all of his allegations of professional misconduct and placed this conflict within the 
sphere of professional rivalry. However, Carlyle and Cruickshanks are far more severe in 
their assessment of Coventry’s character, seeing him as greedy and ill tempered (Carlyle, 
1912, p. 269 & Cruickshanks, 1954). This research concluded that the character depictions 
as noted by the Carlyle and Cruickshanks are unfair, due to the primary usage of 
Clarendon as a source. Of whom, as an adversary of Coventry, cannot be deemed to be 
impartial.  
 




Firstly, as discussed above, this research conducted a thorough literature review and 
created an original framework, that was subsequently used by this thesis, for the 
definition of professionalisation. Therefore, this thesis is responsible for the design of a 
new theoretical framework as well as the novel application of said framework against 
seventeenth century naval administration. This research has also definitively proven 
through the use of archival evidence that the Royal Navy between 1660 and 1688 was 
implementing performance management and management control in order to move 
towards organizational professionalism. These concepts are seldom applied outside of 
modern settings, and never before applied historically to the Royal Navy. 
This research has for the first time managed to ascertain what the professional role of 
Coventry was, demonstrating that even though he was not officially a member of the 
Navy Board and did not have any official job profile disseminated during his tenure, his 
role was strikingly similar to his Navy Board colleagues. He was clearly working alongside 
the Principal Officers and treated as a peer. The abundance of primary source analysed 
within this research proposes that he was primarily financially focused, working towards 
retrenchment within the navy.  
The main literature that existed prior to this thesis included Lee and Kelsey, Cruickshanks 
and Vale (Lee and Kelsey, 2004, Cruickshanks, 1954 & Vale, 1956). Lee and Kelsey and 
Cruickshanks both gave general accounts of Coventry’s life, of which their accounts of his 
professional life read like a Curriculum Vitae. They explain what official titles he held and 
when, with some extra details like what committees he sat on and those that he chaired. 
Vale’s work goes even further, explaining that “it fell to Coventry to execute the wide and 
ill-defined range of business connected with the ancient prerogatives of that office” (Vale, 
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1956). However, he also gave general statements, explaining what Coventry was 
responsible for; employment appointments, the dispensing of justice, the movement of 
ships and traditional Admiralty jurisdiction. This thesis, for the first time, analyses 
Coventry’s role with technical minutiae. It specifically details the duties he was 
responsible, using archival evidence to demonstrate examples of the remit of his 
professional responsibility.  
Additionally, prior to this research, no in-depth analysis had taken place into the 
instructions issued by the Duke of York during his tenure as Lord High Admiral. This 
research has transcribed multiple editions of these instructions and tracked changes 
across the time period. In turn, this research has highlighted the entirely financially 
focused changes that were implemented by the Duke of York.  
Moreover, alongside the transcription of the earlier version by the Earl of 
Northumberland, this research has, for the first time, managed to ascertain which 
sections were copied from Northumberland’s version and which were the addition of the 
Duke of York and his team. Again, all additions to Northumberland’s original instructions 
were accounting and financially focused, showing the evolving and changing focus of 
naval administration in the seventeenth century. As far as this researcher is aware, no 
analysis of the Northumberland instructions has taken place previously, it is only their 
existence that has been briefly referenced.  
Prior to this thesis, the literature that analysed these instructions included Coats and 
Pool, (Coats, 2000 & Pool, 1996). As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, Coats’ 
research constituted only a broad discussion of some of the larger changes introduced 
with these instructions. It is a brief reference and not the primary focus of her work. 
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Additionally, Pool included some references to Navy Board contract regulation between 
the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, but again, doesn’t analyse the minutiae or the 
rest of the instructions (Coats, 2000 & Pool, 1996). Whereas this thesis is the first full 
analysis of the instructions in their entirety, in addition, the first analysis of these 
instructions with the new framework for professionalisation.  
Next, through the analysis of the Pepys case study, this thesis has undertaken novel 
research regarding the implementation of a financial year. Initially, this research struggled 
to find definitive descriptions within academia of when the financial year was first used. It 
appears to be a concept that is pre-supposed by scholars and as such has not received 
any academic attention. 
However, using Jones & Cheney amongst others, this research has been able to ascertain 
that the notion of a financial year, was not new in the Stuart era. However, it is still 
noteworthy. This research has shown, for the first time, that the seventeenth century 
Royal Navy were conforming to a formalised financial structure, attempting to 
standardise their procedures as well as showing that occasionally they were ahead of the 
curve, through the use of January as a month to reckon themselves financially. 
Additionally, upon reflection of the literature relating to the characters of the Duke of 
York and William Coventry, this thesis summarised the current historiographical debates 
and entered its own conclusions. Prior to this research, there were contradicting sources 
which argues the two different sides to the Duke of York’s personality. Was he Scandalous 
and workshy? Or, was he a diligent and attentive naval leader and administrator? 
Additionally, there is a historiographical debate surrounding Coventry’s character, was he 
a beloved, effective, capable and hardworking member of the restoration naval 
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administration? Or, was he ill-tempered and unpopular? This research has supplemented 
the current academic arguments and reached its own conclusions. There is a wealth of 
primary evidence, from state papers, memorandums and diary extracts which detail the 
diligence to which the Duke of York approached his office. Therefore, this research argues 
that his private life is irrelevant to the topic, due to his effectiveness as a naval leader. 
In a similar way, this researched assessed the negative depictions of Coventry, and saw 
that it was primarily undertaken using Clarendon as a source. The bias of so heavily 
utilising Coventry’s adversary, in the opinion of this researcher, weakens their argument. 
Whilst analysing all three case studies alongside one another with the criteria for 
professionalisation in mind, we can show clear and succinct examples of the restoration 
administration achieving most of the hall marks of what an organisation needs to be 
professionalised. As the literature defining professionalisation states; for 
professionalisation to occur, an organisation needs to be moving towards becoming a 
professional model. There is no expectation that this should be fully achieved by the end 
of this research’s given time period. As such, even though the navy was still struggling 
financially, this research can clearly state that the restoration was professionalising 
between 1660 and 1688. 
Finally, Funnell and Chwastiak wrote a special edition editorial of the ‘Accounting History’ 
focusing on reminding “us of these arresting features of the military and, thereby, to 
highlight the rich opportunities for research into matters that are of critical importance to 
individuals and to nations” (Funnell and Chwastiak, 2010, p.147). They discuss how 
military force is the driving force behind ‘social and political stability’, particularly focusing 
on the English Civil War, with military forces determining who retained political power in 
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England “Most especially, never again would the Crown be allowed to control the means 
to finance an army” (Funnell and Chwastiak, 2010, p.148 ). In turn, due to the expanding 
reach of the powerful British Empire, this had geographically far reaching consequences/ 
influence. 
Naturally this led to power struggles between the army and state, with the quest for 
security juxtaposed with lacking efficiency due to financial crisis. Interestingly, Funnell 
and Chwastiak discuss this in relation to the army from the 18th century, however, this 
research clearly shows this is also a prevalent factor in the Navy in the 17th century. 
Showing, why this research is important because it is expanding the pre-existing literature 
and knowledge. Funnel and Chwastiak then both state the following;  
“In contrast to the army, the navy was not seen to represent a constitutional threat. It 
had never imperilled parliament or the Nation’s liberty. Thus, accounting for naval 
spending assumed far less constitutional importance than that of the army, the navy 
escaping many of the constitutional and financial controls deemed necessary for the 
army. National caution in dealings with the army and Britain’s insular geographical 
position ensured the navy’s standing as the pre-eminent service, carrying not only the 
great bulk of the responsibility for defence but also the nation’s affection. With the 
navy as the first line of defence it was upon the navy that any defence expenditure 
must be lavished. Throughout the nineteenth century and into the first decades of the 
twentieth century the navy and its needs which had long dominated” (Funnell and 
Chwastiak, p.148).  
Although this may be true later, this thesis has proven that the constitutional battle 
between crown and parliament regarding naval finances was strong in the seventeenth 
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century. Therefore, this research has all challenged pre-existing historical timescales for 
political tensions. 
 
8.5 Implications for future research/recommendations 
 
Naturally, whilst undertaking any sizeable research project, researchers frequently have 
to neglect avenues of enquiry. Without this, a PhD would necessitate numerous volumes 
and be unattainable in the given time parameters. The clearest avenue that has not been 
followed by this thesis, is the role of King Charles II in the restoration administration. 
Charles II would benefit from an individual research project, undertaken with a similar 
historiographical enquiry as the Duke of York. Because, alike the Duke of York, he is often 
praised as being expert in naval matters. But the extent of his involvement is largely 
unaddressed, in favour of his personal life. Whilst preliminary enquiries were made into 
his involvement, it was found that within the currently literature, reference to his naval 
professional responsibilities was far too sparse and as such would necessitate significant 
archival enquiry. Therefore, when this thesis was selecting case studies, the researcher 
chose to pursue Coventry, Pepys and the Duke of York because they were the most 
logically connected individuals. This was because the primary evidence displays that they 
worked together closely, whereas Charles II was far more detached from Coventry and 
Pepys than the Duke of York was. 
Additionally, in order to focus on the new data relating to professionalisation, this thesis 
chose to only briefly analyse the life of Samuel Pepys. Unlike Coventry, as one of the most 
popular names associated with seventeenth century England, there is already an 
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abundance of literature relating to his life. This thesis chose not to pursue all of these 
avenues, in particular this research did not explore Pepys’ private life. Although this is 
undoubtably an interesting topic, it is already the topic of many research papers, and it 
was felt that approaching this area would cause the thesis to go too far off topic.  
Therefore, these un-explored avenues would lead to exciting future research projects. 
Additionally, not only would an advanced analysis of the role of Charles II in 
professionalising the Royal Navy constitute an exciting subsequent research project, but it 
would benefit from receiving the application of the original professionalisation 
framework, as conceptualised by this researcher and applied to this research. 
Additionally, this frame could be applied to other time periods relating to naval history, 
for example the era in which the Earl of Northumberland’s instructions were issued 
before the English Civil War. 
Finally, this research has been applying modern terminology to historical concepts. 
Previously, it was felt that concepts such as management control were new and relevant 
only in a contemporary context. Therefore, future research could explore this in different 
historical organizations (or current organizations but in a different time period) or within 
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Appendix Four- NVIVO stills 
 
 
Figure 10- A screen shot taken from NVIVO demonstrating the use of Nodes 
 
 





Appendix Five- A table demonstrating the Royal Navy vessels in commission 
each year, specifying what rate of ship (1559-1602) 
 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
1559 - - - 2 4 - 
1560 - - - - - - 
1561 - - 1 1 2 - 
1562 - 2 4 1 5 - 
1563 2 1 9 1 7 4 
1564 - - 1 2 3 1 
1565 - - - 2 - - 
1566 - - - 1 2 - 
1567 - 1 - 1 1 - 
1568 - - 2 1 1 - 
1569 - 3 4 2 2 - 
1570 - 3 3 3 2 - 
1571 - - - 2 1 - 
1572 - - - 3 2 - 
1573 - 1 1 3 1 - 
1574 - - - 2 1 - 
1575 - - - 2 1 - 
1576 - 1 3 2 2 1 
1577 - 1 2 2 - - 
1578 - 2 3 1 - - 
1579 - 1 3 3 1 - 
1580 - 1 6 2 1 - 
1581 - - 2 5 1 - 
1582 - - 1 2 1 - 
1583 - - - 2 1 1 
1584 - - - 2 1 1 
1585 - 1 2 4 - - 
1586 - 3 1 4 1 7 
1587 - 3 3 5 3 6 
1588 5 10 5 3 7 3 
1589 - 4 2 4 2 4 
1590 - 8 4 6 2 5 
1591 - 8 4 2 2 4 
1592 - 2 4 2 2 3 
1593 - 1 3 2 2 2 
1594 - 1 3 1 1 4 
1595 - 4 4 1 2 3 
1596 4 9 5 3 2 1 
1597 6 11 6 1 2 2 
1598 - 5 5 2 2 4 
1599 6 10 6 2 2 7 
1600 2 2 5 1 1 5 
1601 2 11 3 1 2 3 
Table 11- A table, taken from Oppenheim, demonstrating the Royal Navy vessels in commission each year, 
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